
PLATE I



[*Front.*

The Milinda-Questions

An Inquiry into its Place in the History of Buddhism with a Theory as to its Author

By
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THE MILINDA QUESTIONS

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To

"MĀṆAVA"

Editor and Author

of the Books known as

MILINDA-PAÑHA

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p. 161, l. 24,	*read* on the religious mentality.
p. 163, l. 12,	*read* emergence.

I have here, as elsewhere, used the old Indian name for Buddhism with the dental and not the palatal *S*: Sakya, as in the Pali Suttas, and not as in the Sanskrit: Śākya-muni, etc. So also for Asoka, not Aśoka. This may pain my learned Sanskritist friends, for which I am sorry. I have grazed in a different pasture, but am really indifferent as to either usage.

The Anglicizing of *anattā* to *anatta*, dropping the accent as in Nirvana, is perhaps less justifiable; *anattan* had been more correct, save that it is as little used as is Nibbāna, or Nirvāṇa.

There is a wavering in the spelling of Si{n/m}(g)halese. Which is it ultimately to be? Not, I trust, Cingalese!

The " survey " desiderated on p. 9 has been actually compiled since 1930 by Dr. Siegfried Behrsing of Leipzig, but the means of publishing it are alas! yet to be found.

PREFACE

ALL we, who are inquiring into, or are just interested in the historical study of Sakya, now called Buddhism, are in a way, whether we like to think so or not, the heirs of the work of Rhys Davids. It is as one of these heirs, that I have here tried to exploit and develop the heritage he left us. One of his unrealized wishes, he wrote, had been to " discuss the doctrines of the author of the Pali book *Milinda-pañha* ",—which he translated for Max Müller's series: Sacred Books of the East,—" comparing his standpoint with that of the earliest Buddhists, set out in the four great Nikāyas, with that of the later books contained in the Piṭakas, and with that of still later works not included in the canon at all." These words, taken from his introduction to the second volume of the translation, are dated 1894.

I do not think, considering the extent to which the materials to which he referred were still practically inaccessible, that the time for such a discussion was yet ripe. The non-appearance of any such mature historical discussion of the ideas in the work since that date goes far to show I speak truly. The works on the Milindapañha, published since that date, which have come to my ken are only four, and not one of the authors was in a position to do more than to deal quite superficially with the history of the ideas in it. These works are Garbe's essay " Der Milindapañha, ein kulturhistorischer Roman ", of 44

(small) pages in the little volume *Indische Kulturgeschichte* (Tübingen, 1903), nearly one-third of which is devoted to an account of the external conditions under which the book was produced, or at least begun. The second is a tenuous work by Dr. F. Otto Schrader, *Die Fragen des König Menandros* (Berlin, 1903), being a translation of only the greater part of the first 89 pages of the text, i.e. of the Conversations and the (late) introduction. Here " discussion of the ideas " is practically limited to detached footnotes, as it were in a teacher's commentary, a way which certainly permits of many good *aperçus*, but precludes effective general considerations. These are confined to an introduction on the accompanying and external historical conditions, together with a genetic theory of the compilation, with which I shall show only partial agreement. The third is a description, occupying 7 pages only, in Dr. M. Winternitz's *Geschichte der Indischen Litteratur* (vol. 2, Leipzig, 1920), of which a revised English translation, to be issued in India, is now forthcoming. The fourth is a complete translation into German by a neo-Buddhist resident in Ceylon, who is a monk in the Buddhist Order, and has taken the name of Nyanatiloka. Here is again an appended commentary, consisting largely of sagacious criticism of previous renderings in this or that word or phrase. But there is no attempt at historical consideration of the ideas. Indeed in two ways he has made that impossible. He has so far " edited " his text as " to make it as pleasant as possible for collective German readers ", expressly avoiding " the disturbing purely scientific remarks in the text ", so as " to give them Buddhist truths in simple form

and easily intelligible style ". This for the home of Kultur! In the second place, as Buddhist monk, he has taken " Buddhist truths " to his bosom as the truth without a history. He has forfeited the vision to see, or to try to see that history, and the freedom to discuss it. But it is just that history of those ideas which Rhys Davids held, and I after him hold, to be needing discussion. The external history of the epoch in which our book took birth has been well discussed. It is with the history of ideas that I am alone concerned. And it is with the advance of those ideas as *betrayed*, rather than as consciously disclosed, in the book, that I am chiefly concerned. There is no man in it of creative genius uttering the New Word. But there is plenty to indicate either maintenance of the old, or altered emphasis in the old, or seeking after the new.

I have shown that, in the works just enumerated, there was no scope for doing justice to all that we may find of historical interest in the changes which had come, and which were coming over " Buddhism ". I have here tried to indicate some of these changes, yet it is a very tentative effort, and there is much more that might be said. If I shall have helped to set inquirers in the way the better to realize, how well and truly " Buddhism " exemplifies its doctrine of " All things are impermanent " in its own history, and that not from a late date, but from the First Utterance of its message on the Way of man's life, I shall have proved myself not an unworthy pupil of my good teacher.

Chiefly should I be glad to think I had checked the tendency to eke out exposition of the original " Sakya "

teaching by the aid of the Milindapañha. It has been done—I too have sinned—it is still done. It should not be done. Historical perspective should forbid the explaining of the older by the younger. To use a Sakyan simile, if in a new way :—To take up the study of the history of a religion is like embarking on a great river. The Will in nature started it in the hills, bound for some greater water below ; the main current in midstream holds on its goalward way ; the shore-hugging waters are retarded by the particular, the accidental features of this or that reach of the river-bed ; depositing matter in creek and bend, and, it may be, becoming seemingly stagnant. And men, forgetting the mighty tide in the midst, judge there has been little or no change, and that the shore-clinging waters represent what the river was mandated to bear seawards. Even so has it been with Buddhism. The source in the Sakyan hills that started with the message of man's will and man's becoming by use of that will, figured (for want of a better word) by wayfaring through the worlds to way's end, went on reverberating :—Magga, Magga—all down the history of the teaching. But that this was the main stream became obscured, and much water went astray here and astray there.

And nowhere did it go worse astray than when the man, the wayfarer, came to be deemed, as willer, as chooser, as becomer, to be ultimately a *fiction*. No message from a Will supreme could have been one so to worsen the man, the man's nature and what, in the Way—that is, by using will and, as we say, conscience—he might as wayfarer become, and whither he might finally attain. It is into a side-creek of this

nature that Sakya was being ever more drawn, when the Milinda was compiled. It is, as I shall show, not the only change in the teaching we meet with, but it is the one which the book starts by flinging at us—flings at us falsely as coming straight from the Source. And as such, both Asia and Europe are as yet content to value it.

We need to form a worthier conception of what is the very essence of any great religion than this. For the Founder of Sakya, the Way implied the presence of the Wayfarer. The wayfarer is the one great reality about the Way. He, the very man, the man-in-man, cannot be evaded, much less ruled out; he cannot be made to peter out either as just body or as just mind (that is, minding). In this book we witness the vogue which had grown up of seeing man's very nature as only to be "got at" in terms of *dhammas* (states or qualities). We are, in our own world, our own time, in very much the same side-creek. It is therefore harder for us to get a perspective of the side-tracking which had come over Sakyan India, and which, though India shook it off, has persisted in daughter churches to this day. Not till we reinstate the man, very real, very true, in our religious values, our psychological values, reinstate him, her, more worthily than we ever did, shall we see that for a world religion to teach "the man" as less, and not the man as shown to be both actually and potentially more, is unthinkable.

My inquiry is not concerned with the production of the text printed in Roman letter, the excellent work

of the gifted Dane, V. Trenckner. Yet I would remind the reader that we are now coming to the Jubilee year of its issue: 1880; and further, that whereas in slow permeation of the world of Oriental studies, it was not far short of taking those 50 years to be exhausted, the original edition has now, at the petition of the Pali Text Society, and by the enterprise of the Trustees of the Forlong Trust, notably of Sir E. Denison Ross, been photographically reprinted.[1] An Index, the lack of which had long been a hindrance to research, was compiled by Mr. C. J. Rylands, M.A., and by it my own work has been much facilitated.

Finally I am sorry if to have dared to give the quite unknown author and editor a name be reckoned as a thing unfit. Māṇava does but mean (*a*) in poetry "man", (*b*) in prose "young brahman". I have here seen not many hands at work (discounting the "frame work" and interpolations), but one pair only. And for me my man is real and alive, and hence, in the primitive way, he must have a name. I would hereby have him at long last become real to others also. Too long has he been a very plural and most vague personality.

[1] Royal Asiatic Society edition, 1928. (In this Society's *Journal*, 1925, p. 130, I have reviewed a translation into Italian, "*from the English*," by G. Cagnola: *Dialoghi del Re Milinda*.)

THE MILINDA-QUESTIONS

INTRODUCTORY

Its History, its Author, and its Editor

THE Milinda-pañha, or Milinda Questioning: How did it come to be? First, what are its contents? There comes first an elaborate introduction, describing king Milinda's capital city Sāgala, the Sangala of Arrian, the Sagala, or Euthumedeia of Ptolemy, which is conjectured to have been situated in the Southern Panjab. This is followed by an account of the two chief characters in the book. The one is king Milinda, identified as Menander, or Menandros, seventh and last but one of the kings who succeeded Demetrios, the Græco-Bactrian ruler in Kashmir. The latter succeeding his father Euthydemos, was, in some political upheaval, forced southward and made Sāgala his capital. The other is a learned pundit, Nāgasena, a member of the order of monks, of almsmen (*bhikṣu* or *bhikkhu* = almsman), which constituted the superior wing of the cult long called Sakya, but which we now call Buddhism. This account is chiefly legendary, dealing with their relations in a former life. Hence we are deprived of what would have lent much additional value to the book: the educational and political circumstances of the king, and the cultural circumstances where Nāgasena acquired and tested his erudition.

We are then informed of how it came about, that these two men met and engaged in debate. Here again it is not the prosaic narrative of things recent and remembered, but one largely fanciful and factitious. The king is first made to have a preliminary trial-joust in debate with a venerable monk, on the very pertinent question : Is it necessary to leave the world to become the " plus-man ", saint or arahan ? The monk, Ayupāla, frankly quotes instances of lay-saints from his tradition, and the king's thrust is prompt and effective : Why, then, are you monk ? His Greek courtiers (Yonăkas = Ionians) thereupon advise him to try his skill on a more adept debater, who was just then visiting the same neighbouring monastery of Sankheyya, named Nāgasena, and of high repute in learning and debate. The king consents, goes to the monastery and the accosting of that monk pundit is told with much gusto from the point of view of a monastic votary.

Here, we are told, ends the " Bāhirā-kathā ", or extraneous talk.

There now follows a series of questions and answers between king and pundit on matters of grave and high import : the nature of man, his survival at death, and on the saint, superman, or " arahan ". It is not clear how many meetings these conversations involved. Only two meetings are referred to, but we may conjecture that several were required, say, from twelve to twenty. It is true that in the book as we have it, we find two main divisions and a number of subdivisions. But these do not correspond to any apparent break in the dialogues. The subsequent meetings are not divided one from the other ; and the major and minor divisions

are quite irrationally made; they might have come equally well at other points. We are twice told, in slightly different terms, that "the questions", or "the answering of the questions" is finished.

There now follows a much longer essay differing considerably from the foregoing in many ways, and entitled the Meṇḍaka-pañhā = ram's horns questions or dilemmas. The debaters are named as before. But there is the significant difference, that the conversations are now no longer described as public debates, but as strictly private and unwitnessed. "Dilemmas" are not to be taken as a strict description throughout. In the last ten there are four which are just question and answer.

In this essay the style is different; it is more literary; it no longer suggests the terse back and forth, with the sometimes desultory nature, of a reported talking. And gradually it grows in freedom, and at length often becomes very eloquent. The subdivisions are continued, namely into "Vaggas", containing each a number of dilemmas varying from four to twelve, and are, as divisions, not less irrational than those of the foregoing section.

To the Dilemmas there succeeds a brief chapter on a case of Inference. It has a unique interest as being the only attempt at a Utopia to be met with, I do not venture to say in Indian, but at least in Pali literature. Here while king and pundit are still made interlocutors, the style is ever more that of a ready writer. Whether it was due to improvement over older, more clumsy writing material, or, to use his own instance,[1] to his art and craft as writer becoming second

[1] Text, 59; trs. i, 92.

nature, we may never know. But his prose and eke his poetry are now a very rush of wordy eloquence.

The next essay, nominally on the stricter religious life known in monastic circles as " according to the Dhutangas ", is of the same length, and is even more eloquent in devotional earnestness.

We then have an essay, of equal length with each of these two, on a comparison of the saint or arahan with an amazing variety of things and creatures, in similes some of which are sane and lofty, some forced and foolish. As compared with the previous arduous programme of the book, it is perhaps more like grandfather's chat. The similes according to the Pali mātikā, or table of their contents, are in 105 groups, but cease abruptly after the sixty-seventh. Either the author was unable to finish the composition of the remaining thirty-eight, or the leaves have been lost.

Finally comes an appendix. This consists in a gloss or scholium, summing questions and their " vaggas ", as having been " handed down " (lit. arrived, *āgatā*), and admitting that forty-two *questions* have not been handed down, but giving no explanation. There follows a doxology, dear to Buddhist scholastics, of Nature applauding the completion (?) of the work by an earthquake, and the Jātaka-like conclusion of Milinda becoming a monk and then arahan.

Such, barely stated, are the contents of the book. As to what we can gather from very fragmentary materials to have been its history, I have no new fragment to add. But as to how it came to take the shape in which we have it I have formed an opinion which, in one or two points, differs from any I have yet read. This I will now give, after first reminding readers very

briefly of what appears to have been the history of the book's literary form.

The following outline, *going backwards in time*, is that history as far as known :—

(*a*) 1877 : First printed edition in Sinhalese, Colombo.

(*b*) 1777 or 1747 : Translated from Pali into Sinhalese, with glosses.

(*c*) Date unknown : Translated in Ceylon by " teachers of old *into Māgadhī* " (? Pali, presumably from Sanskrit).

(*d*) Date unknown (presumably within 90–40 B.C. : Composition, at different periods, *by one and the same author*, in Sanskrit, of the five genuine sections of the book).

(*e*) Five hundred years after the Parinirvana, *circa* 100 B.C. : A series of conversations, say, about twenty, between Milinda and Nāgasena (recorded by a Court scribe-memorizer, on (?) metal plates, presumably in Prakrit. These were stored in the palace, and at a date not long after Milinda's death, an author was selected to convert the notes, taken in Prakrit, into Sanskrit " Report of the Proceedings ", introducing nothing he did not find).

Supplementary, *going forward in time.*

(*f*) Between A.D. 317 and 420 : A portion of the " Report " translated in China into Chinese, it is presumed, from Sanskrit.

(*g*) Between A.D. 785 and 804 : Another and longer portion of the " Report " translated into Chinese.

Both are entitled Nasien-Bikhiu-King, or Book of the monk Nāgasena.

The bracketed portions in the Table of materials give only my own conclusions as filling in a few missing links. In the following sketch of the conversations on the one hand, and of the composer of the book on the other, I will state a little more fully what I think. Namely, that the first part or "Report" (pp. 1–89 of text) narrates a series of genuine events, well-attested and almost certainly officially recorded at the time; that these were later on, in memory of a distinguished and cultured monarch, or for other reasons, and by permission of his successor Dionysios (on coins Dianisia, Dianisiya), brought out of the Palace treasuries (can we yet say "library"?) and entrusted to a competent scholar, to be converted from a pile of Prakrit "leaves" or "plates" into a more presentable *lañchăka*[1] or set of Sanskrit leaves; in other words, to be converted from notes into literature. Whether the conversion would also mean "written on palm-leaves", instead of metal plates, it is as yet impossible to say. The use of this much-needed writing material probably began in the East and South coasts where the suitable kind of palm was plentiful. Inland and in the North, writing (if, indeed, one can call heavy stencilling by that name) on plates will have persisted longer.

Next, that the book, in so far, and *only so far*, as

[1] Pali: *lañcaka*, more correctly, I think, and originally, *lañchaka*, "marked thing," as in Jāt. Comy. It may well have been necessary, *at first*, to have a distinctive word, for *writing* with a style, from *lekha*, which might be used both for the epigrapher's chisel in rock-cutting and for the stenciller on metal plates. When writing became established the term *lekha* and its derivatives would resume sway as just "inscribing", "writing". Cf. *Pali Dictionary*, Rh. D. and Stede, arts. *lañca, lañcha.*

it is of conversations, is the work, first of editing, then of original composition, of one and the same man, at different stages of his literary career. There is insufficient evidence in the conversations, between those merely reported and those composed, of style and outlook to warrant the easy solution of a work by different hands. I here go with Rhys Davids,[1] but not with his alternative solution, viz. " or of different writers of one school within a limited period ". We do not need the " school ", *if* we reject the conclusion to which he inclines. This is that *all* the conversations are fictitious. Nor do we need the " school " if we go herein beyond Garbe,[2] and maintain, not, as he thought, that the original conversations were, in the author's time, " a quite specific recollection," namely of a phenomenal departure on the part of the king, but were actually in scriptural existence. Garbe has, as to some Milinda-Nāgasena hypotheses, a wise warning against " barren dubietitis ".[3] I believe that if we reconstruct the picture as I suggest, we may come to more fruitful conclusions than did this distinguished author.

I fully concede that other hands have been at work on the book. But not to create ; only to edit. That is, not merely to correct palpable blunders in scribe-work, but to insert, to cut out, to reword, to dress up. No one was more familiar with work of this kind than the Buddhist monk, and that, by orthodox confession, from very early days.[4] He was not, and never had been out for historical truth. Propaganda, exegesis, and edification in orthodoxy were his aim. There is nothing

[1] *Ency. Rel. and Eth.*: Art. Milinda.
[2] *Indische Kulturgeschichte*, p. 111.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 110, n. [4] E.g. *Dīpavaṃsa*, ch. v.

far-fetched in the supposition that when, in the course of a generation, manuscripts in Sanskrit (if not already in Pali) had been gradually acquired in Ceylon vihāras, as purchased goods from donors, or by pilgrims from India, and their striking contents had been examined, the monks realized, that in these they possessed a religious and cultural arsenal, and that they set to work to compile (probably in translating) these Sanskrit "lañchakas" or "granths" into a fourth, if minor, Piṭaka. Hence it would come that the Conversation leaf-books, of talks first real and then fictitious, were enframed in a sort of Commentarial foreword and afterword, such as monks were already beginning to set down in writing in those Sinhalese commentaries, which Buddhaghosa at a much later date recast into Pali. In these we see a due glamour thrown over the exponent of Hīnayāna Sakya, and the emotional effect of it upon the king. We see, also, the edifying ending added to that effect ultimately of the king's entering the Order, and its redounding glory to the Sangha. We even see the editorial dressing up in Sutta-terms *imposed* upon the author's own opening sentences (p. 25). We even find the editors dragging in certain teachers, associated in the Piṭakas with the lifetime of the Sakyan Founder, made to serve once more as dummies for a king's superior insight. When we have realized what veteran adepts the Buddhist Sanghas at all times and places have been at editorial propagandism of this kind, we can conclude what will have been the inevitable fate of the series of Milinda-pañhas, once they had found their way to Ceylon. Their longevity and fame were thereby established, but at this price, that we know not as we read just how much is really from the man of

Sāgala, let alone the two heroes of debate, and how much is inserted, altered, or lost.

The object of this little book is not an estimate of the extent and variety of monastic editing in the Questions. The time for that will come when, if ever some editor has every surviving Pali and Chinese edition of the *Milindapañha* under survey. It is quite possible, that one complete MS. may yet come to hand, in which there has survived that curious frill in the final embroidery given us by Plutarch alone in his account of Milinda. Namely, that at his death in a military camp, there came requests for and a distribution of Milinda's ashes. The legend is not in the MSS. consulted by Trenckner for his text. If it be in any Buddhist MS. of the Questions, which is, I think, more than doubtful, it will have probably been excised from the rest, as contravening the editors' appendix that Milinda became a monk. The respect paid to the legend as being possibly true, by von Gutschmid, Garbe, and even by Dr. Schrader, is to me not a little curious. For the purpose of a provisional and supplementary inquiry, as is all my work claims to be, I will only say that for me the " extraneous " introduction, with one episode excepted, and the appendix are later editorial additions. And for the rest I will give but one passage in the centre of the book, where I seem to see a monkish interpolation, such as a Hīnayānist would deem it wise to make.

In a question placed among the Dilemmas (text, p. 267, Dil. 64), but not a dilemma, the king is made to summarize the great manifold of the external world and to ask " What is *not* in the world ? " The answer is : " Three : (1) they who, aware or unaware, are

unageing, undying; (2) permanence in the manifold; (3) getting at[1] the 'person' in an ultimate sense." Here we have approximately the threefold battle-cry of Buddhist scholasticism in altered order: *anicca, dukkha, anatta.* And the Report, or first portion leads off with quite a truculent blast about the third cry.[2] Yet I venture to think that, as here used, No. 3 is an insertion *replacing some other statement.* In the "Report" there has occurred already a threefold answer (text, p. 86), suggesting to the editors that it would be more orthodox to let it form, if in somewhat different terms, a better No. 3 than the author's. Again, the term "in an ultimate sense" is dragged in, probably to justify the denial, in No. 3, in face of the affirmation, of "persons" (*sattā*) in the terms of the question. As reply, the qualifying term "ultimate sense" is out of place; the category in question is of the external world only. Further, it is significant, that the author, I mean the writer, in the Dilemmas, does not appear in the least interested in the *anatta* dogma. So much is he, here and in the remaining sections, concerned with the "man" as no mere congeries of states (*dhammas*) or groups (*khandhas*), but *as having these*; that this No. 3 assertion comes as a very jar.

It is not fruitful or pertinent to speculate, what was the non-existent No. 3 in the original. Several alternatives more apt than the inserted one suggest themselves. And we are still far too acquiescent in the assumptions: (1) that the "not-man" is a basic tenet in Sakya, and not a growth; (2) that the *Milindapañha* is the consistent work of one or more fervent Hīnayānists, for me to expect to carry readers

[1] I.e. immediately knowing (*upaladdhi*). [2] Text, p. 25.

with me. Let us then turn to consider more closely the unknown author, if, with a little reconstructive imagination, we may haply feel after and find him.

I see him as a cultured young Brahman in the thirties, born at or near Sāgala, who had been studying since his boyhood, Brahman-fashion, at the rising cultural town or " university " of Nālandā, a few hundred miles to the east of his home, near Patna. Taxilā, the older seat of Brahman learning to the north, was much nearer. But Taxilā's erudite repose had had to give way to incursions and alarms through invasions from the north, and it was become a great garrison and seat of soldier-kings, Sakas, and others, a very home of turmoil military and political. Taxilā's extremity was Nālandā's opportunity, and a centre predominantly Buddhist succeeded to the position and prestige of the centre predominantly Brahman. Here I imagine this Brahman, acquiring not only Brahman lore, but much information about Sakya. He will have attended courses given in the recitation and exposition of the Suttas by resident theras and repeaters. So might a young Irish Catholic, studying at the predominantly Protestant university of Dublin, take steps to acquaint himself with the teaching of heretic Christianity. Catholic by profession or at heart, or both, he might remain; and similarly I guess at a Brahman outlook and predisposition persisting in our author. And since " the child must have a name ", and any young Brahman was called *Māṇava*—a word which also appears to have served as a proper name—I propose to refer to him straightaway as Māṇava. By some felicitous coincidence of fate or design, it may possibly have actually been his name, may be so still ! Did he

not, for all we can tell, single out from many other such utterances just that ascribed to a man of the next world, Māṇava-gāmiya (or °ika), in praise of the Buddha:—

Of Rājgir's hills the chief is Vipulā (*Saṃyutta*, i, 67), as being especially interesting to himself?

Returning, his study-years being ended, to or near Sāgala, to take up, as Brahmans would, the stage of public life, it is conceivable, or rather probable, that he made writing his profession. By this I mean both master of writing and literary man. Whenever that baffling departure, the *custom* of writing not only letters and other fleeting literature, but also longer and less ephemeral communications actually set in, we can both imagine how very engrossing the new vogue must have been, and also see that Māṇava is closely interested in it. On the one hand, we note several references to letter-writing (lekha: text, p. 42), to a teacher of (?) writing (text, p. 71), to written "books" = *potthaka* (text, p. 80), already in the recorded conversations; on the other, Māṇava, in his own chapters, refers to the (?) newly *written* Nikāyas as lañc[h]akas, and he illustrates a point by reference to a skilled writing-teacher (*kusalo lekhâcariyo*, text, p. 349), who completes his written treatise by an exposition on it. He was, I should say, speaking from his own experience. We can well imagine how, for a long time, oral and written self-expression went hand in hand. With the advent of better writing material, whenever that notable event spread over India, the older art will have somewhat wilted and the younger partner have carried on alone.

As a teacher of writing and a cultured scribe, Māṇava

may well have begun his professional career in Sāgala and set up as a " housefather ". Then came the opportunity of his life. One day, it was decided at the palace, most likely in the reign of Milinda's successor, last of Sāgala's eight kings, Dionysios, to bring out the coffer of the scribe's plates of the remarkable interviews which the late king had held with a wise and learned cleric, the memory of which was probably fresh, or at least, may yet have been green among older men of the court, and to have them copied out on the new worthier leaves now coming into use, and made into the new longer essays in writing, such as were coming into fashion with leaves number and tied with knotted strips and called *lañchakas* (*potthaka*, the Pali word, in Sanskrit *pustaka*, was probably much later). Someone will have heard of, or have been taking writing lessons from the teacher who had come home with Nālandā diplomas, and the task was offered to him.

Now it is reasonable to imagine that when Māṇava entered on this important task, equipped only with credentials, with but a newly established erudite or literary status, he would not be expected, or permitted, to exceed his mandate by introductory or inserted matter of any kind. Hence I place Māṇava's editorial commencement just after the Extraneous Talk (text, p. 25). And the editorial conclusion will have been, I agree, at the end of book iii (text, p. 89). Here, as we know, stands the coda " The answering-the-asking of the Milinda questions is completed ". It is true that we come upon a similar (though not verbally identical) coda half-way through the dialogues (text, p. 64): Nāgasena-Milinda-king-questions (are) ended. But the conversations are resumed thereafter so

uninterrupted in any other way, that it were a forced reasoning to see here more than a very temporary suspension of the meeting owing to some festival or other function or hindrance. There is no logical reason for calling the resumed talks by the new title Excision of doubts—a fussiness of late editing.

Māṇava's " lañchaka " or manuscript, long for its day, though short to our seeming, was now launched on its world-career. Copies will have been made by all the available scribes, and presented to ministers, to religious, i.e. educational institutions. Merchants, too, ever on the look out for new vogues in wares, will have sought to purchase copies, and through both them and clerical travellers the work will slowly have travelled through India and abroad. Māṇava was becoming a man of distinction in the word of the Heard (*śruti*), as literary learning was still called. It will hence have become permissible for him to re-edit his book to this extent, that he could make it resemble the Sutta-collections he had learnt to know at Nālandā, and which were there also coming to be written in " lañchakas " (as he himself calls them in his later work). One of the most venerable and revered of these was the long Sāmaññaphala-Suttanta of the Dīgha-Nikāya, claiming to date from the very first Congress of the Sakya.[1] It opens with how a king, on a beautiful moonlight evening, is wishing to converse with some wise man. Very naturally Māṇava, wishing to magnify his royal patron by magnifying the memory of his predecessor Milinda, writes a preface showing him so visiting an imaginary venerable monk-pundit: " Age-warder " (Āyupāla), and reducing him to silence

[1] Vinaya Texts III (SBE), 377 (Cullavagga xii).

by his astute rejoinder mentioned above. Asking for one worthier of his steel, Milinda is, by Mānava still as introducer only, not as chronicler, referred by his minister Devamantiya to Nāgasena, who is then on a visit to the same monastery, and whose fame for learning and exposition is of the first order. The king, sending a herald, drives to the Sankheyya monastery, probably on the following afternoon, his day's business over, and the conversations begin.

In this way and to this extent I follow Dr. Schrader, that the Ayupāla episode is a gloss. But I go further and see a gloss within this gloss. The latter I see as a later one, dating from a very Buddhist centre where the will would exist, not to exalt the wit of the king, but the mystic majesty and wisdom of the Sakyan pundit! It would ill have become Māṇava, the Court employee, to have represented a valiant and accomplished king as all to pieces with nervousness before and when meeting the pundit. The Buddhist editor, on the other hand, would wish so to represent Milinda, both as a set-off against the defeat of his Northern colleague Āyupāla, and also as better carrying on the plagiarism on the Sāmaññaphaḷa Suttanta. The verses, moreover, in this eulogy of Nāgasena have the appearance of afterwork. I suggest then that, from p. 19 to p. 24 of the text, we have a joint " frill ", written partly by Māṇava and partly by another, each at different times and places and each in a different language.

To the criticism which may arise hereat, that the portions translated into Chinese include all of this mixed portion, and that, since the book, i.e. the Sanskrit original " Report ", must have been taken by land to

China, the mixed piece must have been added in India, I would say first, that I place the advent of Māṇava's writings into Ceylon (let alone China) as being likely to have considerably ante-dated the arrival and work there of Buddhaghosa. For in the first place, the Commentaries on which Buddhaghosa worked, the Milindapañha was *already* a quasi-scriptural classic; secondly, it will have come to Ceylon in its original Sanskrit; thirdly, MSS., still in Sanskrit, may quite conceivably have been taken by merchants, or by travelling scholars to China *by sea*; fourthly, that for Chinese trade I can understand the pro-Buddhist interpolation *having been inserted* in Sanskrit, since, for all its elaboration of Pali, we know that the Sanskrit vogue has never been far to seek in Ceylon. Nay, fresh evidence has recently come to support Kern's belief that the Vaitulyakas of the third century A.D. in Ceylon were Mahāyānists[1]; their scriptures were in Sanskrit, and it was at one time and another an even chance whether Ceylonese Buddhism was not to become Sanskrit and Mahāyānist.

Time went on, and Māṇava, now a known writer (though not yet a known expositor), was in one way or another moved to indite an original work. Nothing seems less improbable, once we start with the first part as a task done by commission. That, moreover, he should write as if in sequel to the first part, as if to establish his author's identity in both—this is quite a probable device, if we consider about a decade to have elapsed. The sensation, if any, that the Records of the Conversations, the original novel "lañchaka"

[1] S. Paranavitane, "Mahāyānism in Ceylon": *CJS.* ii, pt. i, p. 36.

will have made had grown dim ; there was as yet no dynastic upheaval, such as may have ensued after the death of Dionysios, but Māṇava's immediate patrons may have gone, or aged. Again, he may have sought and received the sanction to build an edifying exposition of his Nālandā learning round about the two distinguished disputants. He takes great care, as has been said, to shield himself from any accusation of pretending, that what he was now composing was drawn from any records. King Milinda is made to request that the debates might be strictly private. No one else was to be present. This device gives him a free hand. He is not in any way pledged to make his book a series of debating triumphs for either king or monk. His plan is to exploit his experiences of college expositions, which may well have turned on points of seeming, or, indeed, actual inconsistency or ambiguity appearing in the Suttanta, as taught there from memory, or with the aid of the new " lañchakas ".

I do not think we need credit Mānava with entirely original expositions. He had only changed his materials, from recorded conversations, which he was bound to reproduce, to memories he retained, and perhaps notes of heard discourses he had made. He nowhere shows himself more of a philosopher or an original thinker than was Nāgasena. Nor does he show himself a sound Hīnayāna Buddhist. The Sinhalese editors, however they may have dressed the records, so that the king, where his attack is not glozed over, is made to appear a refuted and tamed pupil, have perhaps not spent much editorial labour over Māṇava's own work. In this he so far shows himself loyal to his Buddhist teachers, as to make their explanations of knotty points appear

plausible. If, for his dummy king, we replace those who were, I imagine, actually present in his mind—student-questioners at Nālandā lectures—we get a picture more appealing to our sense of the historically real. The more than improbable royal student of the Piṭakas dies out, and we see on the screen Māṇava and other young men at what would now be called a "Seminar", debating together, or—though this is less likely—putting their difficulties before an expounding Thera, who with a mixture of oral or documentary proficiency, evasive skill, a seemingly conclusive guidance by analogy and much sound correction of mere logomachies, saves the orthodox situation.

Māṇava was an interested and appreciative student, but I think he was not a Buddhist. With Jātaka lore, as the popular and cultivated branch it always appears to have with Hīnayāna, it is difficult to imagine a trained Buddhist speaking of the Bodhisat in this and that birth as equivalent in superhumanity to a Buddha. This is a heterodox feature which the editors, it is true, have suffered to remain, but which has puzzled scholars and has not been explained. Nor is it likely that a cultured Buddhist, especially had he been a member of the Order, would have failed to make play with those two sections of the sayings (or Piṭakàs): Vinaya and Abhidhamma; with the former, because it was from of old the monk's special hunting ground; with the latter, because of the great vogue enjoyed by the presumably now completed Abhidhamma. In the recorded conversations we see, in Nāgasena, a true Ābhidhammika, estimating the man in values, as just a complex, or continuum (*santati*) of *dhammas*, or

" things ", or mental phenomena and defining these with a popular mixture of Abhidhamma text and oral commentary. In Māṇava's own work we find the " man " in worth as man, much dominated as man—even if he be a saint—by the body he owns, but dominant over the mind, which he equally owns.[1] This is a very different standpoint from that of Nāgasena, but such as a Brahman would profess. Moreover, we find no interest displayed in, or acquaintance shown with the contents and rising vogue of Abhidhamma, a culture which was, as we ultimately gather from its manifestations in Buddhadatta and Buddhaghosa, the natural outcome of the now established anatta doctrine. For all that Māṇava has to say of this and of its literary results, it might be non-existent! There is the one rather forced allusion to it in the three non-existents, referred to above as a probable gloss.[2] There is passing reference to anatta once or twice in the last chapters, but then it is only by way of mentioning categories in which it is listed.[3]

The reader of the translations can get a quick purview of this different outlook, if he will consult the indexes, s.v. " soul ". Rhys Davids was keen enough not to let references on this matter go unheeded. Now he has no reference to it as in any portion save the conversations.

It may be said that the subject was vehemently emphasized at the start, and on that account left unresumed. I would reply that were the author of the subsequent sections a thoroughpaced Hīnayānist like Nāgasena, with an obvious choice of *anatta* as his battle-flag, it is at the least highly probable that the

[1] Text, p. 253. [2] P. 9. [3] E.g. text, pp. 286, 332, 413.

doctrine would have been shown reverberating through much of the discussions. He does not even make use of the distinction between "conventional and ultimate meaning" (which we first see emerging in the Dilemmas, and which came to be used mainly to justify *anatta*), to start a debate on this subject with those two terms brought in to dispel the querist's doubts. To an orthodox *anatta*-monger like Nāgasena, a dilemma propounded, say, on man as reborn and yet as unreal, resolved by this convenient, if ill-based solution would have been irresistible.[1]

No, Māṇava is clearly not interested in an ultimately non-knowable self; no Brahman could be. But he is interested, and that very deeply, in something else, and that is in the Sakyan doctrine of man's capacity of attaining to perfection on earth, the theory, that is, of the arahan, and the arahan's destiny, that is, of nirvana. And to this theory he makes the one and only original contribution in his writings, or perhaps in any Indian writings, namely, the arahan as living in a sodality not exclusively of monks, but of citizens, and not in the loneliness of the recluse. (Of arahans and of arahans-to-be is the more correct description.)

I have called Māṇava a Brahman, apparently without better excuse than his mistake over Bodhisats and Buddha, and his treatment of the "man" or self as real, in a way the Buddhists then did not. It is true he writes nothing that betrays him as positively, or specifically Brahman. But then he was not writing

[1] I have no idea what may be the status of "Nyanatiloka" in the Ceylon monk-world, but two of his comments interest me: (1) that the questionable orthodoxy of the Milindapañha has evoked much literary controversy there for and against; (2) that *anatta* is the "innermost kernel" of true Buddhist doctrine; (3) he interprets *anatta* as Buddhaghosa would, and *not* as does one eminent cleric, at least, of Ceylon. (See Preface above.)

under specifically Brahman influence, either as in a Brahman cultural centre, or as a Brahman teacher. Other influences were just then acting upon the educated Indian. It has been justly said that there are no *patent* traces of Greek influence in the book, even in the king's first mental attitude. But that influence may have been telling on the Indian mind more as a solvent than in a constructive way. I mean, that it may have revealed to the aristocrat of Indian culture, the Brahman, that the main subject of his study, man, was in the first place man as man, rather than as Brahman or Kshatriya. To this extent his sectarian or caste limitations will have been melted out of him. And I think this has been overlooked.

Secondly, there was this new way of self-expression in writing, writing not as just recording, in order to preserve what had been first spoken, but the writer's own thoughts as yet unspoken. First, the " repeater " became a recorder ; then he became an " author ". We hardly rate yet, as we should, what this transition may have meant to India, so long a relatively cultured, and yet a bookless world. It is chiefly from India that we learn to appreciate what the might and the mystery, ay, the divinity of the spoken word meant to ancient cultures generally. This glamour was in some degree decadent even before book-writing began. We can note this in the lowered worth in which Buddhism, as still " Sakya ", was holding the word or name. It was coming to be rated as merely a mark, a label, a conventional currency.[1] We note this even in the Four Nikāyas. We note it yet more in Abhidhamma,

[1] *Dīgha Nikāya*, i, 202, cited by Buddhaghosa, Kathāvatthu Comy. ; cf. *Kindred Sayings*, i, 16, 17, n. 1.

most of all in the Commentaries, and later still, as in a Tibetan poet :—

Accustomed long to know the meaning of the Wordless,
I have forgot the way to trace verb-roots and source of words and phrases.[1]

But this was at one time a startling thing to affirm, and it points to a great transition. The cult of the "plus man" as recluse, as a wordless recluse, may have helped to bring it about. The Sakya had become a cult, no longer of the teacher and helper of the many, as which it began, but of the lone, detached votary of silence—not, it is true, for every one, nor for every monk, but for the élite among these—whose ideal was his own perfected welfare. For such, the word, the spoken word, had lost its ancient sanctity and constraining power.

Now in writing, the author seemed to get behind the emission of partly discredited *saddāni*, or vocal sounds, and nearer to the thinking operations, and so, nearer to the thinker, expressing himself in silent speech. Hence I imagine that the *initial* results of authorship proper may have been to throw emphasis on the man, rather than on the cheapening of man's essential reality in the cheapened word or name.

But I go further. When Buddhists had become fluent writers, and Greek influence had faded from India, Hīnayāna became not less, but more than ever set on the man's unreality. And so that initial emphasis soon died out. It was a peculiar and interesting, if fleeting conjuncture, taking effect when Māṇava took to authorship in the Dilemmas, etc., and perhaps only then.

[1] *Milarepa*, by Evans-Wentz, p. 247.

And I judge that Māṇava's emphasis on the reality and worth of the man, especially of the man as arahan, will, in view of the importance laid on the book in Ceylon, have done something to counteract the stress which had been laid by Nāgasena on the " not-man ", the man only *knowable* as just " states ", in the Conversations.

We now quit things preliminary and come to the talks. For the benefit of the most hasty reader I sum up thus :—

(*a*) Text, pp. 1–24, 419, 420. Framework added in Ceylon in order to present (i) the " Questions " proper, (ii) the four later MSS. as a connected whole for the edification of the faithful. But of these pp. 19, l. 7–21, l. 11 were a distinct introduction, added by the original editor (Māṇava) to later copies of (*b*).

(*b*) Text, pp. 25–89 : Recorded conversations, held as stated, and edited in the new book-form after Milinda's death, by special commission by a Brahman of Buddhist collegiate training, here called Māṇava.

(*c*) Text, pp. 90–328 : Original work by the same man when known as editor of the conversations.

(*d*) Text, pp. 330–419 : Three successive essays by the same writer.


PLATE II

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1



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PART I

THE RECORDED CONVERSATIONS

MENANDROS, or Milinda, has driven to the neighbouring monastery, where Nāgasena and his attendant monks—seniors, novices, repeaters—and all other lay inmates are awaiting him. In the king's retinue are four ministers, attendants equally indefinite in number, and, I suggest, at least one scribe. Nāgasena may also have had scribes instead of, or as well as repeaters, but ecclesiastics are notoriously conservative in their ways. There is no mention anyway of either in either of the companies. Nor is there of an interpreter. In what language did they converse?

It is nowhere claimed, that Nāgasena was a native of North-West or Græco-India, who might have come to learn Greek in his youth. That he would have learnt it as a monk is practically out of the question. It would belong, not to monastic culture, but to worldly pursuits. Such is even now the attitude taken up by monastic die-hards in Ceylon, who disapprove of monks learning English, even when their reason is propagandist. If against this be set the much missionizing with which Buddhism is credited, we should recollect, that we have no statistics of linguistic preparations, and I hold it probable, that here the merchant will have preceded the missioner.

Menandros, on the other hand, was probably at least bilingual, much as our Plantagenet kings may have come to be, much as many a European ruler has

had, and has to be. That is to say, he will have learnt Prakrit, the vernacular, in the nursery, and Greek from his tutor, or with his courtiers when quite young. It is unlikely that he had learnt to write Sanskrit, the tongue of the clerical and cultured world. It is less likely that he knew the literary form into which Māgadhi, the Prakrit of Patna, was developing, and which, in Ceylon, became the Pali we know. I imagine, then, that the two men conversed in Prakrit, and that the scribe took down his notes in that tongue, and in it wrote them out more fully afterwards.

But what of the recording of the brief after-inquiry by one of the four ministers, as he is escorting Nāgasena to the return visit at the palace ?[1] This will have been also carried on in Prakrit, and it is a reasonable assumption, that the three escorting ministers, or the one inquiring will have seen to it, that the scribe added a record of what was said, if not the actual record which has come down to us. This has too much the appearance of pro-Buddhist editing about it to pass as a veracious testimony.

Even if all four ministers were Greek—and their names, impossible as they are in either Greek, Sanskrit, or Pali, have been ingeniously and probably rightly interpreted as Greek[2]—they will have been no less bilingual than the king. For that matter they may have been natives of India, and yet with Greek names. We have had in our own history Saxons (i.e. English) given Norman-French names, and we see to-day Singhalese with Portuguese family names and English

[1] Text, p. 30 f.
[2] Devamantiya = Demetrios, Anantakāya = Antiochos, Mankura = Menekles, Sabbadinna (Sarva°-) = Sarapodotos, or Pasidotos.

first names. The four may have been selected, two from the Greek and two from the Indian entourage of the king.

To revert to that little by-talk :—it is improbable, it is scarcely conceivable, that were " Antiochos " Greek, or even were he Indian, a monk would have won him over with allusions to Abhidhamma ! Again, it is scarcely conceivable, that a reply so shallow as Nāgasena's could for a moment have appealed to a man, whose main difficulty probably was, that he could not find a fit Prakrit word for " psyche ". It is not only reasonable, but fair to Antiochos to judge, that we have here no fit record of what was actually said. It is too easy a solution to see, in Antiochos, who was very possibly not only interested, but also a distinguished and cultured official, an inept thinker. Even in so far as the recording may be intact, there may well have been much shoulder-shrugging among the four gentlemen over the evasions of the pundit. It is not impossible, that they were to some extent acquainted with their Plato, their Aristotle, and have wondered what the silver-tongued exquisite word-wielder, or the world-surveyor of all-embracing intellect would have said to this man's odd logic. To build up a character of moral and intellectual qualities as a bulwark, in the man, *against* life immortal must have seemed to them, if they were Greeks, something amazing. Or did they see in him one akin to the Orphic votaries, who could so approach the Sakyan monastic spirit as to devise such epitaphs as

And thus I escaped from the wheel, the painful, misery-laden ?[1]

[1] Inscr. Gr. Sic., 641, quoted in Rohde's *Psyche*.

But one thing there was in Nāgasena, which may well have impressed them, if they were Greek, more than his doubtful logic, more than his flagrant evasion of the king's very pertinent first rejoinder. This was his moral earnestness. Judged by our own standard of to-day, it was a limited morality, a somewhat negative ethic, but in world-weight, in ultimate aim, in ultimate cosmic efficacy so all-important as to determine and indicate the individual's eternal destiny. In this light Nāgasena stands a benignant truth-speaker for all time; in this light the modern world may forgive him his inadequate reasoning.

We cannot " get-at " the man ultimately; literally, " in the highest sense."[1] Analysis reveals to us not the man as stripped of qualities, but just the qualities, bodily and mental: a congeries of cognoscible things. Such was Nāgasena's opening, and he flings it down like a glove of challenge in reply to the king's formally courteous inquiry. It is very possible he was the nervous one, not the king. Kings were despots, and had a handy way of dismissing men of back-chat and unoiled tongue.[2] He was careful, before the second meeting, to seize an opportunity and secure his position. At the short notice given him, he had to be bold and forestall attack with a pronounced mandate of ecclesiastical learning.

That he led off with just that opening should be for us of considerable interest. There were three main tenets, already adopted in the Sakyan Sangha or " church ", as it grew out of its original community of missioners into a monastic and cultural institution.

[1] *Param'atthena n'upalabbhati.* [2] Text, p. 193.

These were much repeated in the oral teachings called Piṭakas or baskets of traditional wordings. As to these, let it never be lost to view—it usually is—that the compiling of them from many groups and many generations of repeaters in those groups was a long and gradual process. These three were " impermanence ", " ill ", " not-self ". Here the first two are ignored, swept aside. Why is this ?

The first, " impermanence " (*anicca*), was originally maintained against the once Catholic Brahman teaching, that the " man " or self, as immanent deity in body and mind, was " imperishable " : *nitya*, *akshara*—permanent in essence, unchangeable. Sakya maintained that, on the contrary, the man was ever changing. Now the Brahman view, since Asoka's day, when it had long been growing decadent in many particulars, was under a temporary eclipse, even in the north-west, which had been its stronghold. The Sakyan view had for the time prevailed. The *anicca* tenet had less need to be stressed. Its ancient weight had been transferred, with altered emphasis, to the third tenet. Again the second tenet, " ill " (*dukkha*'), was no longer to the fore. The monk had made this, rather than his teaching and counselling offices towards the community, the ground of his leaving the world. Quiet, retreat, freedom from wordly cares, were not so much the requisites for a life of service, as the means for shunning his fellow-men in this, as in all spheres of existence. That life in the world was ill, and in the long run irremediably so had been the root-value in monasticism. But as time went on, the monk-vogue ripened into an accepted institution, well-established in social values. There was coming, in India, a

loosening of its foundations, but apparently it was then not yet felt. Thus the stressing of " ill " was no longer necessary. The monk was no longer on sufferance. He was, or seemed to be, a rock-based institution, and " ill " came to take a second place. In medieval monastic manuals, like the standard Abhidhammatthasangaha, it came to take scarcely any place at all, save for a quite passing enumeration of the " four truths ", in which, as we know, it is the leading idea.

Here we have, then, a reason for Nāgasena's opening the debate with the last of the three cardinal tenets of Sakyan ecclesiasticism. So methodical, especially as to precedence in order, was the mind-work in that system, that some reason for this departure is needed. Even to-day, in Ceylon teaching, I have seen the third tenet—*anatta*—put forward as " the centre point in Buddhist philosophy ".[1] That one Sangha-authority now interprets it in a new and heterodox way, not to be found in the scriptures, as " not-self-dependent " does not lessen the significance of the place given to the tenet in name.

Nāgasena, in fact, takes up and attacks with the very position left in place of primary importance at the " Third Council " in Pali records, the congress of Patna, of about two and a half centuries before his date. The collection of argued points of controversy, alleged to have been composed for, and recited to the Council by its president, puts foremost and makes longest and most detailed, the very thesis which Nāgasena introduces in a more picturesque way : " That the man is not got at in a real and ultimate sense." It leaves us with the impression that for those 250 years

[1] Cf. above, p. 20, *n.*, which is only one instance.

or so the *anatta* dogma had remained foremost in doctrinal or academic position. In Asoka's day it was the new word of the new orthodoxy, which had grown up on the new Sānkhya psychology—the innovation of considering mind, in phases and functions, *apart from* the man (*puruṣa*, *puggala*) or self (*ātman*, *attan*). In Nāgasena's day it was the old-established orthodox doctrine, worded in the same way, and further, with one new term.

This is *vedako* (dialectically, *vedagu*), instead of the older term *paṭisaṃvedī*.[1] Both mean (the man as) *feeler*, or *experiencer*, over and above the feeling or experience in organ, mind-phase, or process. The Patna work, Kathāvatthu, has the complementary term *kārako*, doer, maker. But this, the clearer word, had naturally come earlier to man where much of the doing, the making was external and visible. In feeling, experiencing, we are in an inner or unseen world, and the wording has been less clear, or slower in becoming so.

It may here be objected by those who know the Nikāyas that the *thesis* of the Kathāvatthu, just quoted, is not so late as we might think, but is anticipated in much the same wording in what is presumably a very early Sutta: No. 22 of the Majjhima Nikāya: "The Parable of the Snake." It runs there: "Since both the Ātman and what belongs thereto is not got at truly, correctly . . ."

I quite believe that this may be a very old Sutta. As such I also find plausible two other things about it. The word *Attan* (man, self) will, when it was compiled, have referred, not to the human

[1] *Kathāvatthu, Points of Controversy*, both, p. 47.

personality or *puggala*, but to the Highest in the current Brahman teaching, as Deity immanent in man. The word *puggala* was used much later, when with less of Immanence surviving in Sakya, the conception of the man or self had become more akin to the psychologized concept such as we ourselves have grown familiar with to-day.

And I also hold we may suspect, in this Sutta, the work of the later reviser, if only to this extent, that we find here a unique occurrence, in just this connection, *in any of the Nikāyas*, of the word " got at " (*upalabbhati*). The word " got at "—so curiously on all fours with Hume's " stumbled upon ", in his search for a self conceived as distinct from *mindings—was not wanted* in the vocabulary of the early Sakyans. The simpler *assa* : " may," or " would be "—suffices here ; it suffices for Buddhaghosa *in his Commentary on those lines.*[1] But it *was* wanted later, when, at Patna, the monks had come to discuss, after much new Abhidhamma, the inner nature of man. Accordingly, Buddhaghosa is *careful to discuss the word* " got at ", in the Kathāvatthu. Much revision had taken place before his day, notably at Patna. Yet I incline to think we may have here a piece of even later revisional gloss, carried out when the Piṭakas were come better to be known as a unity. Else I think we might have had his comment on " *an-upalabbhiyamāne* ", in the Majjhima Commentary, worded like that on the Kathāvatthu.

Thus it is with an old-established, albeit not original weapon that Nāgasena made, as one may say, his first joust at Milinda—one in which the subsequent editor Mānava, in his own portions, shows no interest.

[1] *Papañca Sūdanī* (P.T.S. ed.), ii, p. 113.

Māṇava is more interested in what one might go on to call Nāgasena's steed :—the argument by analogy, or simile [1]—which he makes use of as original author. This ancient and popular vehicle, of exposition rather than argument, seems to have played a great part from the first in the Sakyan repertory, and is not seldom introduced with commendation :—" I will tell you a simile, for even by similes some wise men admit the force of what has been asserted." [2] It is possibly as heirs of Greek logic, that we give low place in argument to analogy. It is nevertheless curious that only Rhys Davids refers to the weakness rather than the aptness or pertinence of Nāgasena's reasoning.[3]

An analogy is just a likeness or comparison, and as such, and falling short, more or less, in complete coincidence, will only be true to a partial extent, and not in respect of the whole thing compared. Buddhist ideas are as careful as those of other cults to distinguish things external and internal, material and immaterial, seen and unseen. It is therefore the more curious to note what logical slovens their speakers were in their blind confidence in analogy. Few similes have been so respectfully assented to as that comparing the whole of man's nature or being with a chariot, and yet how absurd it is ! The analogy is only apt as between the vehicle and man's body. The motive power is left out. The charioteer is left out. The fashioner is left out. Yet we are asked to see in a fivefold mechanism of " groups " the entire man as, in the adjusted

[1] Pali *upamā*; in the Milinda Pali *opamma*.
[2] *Majjhima*, No. 23, and several other places.
[3] In his art. " Milinda ", *ERE*.

mechanism we see a chariot. It might be said we have not even got a Robot, let alone a man.

The originator of the simile appears to have been an insignificant Therī or nun, named Vajirā. Her verses are not included in the Anthology (Thera-therī-gāthā), they are added last of all to the set forming the nun-collection of the Saṃyutta Nikāya (i, book v), and the Commentary dismisses her as curtly as he does the others. But her verses will, in their turn have been repeated, and when the vogue of analyzing the man into a fivefold complex was growing, they will have matched and worded that vogue. Hence Vajirā lives as the one woman author quoted by Buddhist schoolmen! It is a very irony of history (I repeat), that whereas the Founder is made to predict a duration of sound doctrine as shortened fifty per cent by the admission of women into the Order, the mischief they would work (and in this case helped to work) proved to be by way of logic and not by way of sex appeal!

However, Vajirā was deemed insufficient to pose as guide unsupported. We first have Nāgasena so far emend the Sutta as to make her utter her verses "in the presence of the Blessed One".[1] In the *Visuddhi Magga*, ch. xviii (P.T.S., ed. 593), Buddhaghosa quotes the verses with the canonical reference: "It is said," but his contemporary, Buddhadatta not only also wipes out the woman, but places her verses in the Founder's mouth.[2] For her an unmerited immortality; for him a woeful libel. Yet for Vajirā, too, it was a misrepresentation. The theme of her verses is not *anatta*, but *dukkha*.

[1] The *Kathāvatthu* cites her more correctly, p. 66.
[2] *Abhidhammâvatāra*, "Kārakapaṭivedha" (p. 88).

It is the very wail of the refugee, the shipwrecked, from the woe of the world. That creatures come, as bundles of parts, as so many chariots, and break up is but a phase of universal ill. "This it is that comes; this is it that passes; nought else"[1] . . . This has been overlooked. She is not the only utterer to be misquoted, yet, as we say, she was asking for it.

This is but one of Nāgasena's many analogies, or those of his Sangha's tradition, and not all are misfits. There is, indeed, one service to popular thinking which analogy can render, and it is not lacking in the book. This is to open up a manifold, a plurality, a uniformity, where there had seemed to be uniqueness, as if one should say, O yes, I can show you another case of that. Herein it may stimulate the dull imagination. And yet it is rather the man of barren imagination, who does not see the rich manifold in things, in whom the indulgence in analogies will be found. He compares them under one aspect only and—I quote J. Stuart Mill—overrates its probative force, including the whole under the partial aspect. So Nāgasena's tendency is to argue from a thing wholly material to a thing only in part material. In every case the analogy serves him as sound exposition and instead of reasoning. He is to all appearances entirely satisfied that he has made his point.

And the king is made to appear convinced. But we cannot remain convinced that he was, or that we have in his acquiescent rejoinders what he really said, if we hold that the conversations actually took place

[1] *'Tis simply Ill that riseth, simply Ill*
That doth persist, and then fadeth away.
Nought beside Ill it is that doth become;
Nought else but Ill it is doth pass away.

and actually were recorded. Nāgasena would not have been let off so easily when, the king having protested in very apt terms against his manhood being reduced to so many parts and a label,[1] the protest is waved aside and never met, and also, never pressed.[2] Milinda, known according to the book for his skill as a debater, is here reduced to a very echo of the pundit. What, we ask, and ask in vain, has been done to his subsequent replies by editors interested to bring out the other side as victorious? It is clear that Māṇava, if I place him rightly as Court editor, was not likely to weaken the king's rôle. Some readers will, on this very account, reject my Records theory. I trust this may not be so till they have weighed what, in the history of literature, early mediaeval "doctoring," for purposes of sectarian exegesis, has involved. We are still too much inclined to accept old manuscripts at their face value. It is only when they record events we call supernatural that we are content to wield a blue pencil. We do not sufficiently consider that, where such events are included without question, the early writer will also be indifferent as to historical truth on other points as well, which we do not term supernatural. He was not a truth-seeker; even now the writer is that only occasionally. He was either writing of the interesting manifold he saw or imagined, in things seen and unseen; or he was a man of will with the furtherance of an end for which much special pleading was necessary. It is such writings that we still tend to take too much " at the foot of the

[1] Text, pp. 25–8. I might have said "heaps" for "parts", since *khandha* is so interpreted in the Commentaries.

[2] The pressing a point by ignoring the reply, and repeating the question is a marked feature in the Kathāvatthu debates.

letter ". We may even see this in readers who, in some one field of literature, are keenly critical in detecting editorial treatment, yet who, in a field less familiar, will swallow without question.

I consider it a fortunate matter that there appears to have been no editorial dressing done to Milinda's first and vividly protesting reply. It was necessary to leave it in so as to introduce the business of the chariot. Nāgasena has just asserted that, albeit he is known as answering to the name Nāgasena, this " Nāgasena " is " just a unit of thought, what one is known by, designation, current practice, name, but that herein the man is not got-at ",[1] or found. Milinda's rejoinder is, that if here there is but a name, and not a man, *who* forsooth gives you monks your upkeep, *who* receives and enjoys them, *who* guards (your) virtue, *who* is devoted to (your) spiritual growth, *who* realizes (your) ideals, *who* does the reverse of these practices ? " There can be nothing considered as ' good ' or ' bad ', no doer or causer of actions good or bad, no reward or after-effect of them . . ." [2]

Discounting a certain monkish editing even here (for the king would have been more likely to protest from the common human standpoint, and not that of the monk),[3] we have here the reply a Greek of his day might have made. A modern might have gone deeper. Who, he could say, in considering things as " good " or " bad ", is the valuer or holder-in-worth, who is the judge, who in deciding chooses, who *wills* so to consider, and to do or not to do ? Herein we come

[1] *Sankhā-samaññā-paññatti-vohāra-nāma-mattan, na h' ettha puggalo upalabbhati.*

[2] Text, p. 25. The translation is here and there too free.

[3] Cf. the translations, p. 41, nn. 2, 3 ; p. 42, n. 1.

nearer to the " man ", than Milinda appears to have done. But for these deeper aspects the *words* were much to seek, especially in Prakrit, as also in Pali. Even Greek was not at its best in such a needed vocabulary.[1]

Nevertheless, the protest, even as we have it, is pertinent enough. The " who " in idea and in word is not accounted for if there be nothing in human procedure but a verbal label. Why is there no direct response ? Perhaps this was the king's fault. He goes on to ask. " Then is your body you ? " " Is your mind you ? ". " Is the combination you ? " " Is Nāgasena other than the combination ? " The reply to each is " No ". The terms for each question as here stated were to hand in Prakrit as in Greek, but the Buddhist editor has been busy spreading his own technical terms over all, giving us for body the classical thirty-two parts, and for mind the classical " immaterial four groups ". The answer to the last two questions would seem to go too far. Thus they seem, in the former, to undo much that is implied in the subsequent answers. The Sakyan founder is shown, in his earliest utterances, putting a veto on body and mind being identified with the man or self, yet this is just what Buddhists came to do. In the last question they seem to preclude there being anything whatever, even the label, from being looked upon as Nāgasena. But the inclusion of the fourth Indian logical opposite is probably more a mere matter of form, than as calling for worth in meaning.[2] For even if false, the *idea* "man-as-entity " can claim to be a mental phenomenon.

[1] I have gone into this matter elsewhere, especially in " Man the Willer " : *Bulletin Sch. Or. Stud.*, 1926.

[2] The four opposites are (1) x is a, (2) x is not -a, (3) x is both a and not a, (4) x is neither a nor not -a.

Milinda, anyway, finds that, to all logical seeming, he has before him not a man, but a meaningless sound, and it was here open to him to repeat his list of Who's, and claim a reply. Possibly he did. We find, later, that his pressing a point is not evaded and swept aside, as it is here. It is very possible that Nāgasena had swiftly prepared a series of points before the king's arrival, with no intention of taking up or conceding anything that might be raised in reply, and that he was not at his ease, till he had settled the terms of debate more to his own advantage in the next conversation.

What, then, was the " man " for Nāgasena ?

Here I would allude to what, in Dr. Schrader's thoughtful note on the subject (*König Menandros*, p. 134 f., n. 25), is assumed to have been not merely Nāgasena's standpoint, as being that of an orthodox " Son of Sakya ", but the standpoint of the Founder himself. This is, that every " Nature-unity " involves no " bearer, simple and immutable (substantial) of mental and natural phenomena ", but that this " nature-unity " *is* just a confluence or " system of forces or *sankhāras* "—a sort of multiform Schopenhauerian " will ". " Thing " or " substance " is properly not a " *neben* ", or concomitant of qualities, is not in nature, but is " sublimely super-nature, i.e. super-spatial, super-temporal, super-individual. Once we have overcome the will to live, in Nirvana or Nirodha (stopping of individuality), this our true self becomes manifest . . . This is why the Buddha called on his disciples to cast off what is not yours, viz. the five groups of which you consist. As to that real self

he was sternly silent, because when all things are eliminated, all possibilities of speech are also" (referring to the unique and notable verse, Sutta Nipāta 1076).

I quote in some detail, because this is no hasty comment, but a careful apologia, which will reflect the attitude both of an individual German scholar and of many of his cultured countrymen. In that it rejects such an *anatta* dogma as the crude Pali wording suggests, it is for me worthy and good to see. In that it is an apologia for that, in terms of the mentality of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, read into the mentality of the Indian (and Sinhalese) world of many centuries ago, I do not accept it. If we would interpret that old world as it was, we must *shoo* out all our Western wordings, old and new, and suffer it to express itself in its own terms. "Substance" must go, so must "forces", "will", "nature", and "bearer of phenomena".[1] It is all like a speaking of the wooden horse of Troy by the Greeks as a "camouflage", or of the sirens singing in the Odyssey as "broadcast by wireless". Actually, for the "Sakyan", the man (*attan*, *ātman*) was either the Highest ("thou art that"), or he was not at all, save as manifestations. We can no more explain the old by the new, than we can justify the new by the old. As the Old thought, so did the Old express itself. And when new thoughts stirred and sought birth, finding inadequate words, we must, in giving value to the growth, seek their content near to, and just branching out from the old, where this was getting outgrown. But the terms I would expel are children of far later outgrowth.

[1] I would include such modernisms as "subjective", "empirical", "metempirical", which I have met in criticism of older Buddhism.

I return to the question: What then, if anything, was the "man" (the self) for Nāgasena?

We now pass to the second conversation. Nāgasena is not being visited and possibly anxious, and therefore having to maintain a bold front. He is visitor, and he has dined. "Let us," he replies, "talk about *attha*. It is, sire, what we are needing." *Atthena mayaṃ, mahārāja, atthikā* (text, p. 31).

Attha, in Sanskrit *artha*, is a formidable word to translate, so many are its meanings. Buddhaghosa enumerates as many as seven, nor even then does he give the meaning the word may have meant for a king. The Pali synonyms are (1) text, (2) need, (3) profit, (4) goods, wealth, (5) welfare, (6) cause, or reason for, (7) purpose.[1] For the king the word may well have meant one of the three life-aims common to men: *dharma* (duty), *artha* (utility, worldly profit), *kāma* (sensuous, especially sex desire). *Artha* came to be used as a comprehensive term for all things expedient for an educated layman to have studied, and it has its equivalent in the term *nīti*, or guidance, in which Milinda is called proficient.[2] For him then Nāgasena's reply may have meant: "Let us talk about the What-for, or life's aim." And, for all the ambiguities, he would not be far wrong.

This is all, however, not too evident from the translation, and I here give the opening sayings more literally.

The king proceeds: "Having what *attha*, sir, was

[1] See *Kindred Sayings*, i, 317. The Pali equivalents are (1) *pāṭha*, (2) *vicakkhaṇa* or *payojana*, (3) *vuddhi*, (4) *dhana*, (5) *hita*, (6) *kāraṇa*, (7) *kicca*.

[2] Text, p. 3.

your leaving the world? And what is your highest *attha*?" The elder said: "Why, sire! that these ills might be stopped, and other ill might not arise—this, sire, was the *attha* which our leaving the world had. But our highest *attha* (is) utter passing away with no grasping."[1] "Why, sir, does everyone leave the world for that *attha*?" "No, sire, some do; some leave the world to escape from kings, from thieves, from debt, or for a livelihood. But they who rightly leave the world do so for that *attha*." "But did you, sir, leave the world for that *attha*?" "I, sire, left it as a child; I did not know that just 'this' was my *attha*. But it seemed to me 'These Sakya recluses are wise, they will make me learn. Trained by them I know and see: leaving the world is for that *attha*'."

Comparing this with Rhys Davids's translation we see he has used no less than six different words for the one Pali *attha*, with adjective *atthiya*.[2] This was not really needful, as Dr. Schrader has shown with his two terms,[3] and is regrettable.

More worthy and more important is it to note the much loftier plane taken by Nāgasena, as compared with that in the previous talk. It is true that he does not put his salvation into worthy terms; it is negatively conceived, yet that is the fault of his tradition, and for him it *meant* the Highest. The king will have been impressed to better effect than by the unworthy shrivelling up of the aspirant-to-the-highest-he-can-conceive into a not-known-man of even less than so

[1] *Upādāna*. This term is also used for "fuel", or "support" or "substrate". We cannot combine the meanings in one word. Commentaries paraphrase it as "laying strong hold of".

[2] Truth, object, (summum) bonum, end, aim, reasons.

[3] *Ziel, Zweck*. *König Menandros*, p. 21.

many parts and an empty label. He will probably have begun by deeming that Nāgasena was going to talk about " utility " (*artha*) in general, and possibly have wondered a little, that a monk should propose a secular topic. Hence perhaps his prompt turning to the monk's scope in this matter : " Where, in your case, did utility come in ? What for you is of maximum utility ? "

Now we cannot read the Piṭakas without gathering from them, that in this term the Sakya has an old, a Vedic bottle, into which it poured new wine. It is this quickened, loftier, " religious," import given to " the useful ", or to " wealth ", or to " purpose-for-profit " : all old meanings of *artha*, which constrains translators to bring in such renderings as " good ", " goal ", " welfare ", " salvation ", and even " truth ". The deeper content may be drawn from many contexts as amounting to this : that a man's temporal good or advantage (*diṭṭhadhammik' attha*) is shown as closely bound up with his other-world good or advantage (*samparāyik' attha*). Nothing is really " useful " here, which has not the making of utility hereafter.

It was a fine theme, and reflects infinitely more credit on Nāgasena than his unfortunate beginning the previous day. The conversation is turned at once to that concept of man as *atthika*, or seeker after welfare here and hereafter. For this is the hall-mark of the great gospels, that they do not bring to man a new word belittling or negating his nature, but a new word enlarging and enriching life for him, and his capacity to live up to his destiny.

The very next topic will only appear the abrupt

departure that it is, if we imagine the scribe had evidently got a little behindhand with his notes. To imagine there was, here, let alone often elsewhere, no gaps of omitted conversation is much more forced. These gaps are so far a support to the theory of the conversations as actual. It is scarcely credible that a *composition* would proceed by such abrupt steps, not even if it were the committing to writing of Garbe's theory, viz. specific memories lingering as a tradition. If we interpose here some questioning on the king's part into the to him strange connection between end of ill and utter passing away,[1] and this as qualified by "not grasping"[2] or, as it may be rendered, "without the wherewithal" (namely, for further living), his next recorded question: "(Do you really tell me that) anyone dead is not reborn?" follows less abruptly. Moreover, the repetition of the "grasping" term: "If, sire, I shall be co-grasping, I shall be reborn . . ."[3] completes the connection with his definition of his highest purpose (*attha*) just before.

The king's next question follows naturally as a cross-questioning on the mystery of what he is told is an *an-up-pādāna*, a stopping rebirth: "How do you say he is not reborn? Is it by careful thought on the matter?"[4]

The conversation now, in detail and at some length—seven pages of the text—bears on what our age terms psychology. This was then no novelty in India, but had been a strand in the web of its culture for some five centuries. That is to say, since Kapila first taught

[1] *Parinibbāna*. [2] *Anupādāya*.
[3] Translated "with craving for existence" (which smells of the Sinhalese Commentator) and "re-individualized".
[4] "Escape" (in the trans.) is not in the text.

what became known as Sānkhya, and later as the Sānkhya system, the teaching which first considered the mind, and not body only, as (logically) distinguishable from the self, or man. Adopted as legitimate by Sakya, before it was accepted among Brahmans, it leavens the monastic discourses of the Sutta Piṭaka, and acquired notable development in the composition of the later third (Abhidhamma) Piṭaka. For a long time this analytical method of valuing the man in terms of his mental procedure, or ways of minding was promoted into a super-study, or *abhi-dhamma*, being ranked above the religio-ethical teaching of the original Sakyan missioners. We note that Nāgasena, being an intelligent youth, was taught " Abhidhamma " before " Suttanta ".[1] We also read that he now and then explained points in terms of Abhidhamma to the king (text, pp. 45, 56). But since the records are here confused or evasive, we may infer that the scribe may have failed to follow Nāgasena grown technical, and left a mere " etc." (*peyyāla*), and that the references to Abhidhamma are a gloss by the later editors who were familiar enough with such a mode of discourse, and wished to keep up allusions to Nāgasena's erudition.

The definitions in the mind-content of the " man-not-to-be-reborn ", or Arahan are nearly all anticipated in the first book of Abhidhamma, entitled *Dhamma-sangaṇi* or " compendium of dhammās ", my translation of which did not appear till a decade later than the first volume of the Milindapañha translation. A translation also of the Commentary has now been

[1] Text, p. 12. In the trans. (p. 21), " the deeper things of the faith " is merely a free rendering of the word Abhidhamma.

published, and it is worth the historical student's while to compare this version, compiled or translated by Buddhaghosa, and adopted in and since his day in Hīnayāna, with Nāgasena's version. The Commentary was the teacher's running guide to the text, and was left free and unfixed. We see that some of the many similes used by Nāgasena are incorporated by Buddhaghosa into his own much later Pali version. It does not necessarily follow, that these were Nāgasena's original contributions. But his repute in Ceylon, based on the manuscript of these records, had become classic and authoritative by the fifth century A.D. We thus had Buddhaghosa writing "Hence the Thera" . . . or "hence Nāgasena said . . ." We even have him quoting one of the similes: that on rams, and cymbals, to illustrate sense-impact[1]—as a Sutta, which is to make him quasi-canonical. And we can see, by his exposition, how the very dry bones of the Abhidhamma catechisms were made alive and interesting.

They were made so by the delightful inconsistency of breathing life again into the corpse of the slain very-man or self! There is nothing whatever to suggest in these talks between two persons, not average folk but of the day's best culture, that the man, whose qualifications for the highest destiny were under discussion, was so empty a concept-in-the-ultimate-sense, that he was not even parts and a label; or, discounting those four logical alternatives, at best *only* parts and a label. There was nothing to prevent Nāgasena, affirming as he was before such a

[1] Text, 60: *Expositor*, 144 (P.T.S. ed.). Translated by P. Maung Tin, B.Litt. Oxon.

listener, from using speech *consistent with* his opening assertion. When, for instance, he defined and illustrated wisdom (*paññā*), he might have spoken only in terms of state and process, thus: "Even so does thinking grasp the mind and wisdom cut off faults."[1] But he actually says: "Even so does *the recluse* with thinking grasp the mind," etc. And this concession—for so a Buddhist would look upon it[2]—runs all through the talks, with perhaps one exception, and that, significantly enough, is also on *paññā*. This is at the close of the meetings.[3] Nāgasena replies: "Right (*dhamma*), sire, is all-subtle, but things (*dhammā*) are not all of them subtle; 'subtle' or 'coarse'—these are epithets of things; but whatever is divisible there is dividing of all such by wisdom; there is no other dividing (possible) of wisdom (itself)."

The words here "there is dividing" are literally the verb used with only an implicit reference to a subject:—"one divides" (*chindati*)—such as is possible in Latin and Greek, and "one" could translate it "one divides". This is the utmost to which the "man", or subject *in action* is reduced in Abhidhamma. In the *Dhammasangaṇi*, for instance, we get the same idiom: "When for access to another world one makes-to-become a way . . ." (*maggaṃ bhāveti*)[4] . . . And, as I have elsewhere said,[5] it is a little curious that Buddhaghosa, of all, the keenest to emphasize *anatta* in this work and elsewhere, rejects this obscuring of the subject in the verb thus used.

[1] Text, p. 33.
[2] Buddhaghosa does explicitly so look upon it. *Expositor*, p. 404.
[3] Text, p. 86. [4] (Text and trans.), § 160.
[5] "Dhyāna in Early Buddhism": *Indian Hist. Research*, 1927, p. 700. On *Expositor*, 164: "given a *paṭipadā*, there must be a *paṭipannako*."

and explicitly brings him forward, thus: " In such progressive practices, progress arises, *given a progresser*. To show this (the Teacher), making the teaching with the man (*puggala*) preceding, said " as in the text. So curious it is for me, that I am almost driven to think the wording of the text, in Buddhaghosa's day *had* the word *puggala*, or its equivalent just here! But to return.

We have seen that the man-not-to-be-reborn, or arahan, is exempted on the ground of certain intellectual and other *dhamma's*, that is, things or qualities. And that among these, whereas the king is not wrong in suggesting " careful (or systematic) work-of-mind ", the more specific quality is " wisdom " (or understanding): *paññā*. In this, said Nāgasena, even the more intelligent animals have no share. Nay, as he adds later, " it is among *dhamma's* unique; they are divisible, or analyzable; *paññā* analyses, but is itself unanalyzable." *Paññā* then can value, or set worth upon, but may not be valued along with other *dhamma's*.

It is interesting here to note that in thus distinguishing *paññā* from ordinary work of mind, Nāgasena's acquaintance with Suttanta, or the Sutta-collections, did not suggest to him the interesting distinction assigned by (it is said) Sāriputta, in the Majjhima Nikāya, to *paññā*:—" Mind must be *pariññāta*, i.e. examined, scrutinized, analyzed; *paññā* must be *bhāvitā*, i.e. literally ' made-to-become ', or ' -to-grow ', or ' -to-be-realized '." Now this word, the causative form of *bhavati*, to become, the German *werden*, plays a quite significant part in

Sakya teaching, a part which has been almost entirely overlooked. In particular, it is associated with the very important early Sakyan preoccupation with (*a*) musing or Jhāna (originally practised to gain intercourse with the unseen),[1] (*b*) *iddhi*, or cultivation of super-will, or psychic faculty, (*c*) the (as I think) annexed teaching of the Brahmavihāras, or suffusion of another's will by the suffuser's own amity, pity, etc.,[2] (*d*) progress in holiness generally. And we are confronted with the curious bifurcation in word-usage, that whereas this making to become, or willed growth is an honoured term, the non-causative form of it, "becoming" (*bhava*), as implying undirected, unchastened procedure, is strongly deprecated, and the very ending or stopping of it is made a verbal equivalent of perfection: "the stopping of becoming is Nirvana."[3] Becoming (*bhava*) was practically the only word then for our "life" as a whole in the individual, and this, of course, meant any and every sphere of life, past, present, and future, for him.

Indeed, the word "making to become" does not occur at all in the Records portion of our book. Māṇava uses it himself later. This is not because no idea of progress as procedure is absent. On the contrary, the idea psychologically treated had advanced in Nāgasena's day, and this constitutes, as we shall see, one of the most interesting features in the book. But *bhāvanā*, making to become, was a word for spiritual growth, or, in old Sakyan estimate, the essential feature in a votary of the Way. There it replaced the terms for

[1] Cf. art. on Dhyāna, cited above.
[2] *JRAS*. April, 1928. "The Co-founders of Buddhism, a Sequel."
[3] *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, ii, 117; iii, 14; iv, 86.

life as a course of human drifting: *saṃsāra, sandhā-vana*: "faring on," "running on." In the Way—a word meaning all it can do with ourselves—way-faring meant so living as to be coming-to-be as one was not before, the life according to "more-will", the word "way" having to serve for the unworded "will". That early Sakyan day had long gone by. And the man, in the Abhidhamma vogue, had come to be ever more analytically, and less religiously considered. That is to say, he was—as mind—considered in terms of psychological values, and less in the spiritual dimension.

Nevertheless, it is unsafe to see in the history of a religion, a growth which is self-contained, independent, retaining no roots of that out of which it grew. The distinction ascribed to *paññā*, with which the Records all but begin and with which they end, is no Buddhist, but an Indian tradition. It is a "God-word", a super-value—I wish I could say "more-worth"—which had only died out when in, it is thought, the eleventh century, that hardy plant the Abhidhammattha-sangaha, or Abhidhamma vade-mecum was written by Anuruddha of Ceylon. But the supervalue belongs to Vedic thought, and is the ancient Indian wording of the outlook which saw in man, as the most worthy concept of him, Mind, or Thought,[1] and hence conceived Deity also in the same way. Deity as the Good, in thought, word, deed, may have trickled into India from Persia—certainly before Sakya arose. Deity emotionally conceived arose with "*bhakti*"—after the arising of Sakya. But the more static concept of the deified mind remains as the typically pre-Sakyan

[1] This would now be expressed as CHIT (thought).

idea of the Highest in man = self = God. And this reverberates through early Buddhist sentiment.

Perhaps the most eloquent expression of this attitude is the peroration [1] of the Aitareyya Upanishad, which is among the oldest of that collection. Here " this one ", worshipped as the self, is described in a notable list of mental states or processes, as the subject in sensations :—seer, hearer, etc.—as the heart, also as life, and including at the end such approximations to " will " as purpose (*kratu*), desire (*kāma*) and influence (*vasa*). But all are summed up and apotheosized in *prajñāna* (=*paññā*), " who is all the gods, all the five elements . . . yea, whatever breathing thing there be. For all is guided by, is based on *prajña*. Brahman is *prajñā*."

So man at his highest is wisdom or understanding, or mind—I do not pretend that any one of these quite equates the Vedic word. And to become the Highest he has, so the Brahman taught, to realize his identity with IT. The Sakyan taught, he must *make IT become*.[2] I do not say " create ", for the word create was at hand, and would have been used, had that been in the Sakyan mind. It was not making himself into that from whom he was different in nature ; it was rather to elicit, evoke, evolve that inchoate Thing Which he was. And the only word at hand, for what I have described in terms of our new world, was *bhāveti*, " make-become." This it was in man which distinguished him from the rest of living things with which he shared that lower intelligence. He named that " mindwork ",[3] however systematically (*yoniso*) it might act. *Paññā*, in monastic Sakya, gave back to the man with the left hand of a

[1] Possibly added later. [2] *Majjhima*, No. 43. [3] *Manasi-kāra*.

surviving tradition what it explicitly took away from him with the dogma, the dexter finger of the right:—thou, truly, really, art NOT. For in claiming for *paññā*, that it was analyzer, but not to be analyzed, we have it made to take the place of man, the self or subject, just as, in the Upanishad quoted, it stands for the ineffable and in very truth inconceivable Highest.

I have spoken of the idea of procedure or process, psychologically treated, as an interesting feature of the Milindapañha. I think we may not be wrong in calling it a real advance in Indian psychology. The idea of a fact as a happening is already felt and worded in the Piṭakas. We read in the Anguttara Nikāya, that whatever comes about has "three features: arising, passing, and otherwiseness in the persisting".[1] This is remarkably kinetic in its thoroughness, since even the static interval is a changing. It is a good analysis of the term impermanence (*anicca*). But it is not a fruitful idea psychologically speaking; it led only to the conception of mind, or thinking, as a detached number of moments, each a trinity, or triad, such as we first see emerging in the Abhidhamma book called Kathāvatthu, the date of which, or of the first sections of which is placed at nearly two centuries before these conversations. This unfruitfulness may be witnessed in the record of what appears to have been the third conversation (p. 40 of the text), to which we shall come.

Milinda, still perhaps puzzling over Nāgasena's empty fiction of a man, asks, as thoughtful hearers have asked from the date of Piṭaka-compiling[2] to

[1] I, 152; =Tika-Nipāta, 47.
[2] Cf. *Majjhima*, iii, 19; *Saṃyutta*, iii, 103 f.

the present, about a man's identity in survival of death. Nāgasena, in his usual inapt way, falls back on an analogy from the world of things material to the world of things partly material, partly immaterial (i.e. to the man's body, the man's mind). He falls back on the process of physical combustion. Thus, our idea of the lamp's flame is of something inherently continuous; in reality the flame is a number of successive flash-points. He then goes on:—"Even so, sire, is the continuance of *dhammas* arranged; it arises as one, it stops as another; it is arranged as if without before or after; therefore neither (as) the same, nor (as) another does it go to the last-mental-apprehension."[1]

My rendering differs in detail from that of all the other three translations; it is strictly literal and they are not; theirs may read better, but age and experience have brought me much mistrust of aught but the literal. And as the sentence is important, I append both the text and the two German renderings.

PALI.	SCHRADER.	NYANATILOKA.
Evam eva kho, mahārāja, dhammasantati sandahati, añño uppajjati añño nirujjhati, apubbam-acarimaṃ viya sandahati, tena na ca so na ca añño pacchima-viññāṇa-sangahaṃ gacchati.	In derselben Weise . . . erneuert sich die Existenz (wörtlich "Fortdauer") der Wesen und Dinge. Ein anderer entsteht, ein anderer vergeht. Ohne Pause erneuert sie sich, und so gelangt weder als derselbe noch als ein anderer der Mensch bis zu seinem letzten Bewusstseinakt.	Genau in derselben Weise . . . schliesst sich die Kette der Erscheinungen aneinander. Eine Erscheinung entsteht, eine andere schwindet. doch reihen sie sich alle ohne Unterbrechung aneinander. Auf diese Weise gelangt man weder als dieselbe Person noch als eine Andere bei der letzten Bewusstseinsverfassung an.

It is a good object-lesson here to see the Western mind amplifying and unconsciously rectifying the

[1] Text, p. 40. *Santati* is, by Rhys Davids, rendered "series".

old-world Sakyan mind. In the first place the Pali *has no subject* save the impersonal *dhammasantati :* " thing-continuity." The translators have all three introduced the " man ". This is good to see, but it's not in the text ! Next, there is nothing of the " new " (erneuert) in the word *sandahati ;* it is a mechanical term, e.g. an arrow is *sandahati* to a bow ;—fitted, arranged. But to get on :—

Under the word " continuance " (*santati*, a term which was later to be superseded by *santāna*) which has here been transformed into " man ", " Wesen " " Mensch " " Person " (!), there is nothing that may be considered as amounting to an organic unity proceeding. *Dhammas*, that is, mental units or elements, are no more than, as it were, a row of beads, a succession of flickerings. The one does not happen as here stated, because of the other. Or, if it is claimed that this is a doctrine already involved in the Sutta-teaching of what is called " happening-because-of " (*paṭicca-samuppāda*), it may at least be allowed, that the pundit's saying betrays no grasp of what might now be called functional evolution, organic evolution. There is nothing either in the Sutta-formula of causation :—" Given this, that happens," etc., or in this saying, which goes beyond the merely mechanical, conceived implicitly as cosmic necessity.

But then this must be remembered :—the topic here is " the man ", however conceived, and his next life-step, the passing. Now the negation of his reality in " anatta " made this topic very difficult.[1] The older tradition had handed down the teaching, that this passing (save in the mystery of the saint's

[1] Cf. Winternitz, *Gesch. d. Indischen Litteratur*, II, p. 142.

fate) certainly took place; but it had handed down no certain teaching *how* it took place. Hence it was a topic to be dealt with cautiously, so hard was it to maintain the positive tradition, while asserting the negative dogma. Namely, (*a*) that the man survived death, (*b*) that the man was or could only be conceived as *dhammas*-in-*santati*. It was better to keep to the " bead-chain " of momentary *dhammas* and the flickerings, than hazard any new wording of a casual process in mind which might suggest a continuously proceeding entity.

And yet, in a subsequent conversation, when the topic is not on rebirth and the hereafter, but on our earthly subjective experience on occasions of sensation, Nāgasena speaks much more freely and less according to tradition. He shows that either he, or the spirit of his age had been feeling after the idea of functional process in that experience, to an extent which marks a real advance in what would now be called scientific thought.

Milinda has put the question—we should call it psycho-physical—" Where eye-awareness arises, does mind-awareness arise?"[1] (We might now express this as " Where visual sensation occurs, does perception occur?") " Yes, given the one, the other happens." " Which first?" " The former." " Then," Milinda asks, " does eye-awareness issue a command: where I arise, do thou also there arise! Or is it the other way about?" " No, sire, there is no mutual intercourse." " How then does this arise when that arises?" (As if he were to say with us " How do you account for there being a constant

[1] Text, p. 57; trs. i, 89.

uniformity, at least normally?" But scientific language was then a babe.)

Nāgasena, however, has a fourfold generalization ready for him :—"(It is) because of tendency, gateness, habit and practice." And then the usual recourse is had to analogies, all from the material world, to illustrate the psychical law. Thus :—water runs down an incline, men leave the (walled) city by way of the gate; in the caravanserai, cart No. 2 follows No. 1 from habit; in reckoning and writing the hand, eye, mind come by practice to work mechanically, literally, without clumsiness.

Here, nothing of course is genuinely explained. All that has been gained is a *wording of conformity to a norm*. But the conformity had not before—at least in Pali literature—been so clearly expressed. The very terms are, all four of them, new abstract constructions, save that the second :—*dvāratta*—is virtually the same as the *dvāratā* of the Anguttara and Dīgha formulas.[1] (Our John Bunyan made play with " gate " in writing of the senses,[2] but I doubt if he coined an abstract term for it.) And in those new abstract forms I see the Buddhist mind reaching out to get at that worthier expression of causation as an orderly becoming, than it dared seek when confronted (*a*) with the cessation at death of this organic procedure, together with (*b*) the necessity of providing somehow some further station or persistent datum (*ṭhiti*) for *that-who-connected*.

It is anyway a worthier effort in causation than that shown in the so-called "Causal Origin of Ill" formula, where causation is only of values as lending, in its sure uniformity, a base of confidence in effort *not* to

[1] D., iii, 213; A., i, 94. [2] In *The Holy War*.

produce, create, evolve, but to stop. There is, it is true, one bright exception to that woe-begotten sequence. But what Buddhist knows, what Buddhist reveres and teaches it :—" . . . knowledge and vision is caused by concentration ; this by happiness ; this by serenity ; this by rapture ; this by joy ; this by faith . . .?"[1] And even here the sequence begins with woe, and trails away again to woe and the stopping of the cause. Moreover it survives alone, a solitary exception

Advance in the wording of mental events as process casually determined, and not as bare—how shall I call it ?—repetitive continuum, is seen in a later conversation on recollection (*sati*, Sanskrit *smṛti*). There had been no attempt, in such Abhidhamma as found its way into the Piṭaka so called, to carry on mind-work beyond analysis of sensation. This is curious, but it is true. The fusion of manifold sensations into the percept, that is, the thing, that is, *dhammās* is ascribed to mind (*mano*). This was called in what are probably two ancient Suttas, one already quoted, the " resort " (*paṭisaraṇa*)[2]—one is tempted to call it the referee, or referring. Although the word does not, in its *form*, express an agent, the Commentary illustrates this so-called " mind " functioning thus, by a king, enjoying the tithes paid him by five feudal tenants.[3] Again, Buddhaghosa makes the word stand for personal agency by calling the " Blessed One " himself *paṭisaraṇa*. Referring to the oft-repeated Sutta-wording he says : " Disciples sometimes invite the

[1] Saṃyutta, ii, 30 ; *Kindred Sayings*, ii, 26.
[2] Lit. : " going back to," or more substantively, the " home " or " refuge ". Majjhima Nikāya, p. 295 (No. 43) ; Saṃy. N., v, 218.
[3] Majjhima Comy. (Papañca Sūdanī), ii, 349.

master's teaching by saying (in response to a question from him): Things have the Exalted One as their root, their guide, their resort. Well for us if he reveal the meaning"[1] . . . The comment goes on: "Things (*dhammā*) of all four planes (of being), coming into the focus of his omniscience, are said to resort to the Exalted One, they make him their 'resort', they go down, they keep going down (or, go down together) . . . Thus contact (*phassa*) comes to his discernment asking: What is my name? Thou art 'contact' in the sense of searching" . . . The four mind groups ask in turn "each receiving a name according to its nature."[2]

The illustrations of "things" by persons are of course just the play of fancy, and Buddhaghosa, strong in his *anatta* view, would be eager to say so. But if the two Suttas, one in the Majjhima and one in the Saṃyutta Nikāya, coinciding in this account of "mind" functioning as a common "resort" to manifold sensations, be indeed surviving fragments of genuine early Sakya, I am inclined to see in their wording not what I formerly saw. That is, that they were originally not an Indian anticipation of the European *sensus communis*, or "faculty" of common sense, or sense co-ordinating but that they were once worded *as* "*the self*", *the man*, being the resort of the elements of experience, and as such, in our phrasing, the valuer (the worth-er) of these. Then, when the protesting attitude against the self as immanent, unchanging deity waned, and the protest turned against the real, ultimate existence of any self at all, the word *attan* was, by anxious editors, converted into *mano*.

[1] E.g. Ang. i, 199. [2] Sāratthappakāsinī, *ap.* Saṃy. ii, 24.

And so we get a *dhamma*, or order of *dhammas*, instead of a self experiencing them. I return to *sati*.

In the early days of Sakya the meaning conveyed by the Prakrit term *sati* will have been none other than its Vedic equivalent *smṛti*. This is " memory ", " remembering ", but the religious import of the word was then not psychological, or function of mind; it meant that memorized tradition which in our day has been superseded by " Scriptures ". The Sakya reformers, in cutting themselves, in religious loyalty, adrift from the established Smṛti of their land, were without a religious basis and status *until they had created a Smṛti of their own.*[1] Until time and teaching and a corporate loyalty to principles, leader and community had resulted in a new Smṛti of their own, it was of the first importance for the Sakyans to cultivate the attitude of *men having-a-Smṛti*. And this would be a mental clarity, heedfulness and earnestness as to their convictions about man and his destiny. Thus conducting themselves, they would in time come to memorize a worthy Smṛti.

Thus far we have the two units: the man, the Smṛti. And perhaps the earliest testimony we have to the two ideas mutually confronted is in the first section of that venerable category, later made up to, and numbered as the 37 Bodhipakkhiya Dhammas, or, as we might say, " Limbs of Wisdom," namely, the Four Satipaṭṭhānas :—the " establishings " (*paṭṭhāna*), or more probably the " Presences " (*upaṭṭhāna*), of Smṛti.[2] Here the man is contemplating what he

[1] " It was for us to make our own Vedas, our own mantras." *Gotama the Man*, p. 143.

[2] It is curious, but the Commentaries prefer *paṭṭhāna* to the more obviously rational *upaṭṭhāna*, a word constantly used in connection with *sati*.

reckons himself in his composite nature to be; and that is fourfold, not fivefold—for the five groups, although inserted everywhere, came later. With these four and the whole 37 I hope to deal elsewhere.

Sati, then, or *Smṛti* was clearly a very important thing or *dhamma*. As the vogue grew in the Sakya to worsen the unseen reality of the self or man, and to resolve him into a composite of *dhammas* or mental presentations, we see the externalized meaning of *sati* (oral tradition) giving way to the inner meaning of the word " memory ". The worthy man, the good, or rather the " more man " was, as *we* might put it—they did not—a " living embodiment " of earnest lucid thought, or *mindfulness*. I am not sure which Indologist first used this word, Rhys Davids, or another. But he showed himself therein that rare-minded man, a *historical* psychologist.

For *sati*, even as divorced from memorized tradition, is not merely a psychological factor *in the modern sense*. It is neither just " memory ", nor is it just " awareness ". It is more; that is to say, it is more than these in the Piṭakas. It is the very man or self transferred to mind. Rhys Davids's other rendering " self-possession ", in its very structure, is a testimony to this, illogical though it be to word self as possessing self. It is anyway a logic prevalent in Sakyan thought, which makes, at least in word, " self " react on self.[1] Nor is Spence Hardy so very wrong in using " conscience " for *sati*.[2] In *sati* man is heeding *dhamma* within him, and what else is conscience to the Sakyan, to the Buddhist? It is true the latter has externalized the Sakyan " dhamma ", and made it

[1] Cf. *Buddhist Psychology*, 28 f. [2] *Manual of Buddhism*, 412.

his Smṛti, his now scripturalized religious sanction. The first Sakyans were not in a position to do this.

In the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, *sati* is included as one of several concomitant *dhammas* of " good " thoughts, not of thoughts which are ethically bad or neutral. The definition of it as such runs thus :—" Mindfulness on that occasion is recollecting, calling back to mind, remembering, bearing in mind, the opposite of superficiality and of obliviousness . . . "[1] Nāgasena's definition is very curt, quoting only " the opposite of superficiality ", and adding what is, I believe, a later word, meaning to learn.[2] For him too, mindfulness is become just an adjunct of the good mind. What is most curious about his definition is the absence of any reference to the Buddhist terms for memory, remembering. This, it is true, is made good in a later conversation (text, p. 78 f.), where in reply to the king's question, " how many ways are there of remembering ? " Nāgasena launches out into an interesting and lifelike disquisition on what, among ourselves, came to be known as the laws of the association of ideas.

He gives 16 as the number, but actually describes 17. They are largely redundant, and might be reduced to half a dozen at most, without essential loss. And among them we recognize our own association by similarity, by contrast, by contiguity. Nothing of this kind had previously appeared in any Buddhist literature, or, if I err not, any Indian literature. It is as if the tongue of the dumb had been loosened, and a word, used for centuries—*sati*, *smṛti*—found to contain meanings never before expressed.

[1] *Dhammasangaṇi*, § 11.

[2] *Upagaṇhana*, p. 37.

Almost I am inclined to believe that the many modes were asked, not of *sati*, as we have it in the text, but *anu-ssati*, or *anussaraṇa*. These are Piṭakan terms, and we have, in the Anguttara,[1] categories of 4, and of 10 Anussati's, or subjects to be called up and reflected upon, which Buddhaghosa much later elaborated in his Visuddhi-Magga.[2] If *anussati* was the word used here, in the Milindapañha, but edited later, in Ceylon, to *sati*, we can then understand, that in the Buddhist teaching at Nālandā, in Nāgasena's day, *sati* was retained in its Suttanta meaning, as the attitude of mindfulness, or thorough sincerity and clear-mindedness in thought, word and deed, while *anussati* was used for that " memory " or " recollection ", which was the *sati* " in its first intention ", and as such, had undergone interesting development in psychological expression.

What is perhaps yet stranger is, that Buddhaghosa, who cites Nāgasena with respect as a not-to-be-questioned authority, even to the extent of calling his ruling a Sutta, does not allude to, much less make better use of, his exposition of modes of remembering. We may yet come across a commentarial passage showing I am wrong. But just where the context occurs which calls most pertinently for his own exposition on those modes, namely, his comment on *sati* as *saraṇatā* (recollection), his treatment betrays no knowledge of Nāgasena's " 16 ways ", nor does he show himself capable of supplying his own exposition.[3]

We are driven to conclude, from this discrepancy in the history of such ideas in Buddhism, taken in

[1] In Catukka and Dasaka Nipātas.
[2] Ch. vi.
[3] *Atthasālinī*, 147 ; *Expositor*, i, 194.

conjunction with other similar cases, that in both the text and the commentary, the academic inquiries called Abhidhamma underwent in Ceylon as to *both* a different development from that which it underwent at Patna and then at Nālandā. When Buddhaghosa wrote a recast of the Sinhalese written version of the commentaries in Pali, he may well have found Nāgasena already cited in these. It is on the other hand possible, that those citations are his own interpolations, made from our book which he either had read and in parts memorized, or copied from, *before* he went to Ceylon, or while he was there. Either, then, he found the citations and just translated them, or he, knowing his Nāgasena and appreciating much in his sayings, forgot, or was not interested in some of them, such as that on modes of recollecting.

I spoke just now of similar cases. Take Nāgasena's replies giving definitions of other terms which are formally defined in the opening and therefore probably the oldest section of Abhidhamma. It is not a little interesting to compare these parallel replies on

	Dhammasangaṇi	*Milindapañha*[1]
	—	morals (*sīla*)
§ 12	faith-faculty	faith (*saddhā*)
§ 13	effort-faculty	effort (*viriya*)
§ 14	mindfulness-faculty	mindfulness
§ 15	concentration-faculty	concentration (*samādhi*)
§ 2	contact	contact[2] (*phassa*)
§ 3	feeling	feeling (*vedanā*)
§ 4	perception	perception (*cetanā*)
§ 6	mind (*citta*)	mind (*viññāṇa*)
§ 7	attention (*vitakka*)	attention (*vitakka*)
§ 8	reflection (*vicāra*)	reflection (*vicāra*)

and with them, Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the Dhammasangaṇi definitions.[2] We see how alive and

[1] Readers will note the different renderings in S.B.E. translation, made in days of pre-Abhidhamma study. The footnotes will guide.

[2] *Expositor*, pp. 191 f., 180 f.

pleasant the dry definitions become when taught in the original way, as Nāgasena and Commentary taught:—text illustrated by picturesque parable. The parables often coincide in the two works, and we may be right in supposing, not that Nāgasena was the originator, but that his commentarial stock of illustrations was of and from that which had found its way some time before to Ceylon. Else he had probably been oftener cited over them than he is. But it is in the definitions that we note the main differences. There is practically not one presenting verbal or even essential coincidence. In some terms Nāgasena's definitions are truer, deeper; in some his are poorer.

It may be said, that his definitions are largely confined to detecting "the characteristic mark" (*lakkhaṇa*). But this is, in the *Milindapañha*, come to be the academic form of defining, namely, to indicate the salient feature, stamping or marking (*lakṣ*) it as what it actually, virtually *was*. It is not a Piṭaka mode. In Buddhaghosa's day definition had been further elaborated into a fourfold logic, the *lakkhaṇa* and three more modes of distinguishing:—*rasa* (taste, essence), specialized into *kicca*, function, or *sampatti*, possession, *paccupaṭṭhāna*, recurring presentation, and *padaṭṭhāna*, ground, causal precedent. The *Milinda-pañha* therefore is in this also an intermediate link between Piṭaka as written and Commentary as written.

Now the text was something that could not be so freely handled as the annotation, i.e. commentary. It might, it is true, be not cited quite correctly. We have already noted two discrepancies in Nāgasena's definitions.[1] These may be due to (1) faulty memory

[1] Of faith and of mindfulness.

of the citer, (2) citing from a differing version of the text. Had we to deal with just those two slips—if slips they were—we might accept the first explanation. Even then we should have expected to find Ceylon editors correcting, assuming that they were well versed in the whole body of their Suttas, as we now, with our printed editions, can be. But the long list of divergent definitions, revealed in the matter of the two tables given above, should be enough to persuade us, that we have, in Nāgasena's definitions, citations from a recension of Abhidhamma (not to say, also Suttanta) as authoritative in Buddhist North India, which differed, had evolved differently, from that which had evolved, in Ceylon, and had there been written down. Always assuming however, that Nāgasena would hold strictly to the letter of that N. Indian recension. If he did not, we come to this alternative and not very improbable solution, that a teacher of great distinction and worth, as Nāgasena was reputed to be, might hold himself free to teach what he knew *as* he judged best, holding more to the spirit than to the letter.

Sometimes his plan, if indeed this was free and not text-bound, yields better results than are to be got from the text as we have it. It is difficult to conceive a definition of faith, as it is in Dhammasangaṇi, § 12, as very helpful to the student :—" believing, stabilizing, great satisfaction " :—this, literally rendered, is the reading.[1] Nāgasena's two characteristics[2] give on the one hand the serenity of faith's clear shining, and the more-will or forward urge proceeding from it. It

[1] My translation of 1900 is too much affected by the Commentary.
[2] " Tranquillization and forward leaping." " Aspiration " (S.B.E.) is very free.

is well characterized, although it is not defined as we reckon definition, and the illustrations are more curious than to us convincing. It is noteworthy that the Buddhist, turning away from the Highest conceived either as not-ourselves, or as That who thou art, is forced to make faith, in its forward urge, determined not by a somewhat supreme, but by the urge as manifested in others who, no less than he, are in need of what faith can give. It is one arm of faith : that of the explorer, the fighter, the mariner, in men who have been or are in like adventure with himself. But religious faith is more than that, even in Sakya when rightly understood.

In characterizing effort, or, as I have much called it, energy (*viriya*), he falls behind the noteworthy synonyms which, as is the usual way, *define* a term in Abhidhamma. There *viriya* is " initiative (*ārambha*), striving and onward effort, exertion and endeavour, zeal and ardour, vigour and fortitude, unfaltering effort, sustained desire, sustained endurance, inclusive supporting of the burden " :—brave words, and a fine effort to word the unworded " will ". Nāgasena contents himself with characterizing *viriya* as " propping up " (*upatthambana*). This is in no way a feature to be despised, but the outlook has lost the initial force of the term as used in the Piṭaka, and which will have reverberated there from the youthful vigour of the great Founder's will and that of his co-workers. There is, in Nāgasena's *viriya*-characterization, some sign of the decadence, the premature age-weariness creeping over Sakya through excessive value of things monastic.

I now leave these considerations, which belong mainly to what a Buddhist would call Abhidhamma, and we psychology (or we of yesterday, philosophy), and ask whether they have brought us nearer to answering the question :—What was for Nāgasena, not for Buddhaghosa, not for modern Buddhist ecclesiasticism, the " man " ?

Or have we not first to account for another curious feature in Milinda as here presented :—I mean, the patient way in which he is shown taking a polite and submissive curiosity in the wearisome list of technical terms trotted out by Nāgasena ? Had he shown the slightest interest in comparing these with analogous terms in doctrines better known perhaps to him, such as Sānkhya, Yoga, Vedânta, an explanation had been possible, and the text have satisfied us. As it is, his cross-questioning is merely the dutiful routine-procedure of a pupil, who is not even showing the live curiosity of an intelligent questioner. A strange change in fact is made to come over him. His first rejoinder is very natural, very interesting, and is just what we might expect a sharp-witted man of the world to be uttering on hearing Nāgasena's curious asseveration about his name and him-" self ". But after the second talk begins we have the natural speech of the educated " outsider " recurring only here and there. For the most part Milinda is as a youth who has listened to a string of terms and has to have them explained. What has happened to the historical Milinda ?

My reply is that Milinda has largely been de-edited from, edited out of, the records. He appears as a very real aristocrat, and as such, holding converse so

picturesquely with an eminent Elder of the Indian Sangha, that it will have seemed to the Ceylon Elders, when the manuscripts came into their hands, an irresistible opportunity for dressing up the conversations, and converting them into an excellent manual for conveying instruction attractively to Sinhalese lay or clerical students. Once we let these editors in, we are no longer certain at any turn, that we have a faithful reproduction in Pali of what Māṇava wrote.

But that he wrote, and that he was recording I believe none the less. The abrupt, brief half-disconnected succession of remarks do not bear for me the stamp of the *made* dialogue. That is what we find in the following sections which I have ventured to call Māṇava's own later compositions. There we find, not the somewhat tentative, fragmentary, "jibbing", almost desultory way of the recorded conversations—qualities which stamp them, for me, as such—but the select topic, the formal presentation of it, the fluency, the rounded completeness of the written composition. And it was a relatively easy matter for editors-with-a-purpose to put new meals into the little plates of the recorded talks. I believe they spared not to do this, and that what we have now in Pali is little more than the shell of the Sanskrit original.

But this much we can see in our refitted shell, in reply to my own question,—and that perhaps despite the good editors. Nāgasena enters with an emphatic denial of the man (or self) as having anywhere, anyhow such ultimate reality as could be "got at",

or immediately known.[1] Nothing is obviously real, but his " Khandhas ", bodily and mental, nor indeed is he even other than these :—a double negation, " neither *x* nor not-*x*." He is then in many details describing qualities (*dhammas*) on account of which salvation (end of rebirth) is won. And each of these is at the outset impersonally characterized. Thus, wisdom is a cutting off, a lighting up. So that our " man " is indeed *resolved into a confluence of ideas about him.*

But Nāgasena then, as our young folk say, gives away the show by applying an illustration of the idea, quality, or *dhamma* to the " man ", as the bearer of the idea, the actor with the idea. The man—recluse, or what not—cuts off, the man sees with his wisdom-lamp, the man stands on morals as on the earth, presses on in faith, uses props, learns and remembers. Here and there, it is true, he succeeds in keeping impersonal so far as to make his man, be he king or another, only the symbol of the quality.[2] But he is ever slipping back ; and we like him all the better for his natural reverting, his metaphysical lapses, his return to the real world of the " man " from the artificial, academic world of the Word.

When the king confronts him with the need of restating his original position, asking him again, and yet again : " Is there an experiencer ? " [3] he is ready as before with his scholastic reservation : " not got at." This as I have said has been interpreted as a negation,

[1] I use the term " immediately ", albeit it is nowhere found in connection with the term *upalabbhati*, because this Pali term *suggests* it. " Intuitively," *paccakkhato*, would be the Pali equivalent, yet that too is absent.

[2] E.g. *samādhi*, text p. 38.

[3] Text, 54–7, 71. " *Vedagu* " :—a dialectical variety of *vedako*.

and negation it did become in the time of the Commentators—of that there can be no doubt. But *their* phrase was " is not "; Nāgasena's was " is not got at ". And this in spite of his uncompromising eliminations of the " man " at the first meeting.

As to that, the more I ponder over the text, the more I am driven to see, in the edited account of the first interview, a later insertion of those four logical alternatives, in which the existence of the " man " is utterly wiped out. Had Nāgasena said that much, there was no need for him to have used the guarded phrase " not got at ". I should judge him (or his Sangha) to have been more like our Hume :—sceptical, but not Nihilist. So also was Moggalīputta Tissa, the alleged compiler of (at least part of) the Kathāvatthu. And Nāgasena went no further than his Kathāvatthu suffered him to go. He may almost be said to have gone less far, and that in two directions.

Namely, he omits the phrase " is not got at in a real sense " (*saccik'aṭṭhena*). In the Kathāvatthu it is maintained by the orthodox, that the " man " is " not got at in an ultimate, in a truthful ", i.e. real " sense ". The older Sutta,[1] be it noted, has the latter adjective only. And this is historically interesting. For in the older tradition the word *paramattha* was of highest religious import, *and of that only*, meaning the Highest Weal, the End of the Way.[2] It was not yet dragged into the service of logomachy.[3] The Self, it runs in the Sutta, is " not got at as real, as permanent " (*thetato*. For the Commentator, " as permanent ", be it noted, has become only an

[1] Majjhima (Alaggadûpama). [2] Cf. its use in Sutta-Nipāta.
[3] *Infra*, p. 87.

alternative rendering). Why Nāgasena should have quoted his Kathāvatthu only in part must remain unsolved. He had every reason to quote fully. But then we are dealing with a talk, and with a scribe's record :—how much may not have got omitted by talker or by recorder ! It is another testimony to the truth of my theory.

And so also is the other direction in which Nāgasena went less far in veering away from the " man " than his tether allowed. Namely, he does not expressly say that, of the two ways in which man was worded in the Kathāvatthu as agent :—*kāraka* (doer) and *vedaka*, or, to be literally correct, *paṭisaṃvedī* (experiencer)—he is in *both* these ways not got at. For Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta the man does not really exist in either way ; there is only doing and experiencing. And the same is re-echoed, if possible even more flatly to-day in monastic Burma [1] !

To man as doer we shall come presently. There is yet a word to say on him as experiencer.

To Milinda's description of the " experiencer " as the " living-one " (*jīva*), who senses (as we now say) by way of the five special modes of sense and mind (*mano*), these being likened to windows giving on the four quarters, Nāgasena objects in a way of which a European may not see the force. To the Indian mind the idea of the self was ineradicably associated with the idea of the super-human, the more-than-man, Deity. " If a man," runs the Upanishad saying, probably contemporary, more or less, with the origins of Sakya, " beholds the self, ware that ' I am he ',

[1] This holds good in Burma to-day among scholastic monks, *JPTS.* 1914, p. 158.

as God immediately in himself, lord of what has been and what will be, he is no more unquiet over anything."[1] We read our translations of the much sublime thought in those books and get into the way of *confronting* our self, man's self, himself, with THE SELF. And we forget, if we knew, that in the Vedic (as in Pali) these appropriations of the human self by pronouns prefixed do not exist. So that to say " beholds the self " is not differently expressed from " beholds himself ". Now if there be a man, a self, somehow inhabiting or informing the body, this is to say, that there is " a god in the machine ". And what need, said Nāgasena, has Such an One of this and that channel in the machine for this and that kind of sense-impression ? To need and use these is to make the man, the self, no better than an animal. As the One Divine, as Ātman, as Brahman, the man in virtue of his very nature were able to perceive without senses, without doors or gates, without adjusting himself to get a better light, a wider view and so on. But inasmuch as you, sire, and I have to bring these means to more knowing into play, can we say that we get at ourselves, viz. " at a self ", as " experiencers ? "

This is for us, or it should be, an argument of no value. We are not pledged, as was Indian thought, to the alternative : either Thou art That in Its fulness, or That and Thou are not. Now beside the idea of Being, fixed and static, the Sakya placed the idea of Becoming, growing and dynamic. But this idea was unable to take firm root, and give India a worthier conception of man as kin to the Divine. The Sakya fell back on the mere negation *anicca*, impermanent, as the only

[1] Brihadâranyaka Up., iv, 4, 12, 15, etc., etc.

way to oppose the *Sat*, or Being of Vedic teaching. And this was because the worthiest concept of man was static, not dynamic, was thought or mind, not *will*. In man conceived as having self-expression in will, we have the very essence of a coming-to-be, of a More. In " mind " we place ourselves in the " Is " ; in " will " we place ourselves in the Becoming. It is only in will that we can reconcile and behold as one the human and the divine.

Handicapped as he was herein, we see no effort made by Nāgasena to discuss the outward going, or efferent expression of an " inner *jīva* ". He and Milinda are the first users, in our Buddhist literature, of the word *vedaka*, experiencer. And as we shall see, there is also discussion on man as *kāraka*. But as such, and not *as anticipating the act in the will* is there discussion.

His argument as to the superfluous character of a sensory apparatus for an experiencing self is historically interesting, because it does not occur to the compiler of the Kathāvatthu in the same context, namely, where the denier of the " man " is challenged to explain the testimony of language to an experiencer. The argument there is that, if there be an experiencer when nothing sensory is being sensed, can he be held to persist as *pro tem.* non-experiencer—a matter with which our own philosophy has concerned itself.

I have pointed out that Nāgasena only said that a *vedaka*, was not " got at ". He did not include a kāraka. We will now see how the conversations turned from man as the former to man as the latter, as the doer.

In our book the word *kāraka* for man as agent, doer, maker does not occur here. The alternative form *kattar* occurs, but it is only used by the king, who does so in his very vivid opening rejoinder (text, p. 25), and by Māṇava in his own later composition (text, 296). Both terms were of earlier date and either might have served, as well as *vedaka* (*vedagu*) for the formula . . . " is not got at." But only the one is chosen. I see in this informal incomplete treatment an argument in favour of the theory, that we have here (fragments at least of) real conversations. For with the precedent, in the Kathāvatthu, of the careful serial debate on each term :—first *kāraka*, *kattar*, then the other (*paṭisaṃvedī*)—it is difficult to imagine a literary composer omitting one half of these two aspects of the man in his formulated thesis :—*paramatthena . . . n'upalabbhati.*

This is not to say that man as doer is not discussed. He is so, repeatedly and in a way not without historical interest. Indeed the theory of real conversations would be much tried if it were not so. The king was necessarily in the first place a man of action. Questions bearing on inner experience will have occupied his leisure thoughts only. And from the first he sees the man as doer, and as experiencer in consequence of what he does. His subsequent questions start from the vital matter : " in order to what have you taken such a course of action ? " And when the Elder proceeds to build up *as qualities* the sort of " man " he aspired to be, in order to attain the goal of that course, Milinda, after considering those qualities, and proceeding, with intelligent curiosity, to inquire into consequences hereafter, persists mainly in discussing them as consequences, namely, of deeds and of

antecedents of deeds. And whereas we here meet with no such negative formula as in the case of man as experiencer, we see Nāgasena stressing chiefly the impersonal side, namely, of deeds, or *karma*, and their antecedents, or *sankhārā*. And again we note his lapses into all these as being only intelligible when referred to an agent (a doer and willer)—lapses which the king would find so rational, that he forgot to pin him down to consistency, as he had at first tried to do, lapses which our own psychology is ever committing, and which we all have, like Milinda, passed over unnoticing when discussing the questions and in general.

At the end of the detailed characteristics of the " man " who is not to be reborn, the king may have had in his mind the problem: "What then does this good friar mean by ' to be reborn ' ? Let me have that out of him before I take him up on the ' not being reborn '."[1] The word for " reborn ", *paṭisandahati*, is now sometimes changed for the more usual term " arises " or " happens " (*uppajjati*).[2] " As re-born, is one the same, or is one another ? " (the word another, *añño* is more sharply distinctive than our " different ", and implies not so much an altered unit as a new or fresh unit).

Milinda asks " *Who* is reborn ? " This is a good try at pinning his rival down. But all three translators have here " what " (*was* reborn), for " who ". The Pali has " who ", " *ko* "[3]; and for the king the *whole force of his position, as believer in the " man ", lay in his using " who "*. To ask " what ", not " who ", is

[1] Text, p. 46. [2] Translated " born ", virtually meaning " reborn ".
[3] " What " is " kiṃ ".

reborn, is to come over to the other side and anticipate the opponent's reply, without striking another blow, and the slip is curious and regrettable.

The reply is of course in terms of the not-man, but with a word which had, for Nāgasena's tradition, lost its Vedic meaning :—" name-and-form." [1] " Name " in the Rig-Veda is " person ", the thinker, the being, the experiencer, the speaker, not just the mind as which it came, in Sakyan monasticism, to be used.[2] And " form " stood for the name's manifestation, bodily *and* psycho-physical.

It is the deeds done by name-form (*a*), which cause another name-form (*b*) to be reborn. And because of the character of these deeds, (*b*) is born akin to (*a*), and as such " is not released from ", in other words *is experiencer* of, their results. On the way in which the linking up is carried out no explanation of a rational kind is given, nor yet is want of knowledge how to do so frankly and honestly expressed. A non-rational explanation is made by way of physical analogies : flame from another flame, fruit from its seed. And, as I have said, this mode of reasoning by a mere external likeness, obtaining to a partial extent, was apparently held, then and there, to be satisfying. And so, in our present idiom, that is that. But that any modern scholar should have commended such replies as apt is indeed a testimony to our own lamentably faulty philosophy.

To Milinda's question : " What is here name, what form ? the reply is " this is gross, that is subtle,

[1] *Nāma-rūpa.*

[2] *Majjhima Nikāya*, i, 65. " Contact, feeling, perception, thinking mindwork " : that is *nāma*.

to wit, *dhammas* (which are) mind-and-mental "[1] :—a comprehensive idiom for what we should now call consciousness. The two adjectives gross, subtle were apparently the nearest concept of ancient India to our more essentially divided matter and mind. To the question why do we not have the one (" name ") reborn separately from the other (" form ")—a very pertinent pinning, if the man be a group of *dhammas*—the reply is now tantamount to a confession of ignorance :—It is so because it has ever been so, or at least " for a long time ". Neither translation is here sufficiently literal, but the English gives us the Pali in a footnote.

Milinda pursues him closely :—" What then is time ? " The reply opens up an interesting vista of what, in Nāgasena's day, or in him as representing possibly a new fetch of mind, we do not meet before in any known Buddhist literature. Namely, he links up time with becoming. And he finds both linked together in the idea of a man's inner activity worded as *sankhāra's*.

This word, meaning literally " doing-together's ", and practically untranslatable is here tentatively rendered " confections ".[2] The translator held it was best to give a mere literal rendering, and await ancient expositions of the term becoming accessible. A decade later he changed to " conformations ",[3] conforming more, it may be, to French and German fellow-workers' choice. The abstract form as of " things *made* " is unfortunate ; " things in the making " had been better. Confectings is impossible ;

[1] *Citta-cetasikā.* [2] Trs., p. 79 f.
[3] *Buddhist* (American) *Lectures,* 1896, p. 157.

" conformings " is awkward. Many of us have belaboured the translation ; if we are as honest as Rhys Davids we shall one and all have, with his latest word, confessed that " we are not particularly enamoured of " our renderings.[1] Dr. Schrader surrenders by asserting that *sankhārā* is but an alternative term to *dhammā* with the general meaning of " things ".[2] There is much to be said for " things " : there *is* a more general use of *sankhārā* meaning " all things ", " things temporal ", "the world " (as in the text) . . . passeth away: *sabbe sankhārā aniccā*, which is the Buddhist's commonplace at a death.

But there is the less general, the more human meaning, no less than there is in the word *dhammā*. And the two terms here do not to this extent coincide, namely, that the one, *sankhārā*, is a species of the genus *dhammā*. Further, there is here the special and noteworthy linking up of time and becoming under the notion *sankhārā*, that we do not meet with under the notion *dhammā* as " things ", nor even as mental things. We have, it is true, the notion of " being made to become " linked up with desirable mental things.[3] But there is a difference between the willed effort of the causative form (*bhāvanā*) and the fact of becoming viewed as a natural law of human life (*bhava*).

There is the further stress, in *sankhārā* as " human " not stressed in *dhammā*, and that is their involving an aspect of the man as active, as a working or combining in order to radiate, to be outgoing, to express himself. This is not patent in *dhammā*, albeit in the concept *dhamma* (the " right ", *and* the

[1] *Early Buddhism*, p. 85. [2] Nyanatiloka uses " (geistige) Gebilde ".
[3] *Bhāvānā, bhāveti, bhāvita*, commented on already, p. 48 f.

sense of, or urge to, the right) that aspect is latent. This aspect of activity is unmistakably seen in the widespread Buddhist symbol of potter, wheel and pots for *sankhārā*. "They are represented in an Ajanta fresco by all three; in the later Tibetan pictures by the wheel and the pots without the potter; in the still later Japanese picture by the potter's wheel alone."[1] How significant is not the varied presentation of the history of Sakya! First, the man as willer or purposer, and doer or maker:—the only possible, because the only acceptable view in India, when Gotama lived and taught the man as wayfarer in the Way of the worlds; then Sakya, as monastic, dropping the man from its ship; finally, the man, in a quite modern psychological way, treated as being only his "ways", his "doing", his minding!

Glancing at the content of the term *sankhara*, we note another fact of interest. This is not loaded up and cumbered with the fifty and more constituents given in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka,[2] nor is it the simpler threefold division under thought, word and deed (the true Sakyan division) which we meet with in venerable Suttas like the Vedallas of the Majjhima Nikāya (No. 44). Nothing permanently profitable to the new Word in the Sakyan gospel has resulted, as surviving teaching, of either the one or the other. It is difficult to see, so as to express, the advantage, which for the teachers of Abhidhamma, lay in the long yet not obviously exhaustive list. Nor, for that matter, in the similar list of *cetasikā dhammā* which replaced it in mediæval Hīnayāna.[3] Nevertheless, in these old-

[1] Rh. Davids, *Buddhism* (American Lectures), p. 156.
[2] *Dhammasangaṇi*, bk. i, *passim*. Cf. *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 237 f.
[3] *Compendium of Philosophy*, pp. 146–8.

world efforts at science, it was doubtless necessary and reasonable too to bring into the field of the thinker all the vocabulary there was. Where the words were mustered, ideas might the better be reviewed.

The number of *sankhārās* given in our book is six only, these being six of the first seven constituents given in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka as constants in any and every " thought " (*citta*) arising in man. There is no indication that this list is not presented as complete. It may be, the pundit spared the king a longer, tedious catalogue, yet it would have been more academically probable that he would at least, in that case, have added " any many more ", an *et cetera* which we actually get in the Abhidhamma itself, after the whole 52. It leaves us again wondering whether, and how far the Indian Abhidhamma really tallied with the seven books of the Pali Piṭaka, the maintenance of which we associate mainly with Ceylon, and then, and now, mainly with Burma ? Nāgasena makes no reference to any of the seven books ; when he refers to their teaching, namely, twice,[1] he calls them the Abhidhamma-Saṃyutta, a title not elsewhere, I believe, applied to them. I leave the insoluble question for what Nāgasena does tell us.

This is, that duration (*addhāna*) is a condition of men who are in process of becoming, of growth towards perfection. It is only they who have consummated in growth for whom duration is not. I will give this literally rendered, since Rhys Davids's translation is not literal. " Those sankhārās which are of the past, are gone, stopped, transformed ; that duration is not ; those dhammas which are maturing, which have the

[1] Text, 45, 56.

quality of maturing, which give rebirth elsewhere, that duration is; those beings who have died and have arisen elsewhere, that duration is; those beings who have died and have not arisen elsewhere, that duration is not; those beings who have attained Parinirvāna, that duration is not because of (their) Parinirvāna."[1]

This cannot be judged to be a happy effort of Nāgasena's. It is the unclear wording of a speaker whose knowledge or belief on the matter is far from clear. The inconsistency of commencing with impersonal *sankhārās*, for which there could be no time-*values*, and then of falling back on the repudiated "beings", as the only rational statement, may, or may not have been another lapse on his part. I mean, that later editors may have been busy, supplying *sankhārā* and *dhammā* where he had said *sattā*, men or beings. The allusion to beings who, having left are not (yet) reborn may be an allusion to a belief in an interval between death and rebirth—a belief condemned in the Kathāvatthu debates of the latter, probably later portion of that work.[2] The to us curious way of alluding to time as *that* (*so*) (or *this*) duration of past purposes etc., as past may be a passing rejection of a belief that "everything is", nothing has absolutely ceased—a belief said to have given the name Sarvâstivādin to the large section of Buddhists so-called.

But when thus much is discounted, the reply remains, as teaching, a lost opportunity. Better is the way he avails himself of it a little later. The king reverts to the time-idea, asking a question only fit for

[1] Text, p. 50. [2] *Kathāvatthu*, viii, 2; trs., p. 212.

omniscience :—what is time's root, or origin? To this he gets the honest reply : The unknown.[1] There follows, it is true, (quite irrationally) the old monastic formula of the origin of ill. If this was not an editorial interpolation, it is given because Nāgasena is making play with the *sankhārās*, and these, in the formula, are said to have the unknown as their ultimate start, *i.e.*, in the man. When the man is once launched from the unknown on the long ages of his life, his purposive activities and resulting actions and the results *on himself* of these land him in an unbroken series, which are in turn compared with bird and egg, and with plant and seed. And so we come to the talk about process, alluded to above, with this so far satisfactory result that the *sankhārās* are not handled as were *dhammās*, as mechanical points, or beads in a string, but as what we might now call, with a word of our day, organic processes. They do not just "happen" or arise; they are produced, brought forth (*jāyanti*). And more, they are so essentially, there is no spontaneous or uncaused coming to be. "Are there," asks Milinda, "*sankhārās* which are brought forth not becoming?"[2] Here Dr. Schrader has the much finer word which we alas! centuries ago let die :— "ohne dass sie *werden*"—yet even he thinks fit to add ("originate suddenly, not gradually"). So the Pali is really better than either language. And then, with a wealth of analogy, not one of which of course is convincing as argument, but which show at least earnest emphasis, Nāgasena tries to make clear, that

[1] *A-vijjā* is usually rendered by ignorance ; here it is out of place. Man's ignorance is not a positive "root" of anything. The word is quite literally "the unknowable". Text, p. 50.

[2] Text, p. 52.

man's rational life is one age-long process of experience not in being, but in coming to be.

How tragic that with the very word, and with thus much of light on its meaning for man, life should not have been acclaimed as a divine opportunity, world after world, for *bhava*, becoming, but should have been deprecated *just as* " becoming " !

I am not saying that *sankhārās* were first associated with man's progress in terms of becoming-in-time by Nāgasena. The formula of the Paṭicca-samuppāda connects them with man's individual past. And the wording of the past as indwelling in the present individual we already find in the old portion of the Sutta Nipāta (verse 1009), where revered brahman teachers are described, by a punning compound, as " past-latent-perfumed " (*pubbo-vāsana-vāsitā*). But I find that he, and not the Piṭakas, first makes the idea alive, as it were the adumbration on the screen of an ancient Bergson. It is true that he makes no use of this compound. It does occur in the book ; but we find it (1) in the added extraneous talk (text, p. 10), and later in Māṇava's composition (text, p. 263 [1]) : Dilemma 61. But Nāgasena's replies make no use of it. And the compound may conceivably be an insertion in the Pali from that stream of teaching which, probably between Asoka's day and Nāgasena's, was finding expression in the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali.[2] And the vogue of this teaching may very well have influenced the Buddhism of Nāgasena's culture, even to the extent of lending it the word for " religious student " (*yogâvacara*) which we find used in our book.[3]

[1] Trans., ii, 94, " upon whose hearts impressions have been left by good deeds."

[2] Edn. J.H. Woods, iv, 8, 9, 18. [3] Text, 33 ; trs. " recluse " ; 43, etc.

Nor am I finding it a new word in *Milindapañha*, that the present is valued, rated, in terms of past acts, whether these were mental (of the will), or overt. Man has very generally done so. Indeed it is only lately, that he has begun to value the past *as* past, without referring his interest in it to his present self. Formerly his way was to state its worth for him in terms of the *deed*, as being the *cause* of his present status. It is just this that has (1) invested the Indian word *karma* (action, deed) with its weighted meaning of effect-producer, and made it loom rather glamorously in European eyes; (2) led to the finding a word like *sankhārā* to place, not without true insight, the cause of the deed at the back of man's actions. With no such word as " will ", or even " motive ", the next best was to see, in man, manifold values being resolved into a resultant deed. " Why do you say *sankhārās* (putting together)? " runs a Sutta.[1] " Because they compose a compound." " Like making rice-pudding or a cake," is the later comment-as-written, " so is there a being brought together by antecedent conditions and wrought up. . . ."

What truth lies in the king's being called an adept in Sānkhya and Yoga we know not, yet it is not too far a cry to imagine that Yoga concepts were not an alien world of thought to him, as sankhārās were certainly not to Nāgasena. The new word I do find in their talk is the idea of " uniformity in happening viewed as process in becoming ". It is groped after, it is crudely expressed, but in their talks, we witness the history of ideas in Buddhism still having vitality enough to be moving on.

[1] *Saṃyutta*, iii, 86. Cf. *Buddhist Psy.*, 51.

But man, and duration in relation to him are not alone past and present; they have also a future dimension. The talks were scrapwise, as talks usually are, and this dimension is past by unheeded over talk of duration. But from the first quiet talk there was a knocking on the door of it: " Complete passing away is our highest good (or aim) . . . then is there anyone who is not reborn? . . . will *you* be reborn? . . . will you be then the same?" Here is persistence on the part of Milinda, where most interviewers nowadays would not persist. Here on the other hand is not a persistence in Nāgasena's Buddhist logic to carry on the teaching in which the man, by *sankhārās* and deeds in the past, was shown to have won to a " more " in the present, in which those *sankhārās* and those deeds were wrought up. In other words, the future life of the man is not taught as a further, a corresponding " more ", resulting from the further continuance of *sankhārās* and deeds by the present man. I am not saying that the man-as-reborn, the man in future life is not taught. I am saying, he is not shown as a " more " in that future. He is rather rated as less, in that the rebirth is not hailed with approval. This " more ", or " most " is reserved for the not-reborn. The being reborn is not shown as the man " at a higher power " in either his nature or his welfare.

The reason of this falling away is not far to seek. Where that who passes, at death, is conceived not as a man in a growing adolescence transcending growth of any one body, or of his self-expression by way of it (mind), where in short he is conceived as not a man, then are we brought up against a blank, wherein

all that has been accounted for, past and present, as an onward coming-to-be towards a resultant state which is, as compared with the past, a " more " and a more " manifold ", crumbles away. Question and reply are clear and direct: " Is there any being (*satta*) who passes on from this body to a different body ?[1] There is not, sire." (It is to be regretted that here again the translator plays into the hands of the negativist, rendering " being " in the following sentences by " it ". Neither the Pali nor the sense permits it.)

To justify the negation, the man who has here done deeds is now reduced to the compound of *dhammās* :—" name-form." Inconsistently enough, as usual, he is illustrated by a " man " planting mangoes ; it was open to Nāgasena to say " there has been a certain planting of mangoes ". The effect of the deeds good and bad is, that elsewhere, elsewise " another " name-form is reborn. A greater inconsistency is the relatively positive way in which the deed-committer, as man or being in the past, is alluded to. I am not alluding to the wording of the Suttas and Jātakas, in which, with quite peculiar emphasis, the founder refers to himself in his former lives as " so and so was just I ", and similarly to other folk he knows. I am referring to these talks, where Nāgasena quotes the Suttas, referring to " beings " not as being actions, but as related to it as *agents to acts*,[2] where he traces " beings " as undergoing retribution in purgatory and surviving it all,[3] where he divides " beings " as reborn, or as to be reborn, or as not to be.[4]

[1] Text, p. 72. The word *kāya*, literally frame, or group, may equally well mean " group of beings " or world. Hence I put no stress on " body ".
[2] Text, p. 46 ff. [3] Ibid., 67. [4] Ibid., 50.

It will be said, by Buddhists: But where beings, or the man as passing on is worded, and not just *dhammās*, or name-form, or karma, the talk is not worded " ultimately ", but popularly or conventionally.

As to that, it happens that our book is shown as an interesting signpost in this very matter. Nāgasena makes no allusion to any such twofold way of " talk " (*kathā*). He uses the word for the one way: " ultimate or highest sense " (*paramatthena*), and this of course may be said to imply the other way (*sammuti-kathā*) Yet he never uses the latter term, nor guards his position when passing from one way to another. And there seems no reason, since he theoretically deemed the " ultimate " way to be the truer way, the way of looking on the real, why, with a cultured fellow-debater, he should have been ever lapsing into popular aspects and popular wording.

When Māṇava took up his sequel, he did draw the distinction which Nāgasena failed to do. He makes Nāgasena say, that it is *sammuti* (or a conventional way) to say " I ", " mine "; not ultimate meaning.[1] But his argument is no justifying of the " not-man "; it is an ethical distinction which he is drawing. Namely, that the great Helpers live to serve others, not to look upon them as instruments for their " own " aggrandizement. This is a very worthy distinction, but it has nothing to do with our present context.[2]

The linking of this context with the two terms is not met with till Buddhaghosa wrote (or at least translated ?) the Commentary on the Kathāvatthu. He takes no notice, that the great first debate (I, 1) on

[1] Text, p. 160.

[2] In fact it is the *only* passage known to me linking *anatta* with egoism and altruism, as neo-Buddhists are prone to do.

the " man " has *not a word* on the " twofold way " of teaching. But, after using the two terms here and there, he breaks out into a peroration on them, asserting that " Buddhas " have these two ways of teaching. He takes no heed that the twofold way of " the teacher's fist ", opening, closing, in expounding, was repudiated in the Piṭakas for both Bodhisat and Buddha. The idea had grown up, before his day doubtless, to buttress the unstable dogma of the man as not real; he found it to hand and gave it wording. Had it been added to the academic machinery of Nāgasena's day, we can be as sure he would have made great play with it, as, in an earlier day, Moggaliputta Tissa, or whoever complied that first Kathāvatthu would have done. It is very difficult to account for Nāgasena's silence in this matter, had it been, in his day, the *worded*, the accepted view, that there were two sorts of " truth ", or " teaching " (*sacca; kathā*), to wit, the sort *we should now* call metaphysical, philosophical (they did not), and the sort called conventional, popular (*sammuti*). If we conclude—and I do so conclude—that when Nāgasena and Milinda met, this distinction had not yet emerged in the history of Buddhist ideas, the silence is at once, and rationally accounted for.

I return to Nāgasena's simile: the planting of mangoes and the others: flame lit from flame, ghee from milk, child-wife and woman-wife, etc. The similes are made to illustrate both the continuance in life on earth and also the continuance of life in the hereafter. Now the persisting of what, for all its growth and decay, is accepted as one and the same body in the life on earth makes those similes more

plausible for readers and writers than they should be. But that, when applied to continuance of life from earth to other conditions, they should still appear plausible to readers and writers, is a little wonderful.

Milinda's sagacity touches the spot, nor was he the first in Buddhist literature to do so. This is responsibility. That is, " ability to answer for," because there has been a taking over, a transference of owner-agency. To be responsible is to admit one's self as virtually he-who-did. There was no such word to hand in Prakrit, Sanskrit, Pali. The current term was not-freed-from ; " irresponsible " was in Pali just *mutto*, freed. But it was not less significant than " irresponsible ". Now in the things used as similes, it is out of the question to see any conceivable " responsibility ". I do not except the child-woman-wife, whose choice, i.e. assumption of responsibility, has not for a moment been consulted. She is no more than a chattel. Not flame, not ghee, not the plant can in any sense be held responsible, that is, a creature as freed or not freed before a judge, whether the judge be conceived as human or divine or as nature. It is not wonderful that Nāgasena, over his mangoes, lapsed from plant to human agency. The similes were not able to bear the load laid upon them. None but " the man " can answer for or to, as having or as not having on his shoulders the burden of why, and for what end the deed had been done.

For that matter the similes are not really plausible even in so far as applied to this life. That the body persists in its microcosmical changing does not make it an apt figure. No one charges the body with

responsibility. That man's self-expression by, with, in the body through what we call " mind ", that is, ways of minding (I prefer, " willing ") does not make the similes apt. We may make these ways or processes nominally substance, by calling them mind, but that does not make them the doer, thinker, speaker. He alone is responsible. He alone would be considered responsible by judge, by guardian, by master, by physician.

No ; responsibility stands or falls with " the man as the very real ". A being held as freed from, or as not freed from a line of conduct in this, or in a past life—as this life will become when the man passes on—with such an one alone, and not with *dhammas* or *khandhas* can we associate responsibility.

Whether Milinda was as demurely approving of Nāgasena's fallacious arguments as of his worthier replies we cannot really know. It is hardly conceivable that he, able and subtle disputer, can have passed from one topic to another with no response save the monotonous " You are clever, Master ".[1] But for purposes of later propaganda it may, as I have said, been held convenient to show him subdued to sit at the good pundit's feet. He was however not passing over topics of importance, even if he is shown touching upon them rather than going deeply into them. Abruptly for example is the question raised " Master Nāgasena, is ending nirvāna ? "[2]

It is not easy to convey in English just those two words : *nirodho nibbānam*. That the king should

[1] *Kallo 'si, bhante Nāgasena.* The occasional variant in the translation is not in the orignal.
[2] Text, p. 68 f.

put the question in these words with the meaning they sought to convey is not surprising. He would not need to be a Buddhist, or even Sakya in creed. He is said to have been skilled in Yoga. And whereas in the Sūtras called Yoga the word *nirvāṇa* does not occur, *nirodho* or " putting-and-end-to " occurs several times. It there refers, not to the final goal and consummation of a man's destiny, but to the stopping, by " practice ", of the fluctuations of his mind as influenced by impressions from without and, as latent tendencies, from within. As to the word *nirvāṇa* (Pali: *nibbāna*), whenever it came into use—and this no one knows—it was not at that time a Buddhist monopoly. It may very likely not have been used by the founders of Sakya, who probably used *attha* for the Goal of life. One of these, Sāriputta, is represented as being asked by a monk what the word *nibbāna* meant. Now it is unlikely that, in a gospel for the many, an unfamiliar word will have been used for that highest aim to which listeners were to be directed. Hence I incline to see it, in the first utterance, on the Way, as a later gloss. But the word was at some time uttered in this connection, and that will probably have been a result of the wave of pessimism and with it of monasticism which engulfed the Sakya teaching. I mean, the idea of a " going-out " or extinction as to all life, that is, all repeated births and dyings, being looked upon as desirable. That *nirvāṇa* was at the same time a " going into ", namely, into Brahman, the ineffable Highest, as it is worded in the Bhagavadgītā, was its more important, because its positive aspect. But this nowhere and in no way finds expression in Buddhism, and Buddhism has won, in the last century,

much undue credit through the popular idea that, by it, this aspect was taken into account.

Whether Milinda was conversant with the Mahābhārata (or positive) idea of Nirvana, or whether he was aware only that the Sakya teaching used the term, we cannot know. Nor can we know whether, in *nirodha*, he was referring to its meaning in Yoga as "limiting", "confining", "checking", or to the meaning given it in Sakya. This is much stronger than that in Yoga, as we may see from Nāgasena's reply. It meant, more drastically than Nirvana, not just "restriction", but ending, stopping, erasing. I do not think cessation or ceasing the happiest word, since this is compatible with a passive expiry. The word is active, causative, involving a stopping agent.[1] I select therefore "ending" for *nirodha* as a Buddhist term, since this can be used transitively or intransitively. But this does not give us a word serving equally well for Yoga as for Sakya use, hence I would not translate either term in this passage; I would say: "Is (what is termed) *nirodha* (what is termed) *nibbāna* ?"

The reply confirmed the translator (at least for some time) in the view, that Nirvana was "a state of mind to be attained in, and which ends with, this life". But this has never been the view of either Sakya or Buddhism. By the Sakya it was condemned as one of the so-numbered 62 wrong views in the first and oldest of the Suttas, the Brahmajāla Suttanta (p. 36 f.). And by modern Buddhist divines I have seen it called "the first 'great nibbāna' wherein is yet residual stuff of life".[2] Why the men of old did not also

[1] Lord Chalmers first drew my attention to this.

[2] E.g. Ledi Sayadaw (the late), *JPTS.*, 1914, p. 138 f.

distinguish it in some such way we cannot tell. We shall revert to it later.

I judge that the question and categorematic reply should be understood in the usual way, namely, not that the two terms equate each other, but that the one comes under or into the other, as when we ask "Is he English?" or "Is evolution a natural process?" And hence I think, that Rhys Davids's retention of the Pali word-order is more correct than Dr. Schrader's "Is nirvana ending (*Aufhören*)?" or Nyanatiloka's "Is Nirvana the same as nirodha?" Nāgasena's Buddhist sense as "ending", makes no explicit pretence to exhaust Nirvana as ending. It is "thus"—*evaṃ*—that Nirvana is ending, in that it involves a going out of things that bring ill. In so far as was more, the matter was closed by and in the word *pari-nibbāna*, *pari-nibbuto*: an utterly gone out personality, as visible or inferable, could in no wise be "pointed out" (*nidassita*). "Only in the framework of the teaching (*dhamma-kāya*) could the Blessed One now be known. Verily it was taught by him."

This that he *did* teach was not dhamma *as* taught by the after-men; it was the inner sense-of-right. This became *externalized* as a system or framework of words. But as a link between the Suttas, which speak at least once of *dhamma-kāya*, and Mahāyāna, where great prominence is given to the term, *dhammakāya* as occurring in the Milindapañha is of interest.

Of interest too as bearing on the date so ill ascertained, when in India oral teaching began to be fully set out in writing, is Milinda's question: "Have you seen *dhamma*?"[1]

[1] *Not* "what the Truth is?" Text, p. 71.

This could only have been asked concerning an unscriptured, " unbooked " creed. " You say you have not seen this great teacher, nor have your teachers; you say, who sees *dhamma*, which he taught, sees him. Now have you seen that ? "

Clearly the king has not heard of any " sacred books " as existing and as identified with the " taught dhamma ". We must not be misled by Nāgasena's simile, comparing the testimony, borne by *dhamma* to the incomparable Teacher, with the survival of the " writing " of a bygone teacher, testifying by its excellence to his having lived, as if the simile had been suggested by a *dhamma* committed from oral to written teaching. For that matter the word *lekha* may not have meant writing at all, or writing only, but some other and older form of graphic art, epigraphic, sculptural, painting, drawing. Centuries had passed since the Asokan edicts were " *likhita* " on rock and pillar, and it is conceivable that a teacher of that art might be referred to by Nāgasena as " *bhūtapubbaṃ* " (in the past), but it is not so likely that a teacher of what was probably the very new art of stencilling, or otherwise, with a style, inscribing at length on some such new material as palm leaves, or a succession of metal plates should be associated with the " long long ago ".[1] Ancient works of graphic art, then as now, will have testified to the skill, or even genius of some artist of old; even so *dhamma* as conceived and taught by the man now called Buddha stood for that man and his message. Milinda may, in *dharma*, have had a standard or norm in mind : what " is done " and to do, or not to do; Nāgasena, in *dhamma*, may have had in mind an external

[1] Ibid.

mandate of many sayings all in fixed wording, tending to pin down the spirit to the letter. But for the man, to see whose *dhamma* was to see him, *dhamma* was the inner mandate of that urge to right burning within like flame on altar,[1] beneath and at back of any code or formulas. Only in this sense could the substitution of one for the other term be justified. And thus for both men the truth about *dhamma* was as much a matter of faith as the truth about Buddha. The true testimony was that the true disciples, having the one and the other as guide and as idea (*paññatti*) walked according to That all their life.

I have said the one and the other; the text gives "Buddha" only,[2] probably an editorial change to follow the usual Sutta phrase "Bhagavanettiko". The context requires rather "*dhammanettiyā*", and the less forced companion-term "*dhammapaññattiyā*". There has very possibly been tampering.

It is on these questions of faith for "evidence in things not seen", that the king comes up against the subject of inference (*anumāna*), or carrying on from things sensed to things not sensed. This was no unfamiliar ground to Greek or Indian, let alone Buddhist. I know of no mention of the word—it means "thought - in - consequence - of"—in the Piṭakas; where it was *wanted*, the Founder is recorded as using *takkā*, as for a mental process of a recognized kind:—"As far as anything can be known by inference, Ānanda, you know it." That is, Gotama had seen and heard clairvoyantly a visitor, personally known when on earth, and had told Ānanda. Ānanda recognized

[1] Saṃyutta, i, 169.
[2] *Buddha-nettiyā* . . . *Buddha-paññattiyā*: "having Buddha as guide, Buddha as idea-manifest."

who the visitor was by the account.[1] How, asked Milinda, are we to know that the Buddha ever really lived? Nāgasena, as evidence (there is no word for evidence) of the teaching, first resorts to his analogies, which are exercises in inference. He mentions a remote river. The ground for its reality here is the hearsay of an accepted belief. The question occurs again, and he gives as evidence (he has no word for evidence) the teaching, as *dhamma* had come to be called.

There is nothing worthy of the name of discussion on the subject. Later on Māṇava took it up, and we shall revert to it. We are to-day more fluent over belief, as psychologically and as logically distinguishable from knowledge; our curiosity in the past as objectively true, and as independently interesting is well launched; we are beginning to weigh historical evidence with ever lessening exemption of this field of the past and that. But it is possible, that in such naïf childlike inquiries as meet us in the Milindapañha, we see that fluency, that curiosity, that weighing showing as a tender little plant with a great future before it. It is the more interesting when we recall, that Themistokles was already a classic, that Livy was a generation or two afterwards to take up his pen, that the stage was getting ready for the manuscripts of Julius Cæsar and Tacitus. And meanwhile in bookless India, in a full world of old tales and legends of the past, man was even then weighing the grounds for our assigning credence to the past.

We have yet to take note of fresh ground broken

[1] *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, p. 56.

by Milinda just before those meetings with Nāgasena were for some reason abandoned. The topic is the supernormal in man, known as *iddhi*, effectuation, and would be far from unfamiliar to men of India. Slight as are the notes of the talk, they afford matters of interest which have been and also which have not been discussed.

One such point, implying historical change in ideas, is the association of great height with an unseen world.[1] This for the king is just "Brahma-loka" (God-world), which is what "heaven" would mean with us for the average man. For Nāgasena it would mean not just the "next world", nor for that matter heaven, but another temporary sphere more worthy than the next world. This, at least, is what it would have meant in early Sakyan days. But now comes an unseen which is so much aloft as to run, measured in yojanas—say leagues—to the respectable distance of over 16 millions. Milinda is dubious as to the power of iddhi in any monk to effect a transfer of himself as if—in the classic Sakyan formula—he were just "contracting or stretching forth his arm".

Now in the Sakya I have not met with any such belief in an "on high". I found it first in Abhidhamma,[2] with its relatively late formulas. For the founders of Sakya the unseen was very near; in and about the seen:—this is especially noticeable in allusions to the Peta world, and other forms of Niraya, or purgatory. But in referring also to happier worlds there is never patent mention of ascensions, let alone descents. "Decease" has its etymological equation

[1] Text, p. 82.
[2] *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, § 1282: "from below upwards . . ."

in "*cuti*"[1]; but then death of the body is for all a "falling" on to where unresisted power of gravity lands us. And if rebirth be an "*uppatti*", why, so is any new event on earth, in Pali, an "uprising".

Those Sakya founders, unless their records are utterly untrue, lived in close touch with human predecessors in other worlds; those worlds were for them not so much otherwhere as otherwise, otherwise as to *dhātu* or conditions. But already, when the great founder lay dying, we can note that a change had come, and the passing is not with attested witnesses from other worlds as was the utterance of the message nearly half a century before. Sakya, in the Sangha of the monks, was still teaching not one, but many unseen worlds, but the monks were far less sharing the life of those worlds, even while on earth, as their founders had been. Their hearts had turned from those wise and kindly denizens, and there was no longer co-penetration of worlds, now held as very much aloft, with our earth.

Nāgasena overcomes his celestial remotenesses by forcing the potentialities of iddhi; he makes it annihilate distance. Two hundred leagues to the Indian Alexandria, or 16 millions to Brahma world: it is all one, even as it is to the swiftness of thought. Once more analogy opens up a possibly sister-phenomenon, and assumes identity in nature, in conditions, in mode or operation, and leaves the matter as solved.

The only thing he achieves is to show the widening gap between his Buddhism and its sources. There is a certain sobriety in familiarity in the wording of

[1] *Cavati*, to fall or die.

actual cases of iddhi in the Piṭakas, (I exclude of course the Jātaka Commentary jumbled up in the 5th Nikāya) and I see in the Piṭaka formula of iddhi, as in most Buddhist formulas, though not all, a sobriety which we do not get in Nāgasena's and in Buddhaghosa's Arahans careering airily to and fro in the air, or there seated crosslegged. These things were too easily magnified when not near enough to be checked by a time when eyewitnesses could testify to a supernormal happening of some kind.

Another point of interest in this topic is that Nāgasena, like his Sakyan predecessors, has no better term with which to word the man's action in iddhi. He still uses *citta* (mind), or *cetas*, not even *manas*, a word which is sometimes purposeful in import. In his figure of leaping, he elicits from Milinda that that stalwart monarch raises up the thought (*citta*) :—"I shall alight there" (it must have been the long jump) "and with that the body becomes buoyant".[1]... "Even so the iddhi-worker, having attained power over *ceto*, plants the body on the *citta* and goes aloft."

The word evidently to seek here is our "will". I have not yet met with any consistent use of *cetas* as such, nor any effort to distinguish it as purposeful minding in comparison with *citta* or *manas*. Some such word is wanted. No amount of thinking where to alight would have informed, i.e. instilled into, Milinda's efferent nerves the requisite motor current. He would have stood gazing at his objective. As leaper he was exercising will with, shall we say, a co-efficient of thinking. (I should prefer wording even the thinking in terms of will.) In the same way a man

[1] Text, p. 85.

with power of levitation uses will to a somewhat higher power. Or, expressed physically, he resists for a longer interval than the leaper the force of gravitation. To this extent we may with Nāgasena say, that he " plants the body on to the will ".

But there is one more point in this topic, and one which brings me back finally to my main question. In iddhi, as in leaping, only more so, *the man* is shown as disposing of the body according to his thought, i.e. will; further he is said to have his thought also under control: *ceto-vasi-ppatto*, i.e. to be willing, with a mandate to the mind (or minding). The talk is all too brief; it is possible that Nāgasena had but vague second-hand knowledge in the subject. But it is interesting to note, that it is from first to last a talk in terms, not of *dhammas*, *santati* or *sankhārās*, but of " the man ". Apparently he could not describe the iddhi-process save as the man in control of both mind and body. He does not even lapse this time into " conventional " talk; he makes no attempt to talk otherwise! Surely if Buddhaghosa's word be right: " Where there is process, there must be proceeder," it is most true here, that where act of will be worded, there also must be the willer. And Nāgasena, at the end of the conversations he opened with such a derring-do of negation concerning the man, leaves us with the man reinstated as wielding and as valuing with his instruments, body and mind, not merely as to be got at, or known in either of them, but as the positive and worded *datum* necessary to their effecting a specific work.

This point had already been advanced long before in the Kathāvatthu by the champion of " the man "

If, he says, to achieve iddhi—say, by the kind called transforming (one's appearance)—one set of faculties (*indriya*) bound to the body be for the moment discarded for another, surely it needs a choosing user to discard, assume and revert to?[1] The challenge is met in the usual way: "Do you maintain the existence of the man-as-operator *only* when so operating?" The point is raised concerning all the other modes in the category of *abhiññā*, i.e. super-knowledge:—remembering former lives, clairvoyance, clairaudience, thought-reading, and is met in the same way. The Commentary only gives a brief paraphrase and passes on, for which we may find various reasons. Here we too must pass on.

The contribution made thus far to our knowledge of Buddhist history by what has come down to us of these conversations I shall try to sum up when we have considered Māṇava's own compositions and contribution. Here I would only add a few words towards what appears, from the talks, to have been Nāgasena's real position about the man, or individual human being: what for Nāgasena was "the man"? It is worth our attentive valuing, since in the first place it is both intrinsically and historically important; secondly, because we have nothing known to be of the same date in Buddhist literature to lay beside it; thirdly, because it is likely that Nāgasena, whose claims to penetrative insight cannot be rated as high, was but the spokesman of what the Sangha of his day in North India held and taught.

It is evident that for him at any rate the subject of

[1] *Kathāvatthu*, i, 1, §§ 217, 218.

the man :—how we can best get at, in order to know, him—was matter of very leading importance. That it was so reveals no novel situation in Sakyan orthodoxy ; it revealed only, as I have said, a persistence in the stand taken up in the earlier, the opening part of the Kathāvatthu long before. And this, if the Commentarial tradition be right, was the stand taken up *by the new orthodoxy of the majority* at the Patna transactions in Asoka's reign.[1] For better or for worse—I consider, for the worse, and India has certainly so considered—the Sangha of the Sakya had decided, and had persisted in deciding, that, both as immediate and as reasoned knowledge, the reality of the man who each of us is could not be affirmed.

At the same time we find, I say again, no positive denial *that the man is*. The translations both of Rhys Davids and Dr. Schrader go here beyond the tether of the Pali, and this is highly regrettable. Had Nāgasena wished to say " The man—being, self, experiencer—is not ", nothing was easier. The phrase *n'atthi* was there and it was much used. So Milinda : " Well then, master N., the Buddha is not ! "—*n'atthi Buddho ti*.[2] So was the phrase " does not exist " (*na vijjati*, or *saṃvijjati*).[3] But from first to last he keeps carefully to the established phrase *n'upalabbhati* :—" is not got at." Even the more nihilistic Buddhaghosa, in commenting on this phrase, does not equate it with *n'atthi*. His comment is : " is got at =is *got* having come *at* (it) by wisdom ; ' is known ' is the meaning." Such translations have

[1] *JRAS.*, January, 1929. " The Patna Congress and the Man."
[2] Text, p. 70.
[3] *Kathāvatthu*, i, 1, §§ 148–53.

helped not a little, both in and outside Buddhist worlds, to nail the man to the cross of negation.

More literal accuracy was shown by Oldenberg when he rendered the phrase by " not to be understood " (*nicht zu erfassen*), and more insight appeared in his latest treatment of the subject in such expressions as " Buddhism *evaded speaking* of pure spirit ", and the Buddhist characteristic of " resolving all apparent being in the world into happening, especially the resolving of the ' soul ' into series of psychic processes ". For these, too, his (late) term *Ordnungen* = *dhammā*, is a happy find from which translators into English are debarred.

It is in these phrases that we may find what the man (as " pure spirit ") amounted to for Nāgasena's culture-world. Men as individuals are for him very real and he does not try to speak as if they were not, namely, in terms of *dhammas*. But he admits that he cannot, as we might say, pin the very man in the *dhammas* to earth. There is sense-organ and sensation, and so on, but the sens-er's presence cannot be known *save in the process*. He does not, analogously, and as in the Kathāvatthu, give up, in the deed, the knowing of the doer, nor of the planner, the willer, the chooser, the desirer. He only, as Oldenberg put it, evades = *lehnt ab*; he leaves the king's protesting queries unanswered.

It is very possible that we do Nāgasena less than justice if we judge him as having said in these scrappy remarks all that he either did say, or could say. These " little ends "—*petits bouts*—of discourse are, after all, I repeat, all that could be expected in records taken down by a reporter unversed doubtless in

such high themes, on very unwieldy reporting material. It is also possible, on the other hand, that Nāgasena was at the best incapable, on a subject so difficult, nay, on several subjects so difficult as those broached by the king, with the king's following up of that broached at first by the Elder, of going beyond his schedule, and threshing a matter out. In that case, maybe it is the Sangha at its best, as imperfectly represented by Nāgasena, to whom less than justice is done. This however we must not forget :—that the Sangha in Ceylon set their seal,—after an indefinite amount of editing—on the conversations, not to mention the rest, as work of, for a long time unquestioned, uncriticized authority. Endorsement could go no further.

PART II

MĀṆAVA'S OWN COMPOSITIONS

A. The Dilemmas

I HAVE said that in one and the same man, but at different stages in his life, I see both the editor of the Recorded Conversations, and the composer of the Dilemmas and subsequent chapters. And I have said why I think thus.

I have also suggested, why he started out as original author, with a sequel to the form of what he edited, but a sequel developed as to that form. Converse between two men both cultured, yet so diverse in culture as were king and monk, was of necessity scrappy, fragmentary, unthreshed out, unfinished, a matter not so much of debate on ground familiar to both as of a demand for information and a supply to the same. But when Māṇava sat down, not to edit but to compose, he was free to improve on his edited work. He was not free before. Had he been so, we should surely not have had the abrupt way with which Milinda now and then repeats questions from former talks without getting further than before in the subject.

To present king and monk having a " real live " debate on that first subject of the " knowability " of the very man, with the monk set to answer all those questions poured out by the king, which he had on that former occasion so " evaded "—shall we say prudently, or cravenly ?—would have been of profound

interest. For if not so wholly evaded in the Kathāvatthu, they are there also, rather got past than honestly met. And in any case, a cultured and less fettered view from a man two centuries later in time would have furnished more positive historical material than Nāgasena's recurring *non possumus*. But I repeat, my conclusion is that the subject of *anatta*, (or the man as not intuitively known) did not appeal to Māṇava. Brahman as I guess by birth, and only having a good overlay of Sakyan, i.e. Buddhist tuition, he preferred wisely enough to write on subjects in that tuition which had chiefly appealed to him. Let us sum up the Dilemmas to find these.

In the first place I found that, of the 419 pages of the text, nearly one-quarter (100) contain allusions to arahan and arahantship. Deducting 90 as not by Māṇava, we may roughly correct the proportion in the residuum to one-fifth. Again, of the 82 sections of the Dilemmas, whereas 5 only have the arahan as central topic, just one-half have either the Buddha alone as central topic, or the Buddha in relation to some person or some other subject. Hence, with a large store of subjects, as is evinced by the residual 36, there cannot well be any doubt as to the absorbing appeal constituted, when he was writing the Dilemmas, by the idea of this wonderful man and his wonderful past as so-called Bodhisattva, in Māṇava's mind.

There is nothing very strange about that. The honour and reverence paid him by the Sakya-world, monk and lay, had grown great between the day of his passing away and the day when the "lañchakas" of Vinaya and Suttas came to be written. What is significant, perhaps, about it is, that the other two factors in the

Buddhist trinity should occupy our author in comparison not at all. The Three, which in Buddhaghosa's time appear as the Ti-ratana co-equal in honour :—Buddha Dhamma Sangha—and which moreover already in the Piṭakas, if not yet dubbed the Three Jewels, are constantly linked in formulas, as equally exalted, save in the one matter of precedence, do not so come before us in the Dilemmas. Is it to be inferred, that Buddhism really owes this co-ordination of the Three, together with an interpolation of them in Piṭaka formulas, to the special development Buddhism underwent in Ceylon? Or is Māṇava's relative disregard of the second, and third "Jewel" simply due to his detachment from the Sakyan tradition, he being nominally a brahman, a student of Buddhism but not an adherent?

I do not wish to stress unduly either this preponderating interest, which may be by personal predilection and of no historical significance, or the other point already referred to :—the seeing in the Bodhisat already the qualities (*guṇā*) of a Buddha. "Nāgasena" is made, in the dilemmas, to apologize lamely and ineffectively for the Bodhisat's weaknesses.[1] Similar attempts are twice made in the Jātaka Commentary itself,[2] albeit where most needed, none is offered; where namely, the Bodhisat as king corrupts through a hireling his friend's wife.[3] But after all, the Buddha-dhammas (qualities) are attributed to the Founder when, as Gotama, he was held to be virtually possessed of the "perfections". And Nāgasena is more wisely made to point out, that even then, when he left home and during his six years of study, he was maturing wherein he was

[1] E.g. Dilemmas 45, 46. [2] Nos. 231, 243. [3] No. 62.

yet immature. It is therefore scarcely here that we may see, with the translators, any notable growth in Bodhisattvaship or Buddhology. Dhammology is there because already the Suttas appear, in Māṇava's references, as the " Buddha-word ". Whatever the king is made to say as what " you " teach, Nāgasena endorses as having been said by the Buddha. " Sanghology " is yet relatively to seek. Dhammology is merged in Buddhology.

An interesting proof of this is a remark recorded as having been made by Nāgasena when the king had put his last question (text, p. 87). We have seen how the monk, as more of an Ābhidhammika than a religious teacher, was chiefly concerned to impart information in mental analysis. And his concluding reflection was, that as Archanalyzer, and Namer of mental states or *dhammas*, the Bhagavā had accomplished a task of consummate difficulty, harder than the distinguishing by taste the water contributed to the Ganges by each tributary. Now this utterance so took the fancy of Buddhaghosa, or it may be also of his age, in Ceylon, that I have met with it in three of his works [1] and may yet come across it again.

We see here a practice carried out in the Vinaya, where every rule, down to the pettiest by-law, is fathered on to the Founder in a formula, which sets on the rule the seal of Sangha authority. We see the same seal being set on the work of Sutta editors, when some monk's or nun's utterances are " passed " by the Founder being said to have commended them as what he would himself have uttered. Finally in the Commentaries, every word quoted from the

[1] Visuddhi Magga, 438 ; Papañca-Sūdanī, ii, 344 ; Atthasālinī, 142.

Piṭakas is referred to as the Buddhaword :—" thus he said," or the like.

And it is noteworthy here, to see the Buddhist mind rating as the work of its Founder just that new product of the Indian thinkers of his own epoch :—the Sānkhya —which had so leavened the form given by his successors to his teaching, but in which he was relatively little concerned, and to set on it, of which they were so proud, the seal of his creative thought (p. 119).

In Māṇava's own compositions we are able to see a further stage in Buddhology reached. It is shown when he is half-way through his Dilemmas (Nos. 43, 53, and 59), in his reference for the first time to the Founder as the Bhagavā " deva-above-devas " (*devâtideva*). And both times, he is quoting, with his little flourish " the excellent ' book '[1] the Majjhima-Nikāya ", or " the excellent ' book ', the Saṃyutta-Nikāya ". But later, when he was writing his " Similes and the Saint ", he used the magniloquent title throughout (without accompanying reference to a Nikāya).

I am not seeing in this title for the Founder a phrase invented by Māṇava. It is true that it is not in Vinaya, the Four Nikāyas, most of the Fifth, or Abhidhamma. But it is not only in the Commentaries that we find it. It occurs once in the Vimānavatthu [2] and once in the Chulla-niddesa,[3] that Commentary on a Commentary on the Sutta-Nipāta. I am put wise in this by the excellent article in the P.T.S. Pali Dictionary. The latter passage runs thus :—" Of devas in common parlance and of devas in rebirth and of pure devas

[1] *Lañchaka.*
[2] Art. 64^{27}, p. 62.
[3] P. 173, § 307.

the Bhagavā is deva, superdeva, deva-and-superdeva, lion of lions, elephant of elephants, company-leader of companies, sage of sages." Now, that we find these two Piṭaka references is, for me, less a proof that the title was early, than it is a proof that these two works were very late accretions to the Piṭakas, dating well after the Patna revision. So recent in fact, that Nāgasena did not use the title which is in them, nor did Māṇava, till he was writing the Dilemmas. It is interesting to compare the sobriety of the Sutta-Nipāta itself in relating Gotama to devas :—*adhideve abhiññāya*—" having higher knowledge of higher devas " (ver. 1148). This indicates a different attitude from that which placed him " above the highest ". It is more in keeping with Māṇava's attitude early in the Dilemmas. Thus in the 2nd, the " Buddhas ", albeit they are considered as omniscient and, in exercising omniscience, have only first to attend or " advert ", are not described as " incomparable ",[1] but only as " uttermost ", or supreme in knowledge and wisdom. In fact they *are compared*, to wit, in a scale, not, be it noted, as in the translations, of " minds ", but of " those-having-minds ", or mind-ers (*cittā*, not *cittāni*). Here, at the bottom, are they of slow, hampered minds ; above are placed in succession they who are in the four stages of the Way, then come individualist Buddhas, then at top the " rightly enlightened Buddhas ", " whose thinking powers are brought quickly into play and who act with ease!" Here is comparison of the comparable, well carried out. The Founder is described as to his mind,

[1] The translator, on pp. 109, 110, wavers between " pre-eminent " and " incomparable " as is the way of translators. In Pali it is in every case the one word *an-uttara*.

not so much as an erudite pundit, but rather as a naturally gifted man having his mental instrument as a swift and mobile servant. But if we look at the later Māṇava, we see him contemplating the same man as architect of the Dhamma-city, and finding him " peerless, unequalled, incomparable, admirable beyond all measure by weight or calculation . . ." We are no longer looking at Gotama the beloved and trusted fellowman and elder brother, but at a being out of all proportion to his fellowmen. Not by the far East alone was the Īshvara, dethroned in Sakya, rehabilitated in Buddhism !

I am not herewith saying, that the Dhamma-divinity or " Jewel " was not in process of " becoming ". The conditions of the age were helping to " cut " it in an unforeseen way. I have referred (p. 21) to that cheapening of the word-as-spoken in the Sakyan world, which the theory of the ideal man as a silent recluse, and not as teacher or prophet had brought about. It had developed a " more-value " in the word-as-thought. This, in Māṇava's day was undergoing another transformation. The word-as-thought was now becoming the word-as-written. The things that were real, important, worth-while, vital to salvation were now becoming not audible, not inner only, but visible. In place of the seen and known Teacher, or teachers, there was now the seen and read word. It is not too much to say, that the power and the fascination of the new art and vogue of writing *books*, whether as records or as fresh thought, were a lever by which Dhamma, embodied in spoken, in thought, in written mandate, was prised up to be placed side by side with the " Buddha ".

I have found, and said so, that Māṇava's own writings reveal him as chiefly interested in the " man "—in the man not as less in conception but as more. For him there is no reducing the man (as immediately known or not known) to less than a label in word, nor is there effort spent over definitions of experienced *dhammas* of momentary duration in an *un-owned* continuum or *santati*. Where Nāgasena, coping with speech unwieldy, because it was evolved by man for the express purpose of expressing man, slips back from talk of unowned mind and body to man as disposing of them—as we saw in iddhi and elsewhere—Māṇava very deliberately discusses the question of man as influenced by and as influencing his body and his mind.

This is in the dilemma numbered as 57, on the only " ill " remaining for a saint as being of-the-body. " The arahan ", the dummy king is made to say, " whose mind keeps going in dependence on the body :—is he then not lord, master, disposer of the body ? . . . Why, even a bird is this over the nest in which he dwells." " Nāgasena " says it is none the less true ; that processes inherent in the body are no more subject to even the saint's bidding—the word " will " is again a desideratum—than is the land to creatures carrying on life and business on it. And there is no ill befalling his mind because *he has well trained this* into complete subjection.

" Never before," is the warm response, " have I seen such a lamp of Dhamma ! " This, be it noted, is Māṇava's own response.

For a genuine Buddhist it was possible here to have weighed impersonally the interaction of body and

mind. As Māṇava words it, we have the man as a very live and distinguishable *tertium quid*.

But let it not be supposed that Māṇava's position here is brahman only, and cannot be supported from the Suttas. In an early-placed Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya for instance, we find this view ascribed to Sāriputta, the Founder's very brother-in-teaching :— "The man who brings the mind under control is fit to add (to the beauty of this lovely night), not he who lets the mind lead himself." (Sutta 32.) How could Buddhists blot out the real man with sayings like this, showing him in relation to mind as master to instrument? But we with books can survey far better than they could without books.

I have said also that Māṇava reveals no knowledge of Abhidhamma idea or idiom. As compared with the Records there is, in the Dilemmas, etc., a marked absence of the psychological terms which are so plentiful in the former. And we find neither the word used there for mind as continuum (*santati*) nor its later equivalent, *santāna*.

Nevertheless there is one interesting exception to this abstention. The question of sleep and dreams occupied the Indian mind in somewhat the same sporadic way in which it occupies us. And in one of the last Dilemmas (75) this is taken up. "What," it is asked, "is this dreaming, and who sees it?" "It is a sign (*nimittaṃ*)," is the reply, "which comes into the avenue of thought, and six are the classes of dreamers." These are enumerated. The only "true" dream is what one sees as a *nimitta* had previously. "Does the mind itself seek out the *nimitta*, or does it come into

the avenue of the mind, or does another come and tell him?" "It comes." . . . "Is he who sees asleep, or waking, while dreaming?" "Neither; it is when sleep is coming upon him and *bhavanga* not entered upon. To one overwhelmed by sleep the mind is in *bhavanga*; as such the mind does not proceed; the unproceeding mind knows neither pleasure nor pain; to it unaware dream comes not; when mind proceeds one sees dreams."

There is more, but I quote only concerning the word *bhavanga*. This is the earliest occurrence known to me of this word, save only in the last book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka: the Paṭṭhāna, or treatise—it does not merit that name—on causal relations. It there occurs merely as a factor in one or two of the hundreds of formulae of which the book consists. It is evidently a current, an accepted idiom of Abhidhamma psychology. This does not make the word of long standing when the first part of our book was compiled. It is highly probable, as I have said elsewhere,[1] that in Asoka's day, when some at least of the 5th Abhidhamma-book was compiled, the two books numbered as 6 and 7, the Yamaka and Paṭṭhāna, had not yet come into being. Once lit upon, *bhavanga* proved to answer a need, and we meet it in Buddhaghosa, in Dhammapāla and (especially) in Buddhadatta. In the standard mediaeval manual Abhidhammattha-sangaha it comes out as better specified in function; it would seem to mean what we now call sub-consciousness. In Kathāvatthu X, 1, there is the term *sammukhībhāva*, used for full consciousness, but the complementary word *has apparently not been found;* we only

[1] *Bud. Psychology*, 2nd ed., 1924, p. 272, *e*.

meet it in *bhavangacitta*, supplied as complement, *in the Commentary*. And I judge that, in the time-interval between text and commentary, this term emerged.

I cannot think it is a compound of *bhava* and *anga*, which yields no sense. I see it rather as an abstract form of what is, I believe, termed a secondary derivative, from *bhavan* + *-gya*, and meaning just becoming, coming-to-be, proceeding. In its brave opposition to the Indian ideal of being (*sat*), Buddhism needed such words. We see this in their developing the kindred word *bhāvanā*, which pervades all their formularies of training. *Bhava* was already pre-empted for "world", or conditions of becoming; *bhăvănă* was sidetracked to mean "abode". *Bhavatta* does once occur, but with a static meaning.[1] A word was wanted for a meaning vital in its view of man's existence, to which *jīvita* did not as used lend itself, and for which *santati*, *santāna* did not quite fit. A word was wanted for vital continuance when the act of waking advertence (*āvajjanā*), which we now call "attention" in our psychology, is absent. The vital continuum, with its potentiality of attention-in-perception, was ever proceeding. They needed this word "potential". They had no Aristotle, and did not find it. But they found *bhavanga*. With attention aroused through sense, *bhavanga* was "cut off", that is, the potential became actual, the subconscious conscious.[2] When the line of perception and what it involved in thought-registrating, was done with, there came *bhavanga-pāto*: recurrence to subconsciousness. This much of thought-cum-word

[1] *Khuddakapāṭha Commentary*, p. 227.
[2] Cf. my "Buddhist Philosophy of Change," *Bud. Psychology*, 2nd ed.

progress had been maturing between the compiling of the Kathāvatthu and the Milinda-dilemmas.

A few words are here due on the changed form adopted by Māṇava in place of the simpler query + reply of the recorded conversations.

In the dilemma (the Greeks understood the corresponding verb—*dialambanoi*) we may possibly have a serious sincere pursuit of truth. Here it is said is a word, a phrase, used in different contexts in apparent conflict with its own meaning. It may be false in both contexts ; it cannot be true, on the surface, in both. In what, in which meaning are we to take the word, the phrase, in each context ?

But we may also possibly see in dilemma a logical and rhetorical game. The Greek word is a " catching between ", namely, between the " horns " of the different contexts. And Aryan Greek had much in common with Aryan Indian, especially in the matter of the play-impulse. Whether or not the Greek spoke of horns as do we, the Indian had certainly come to use the same term :—*meṇḍaka*—horny, for this game. That it needed a Jātaka to spring the usage on North India, as Trenckner suggests, is to me forced and fanciful and unneeded. (The Jātaka itself—it is the Ummagga—uses *elaka*, not *meṇḍa*, for the ram in question.) There is nothing in the story bearing on the essential in dilemma : that of the different usage in the one word. This by the way.

Whereas there is difficulty in imagining a Graeco-Baktrian king, in unstable and strenuous circumstances, finding either leisure or inclination, first to learn from a repeater the contents of the Sakyan fixed

wordings in Vinaya and Suttas, reflect upon them, find dilemmatic points in them, and produce them in debate with a professional pundit, there is little difficulty in imagining an old alumnus of Nālandā turning, it may be to his own stencilled notes of the past, it may be to his own copies of the new lañchakas not yet in Pali, but in the Māgadhī Prakrit, which was beginning, as we might say, to be licked into shape as the " Pali " or ordered Logos it finally assumed in Ceylon. There is little difficulty in reconstructing him as recalling the debates he had taken part in with fellow students over what the teachers had expounded, the horny questions raised in turn by one student and the discussion that ensued; and in picturing him as finding, among these, a number which seemed to promise well as matter for a quite new and interesting form of lañchaka. But not as entitled and as presented under the title " college debates ". If the propounder were named Milinda of glorious memory, and the responders were rolled into one and the same as the monk of distinguished memory:—why, what a " best-seller " the book would make!

This little book is not a running commentary on the Dilemmas, else were it not spatially little. Nor do they for the most part yield such historical side-lights as call for notice here. I will therefore only sample one or two dilemmas which are fairly typical, first of the difficulties they were intended to cope with, and secondly of the very fertile studies in the teaching which they involved, whether taken up as quest of truth or as logical gymnastic.

In Dilemma 13 [1] the two-horned difficulty is in the distribution varying according to context of the import of the word "all" (*sabba*). We should say varying according to the universe of discourse,—or such other phrase as may have replaced that academic idiom of my youth. Māṇava's culture bade him say, "all" is used as non-residual (*niravasesa*) or as co-residual (*sâvasesa*). Thus "all arahans", all saints, have passed beyond fear, refers to one "universe of discourse; there is a residuum". "All men fear death, fear hell" is another "universe", is true of every man, even of the saint, albeit his fear is not for himself; there is no residuum.

And here the analogy is adequate and why? It is between not "the man" and matter, but between two affairs of the man. A king, namely, may order that all of the village pay a tax, but the "all" will of course not include persons not counting as citizens: women, children, etc.

Incidentally we may note that, in quoting the latter of the "horns" as a Buddha-word, Māṇava is not verbally correct, as he is in the former, a Dhammapada verse (129). This is not the only instance. Here he is borne out as to the substance of the sentence, by many sayings as to the saint having attained the high ground of the "no-whence-fear" (*akutobhaya*) of assurance. But he is sometimes wider of the mark. And it is a pertinent feature in my theory, that in Māṇava we have an old student, far removed at Sāgala from the living or written library of Nālandā, with but a few manuscripts of his own, relying, in his quotations, mainly on memory and notes.

[1] Text, p. 145 f.

Let us next consider Dilemma I.[1] Here again we have Māṇava using his college guide-words: non-residual and co-residual. But his application of them is messed up with the adducing of the traditional Sānkhya-borrowed "tag": "This is not I, etc.," together with the new and growing cliché already alluded to, of ordinary as contrasted with technical parlance: *paramattha; sammuti*. It will have given Māṇava's new Manuscript a very learned and up-to-date flavour, but it only obscures the real solution. It is true that this also hinges, no less than the preceding horns, on the meaning of a word. But it is hardly right to say the meaning is on the one hand popular, on the other hand technical. The solution is in the "lead", "leading" being understood in its proper sense when applied to a teacher. That proper sense is not the quasi-military sense where the man and the cause are merged in one. The translation is not too happy here. The Sutta passages, this time agreeing with our versions, run thus:

> "Now it does not occur to the Tathâgata either that 'I shall lead the monk-community', or that 'The monk-community is referred to as mine'. . . . 'Metteyya will lead a monk-community . . . as I now lead one . . .'"

Now where there is leading there will be "a leader", and to have a leader implies to some degree "dependence upon": words used in the translation—(Franke's rendering,[2] among some bad mistakes, is here better). I differ only as to emphasis. But soon after, there comes a rendering where the will to see,

[1] Text, p. 159.
[2] O. Franke, *Dīgha-Nikāya*, p. 203. So is Nyanatiloka's.

in the translator, has twisted a worse original into a nobler wording. " Attachment is put away by the Tathâgata . . . he lives only to be a help to others." Here the Pali is literally " Affection, . . . fondness is absent in the Tathâgata ; there is no seizing as ' for me ' ; having taken up he becomes a shelter." Then follows the analogy of the earth being similarly a basis, support, platform for creatures, with no craving as to them. And the application is, that the Tathâgata fosters in all creatures the good *dhammas* he has brought to birth in them, that they all are Teacher-thriven ; but he is without desiring them as " mine ". And that is because he has put away the opinion about " the self ".

Māṇava is at bottom right, and he could, had he known his " lañchakas " better, have better defended his great hero than he did. For we read, that when chid for spending his time teaching men, Gotama is made to reply :

Whate'er the apparent cause, Sakka, whereby
Men come to dwell together, none doth fit
The holy man. Compassion moves his mind.
And if, with mind thus satisfied, he spend
Himself instructing other men, yet he
Thereby is nowise bound as by a yoke ;
Compassion (moveth) him and sympathy.[1]

Incidentally there are two points of interest I am loth to pass over. The analogy, as is so often the case, complacently compares the man of the great compassion with the material uncompassionate earth, as if that brought us nearer the truth. Here Māṇava follows in the wake of Nāgasena and of Sakyan culture generally. We know however, that in this figure

[1] *Saṃyutta-Nik.*, i, 206.

he had high authority for using it, even if he shows himself unaware of it. Twice in the Majjhima Nikāya is there advice, fathered on the Founder, to cultivate the " earth-like heart (or mind), and to well-wish inexhaustibly, as is earth inexhaustible. The first smells of the monk ; the second is worthy of Gotama—who now can judge whether one or both or neither was his ? But it is perhaps not till we come on to a later day, that we find a worthier sense of fitness in such analogies :—" that ye may be the children of your Father in heaven, for he maketh the sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust." It was a bigger " universe of discourse ", where Jesus, in his similes, compared not spirit with matter, but spirit with spirit, " Father," " children." . . . Verily " thou art That ".

Incidentally again, the dilemma is of interest, in that it is the one case I have met, in early Buddhist literature, where the wording, applied to the rejection of the person as known, is made out as involving what we now call altruism or unselfishness. This connection does not, I believe, appear in the Piṭakas, but it is much caught at by European Buddhists, who naturally seek to find in Buddhism what has really emerged in human thought since the day when that creed stopped growing. But I have alluded to this already (p. 87, *n.*).

There is one more dilemma I would pause over. This is the 12th.[1] It is well propounded, and I seem to hear some bright young limb of an undergraduate, perchance Māṇava himself, throwing out the challenge. " It was said by the Bhagavā : ' Ānanda, the Tathâgata

[1] Text, p. 159.

had not the teacher's fist about things.' But again, when asked questions by the Elder, Mālunkya's son, he did not reply. Now this is a question of two ends, depending on one (of them), either on his not knowing, or on his keeping secret. If he said the former word, then he did not reply in the latter case, because he did not know. If he knowing did not reply, then he had the teacher's fist about things. This is a double-pointed question I put to you; you have to get it clear."

Here Māṇava's citations are in agreement with our Pali recension, but he has omitted a very important following word in the former, which explains the meaning of the "teacher-fist". (It would appear nevertheless not to be explanatory to Franke, whose rendering this picturesque compound by the verb "is not miserly" is inexact and inadequate.)[1] The omitted context, by the words "not having made an inner and an outer" (esoteric and exoteric), explains so far as to show, that the Founder's fist *was* an open hand. The other citation is one of several cases where Gotama is alleged to have refused to reply. It is the one usually quoted, because of the reasons given, and given more amply than in our book, and because of the striking parable of the wounded man, illustrating the need in religion for will-to-be-well rather than for will-to-discuss.

There is here no referring to the solution as being by way of a term used in one horn as non-residual, in the other as co-residual. Yet that is none the less the solution, and Māṇava might have shown it was so, had he not, shall I say, yielded to the wish

[1] Op. et loc. cit. Nyanatiloka's is more accurate.

to appear erudite, and brought out the Sutta formula for the four ways how questions should be answered, and so, obscured the issue. He might have said: It was neither a question of not knowing nor the wish to conceal. It is that you are not properly interpreting the nature of "teacher-fist" in the case of a teacher like the Bhagavā. It is true that, in the case of a teacher of elephants or of the lute, he does or does not impart all that he knows. The latter was the case with the Bodhisat, when teacher of the one art and of the other. He taught his pupils in both all he knew, for is it not said in the Jātakaṃ, that Bodhisats never have the teacher-fist?[1] "All he knew": his fist held knowledge. But what are the contents of the teacher-fist of a Bhagavā? Is it not first and last the questioner's weal, his *attha*? And may that weal not be now forwarded, now hindered by taking the form of something *to be known*? His teacher-fist includes what a pupil should, or should not be told, even as is the mother-fist in rearing her child.

More might be said with regard to the alleged "silences" of Gotama, so unquestionably accepted at Nālandā and by our own writers, but not here.

B. The Saint or Arahan

Next to the engrossing subject of the Bhagavā it is the "theory of saintship"—for it is no less than that—in his college studies, which had most deeply impressed Māṇava. I would not say that he saw the discrepancy which existed on the matter between the teaching of the Founder (as it appears to me), and that

[1] Cf. my *Stories of the Buddha*, p. xxvi, 1929.

theory which had been evolved in Sakya. Nevertheless, as is sometimes seen in conclusions arrived at without, and not within a social unit, he makes a contribution to the subject of the Arahan which derives in one or two features more directly from what I judge the Founder taught, than from what was taught in the Sangha among the after-men.

But what then is that discrepancy?

This will perhaps come out, if we admit that Gotama's message was summed up in a doctrine of man's life, *as a whole*, as a willed wayfaring in a Way through the worlds. So much more is implied in this, than our writers, or than Buddhists are ready to allow. The figure, together with much more, *implies*, that so long as there is wayfaring, there is incompleteness in the purpose and design with reference to each man's quest as a whole. No *wayfarer* can be called perfected, consummated, even though he be reckoned as near, as in sight of the Goal of the wayfaring.

Now by the theory, an arahan was explicitly judged to have completed, to have perfected that, to gain which he had been for ages exerting "desire, endeavour, work of mind", that for which he had, not in one life only, deemed the world well lost. He had won the fruit, of, i.e. realized the highest stage of, the Way:—*arahatta-phala*. He was called one "who has lived", one who "has done that which was to be done", one "for whom there was nought left to do", hence one who had "put away that desire, endeavour, work of mind". As I said elsewhere, he was already walking among the sheaves of harvest. It was not on earth only that the goal could be realized. One

group of repeaters of Suttas, the Anguttara-bhāṇakas, frequently gave it as the alternative fate of an individual or type, that if the goal were not realized here, it would be in the next birth in a very sublime world.[1] Once arahan, a man could not fall away,[2] and whereas he might " offend ",[3] it would only be inadvertently, through ignorance of etiquette, or the like. Such was the arahan, from the moment of " fruition " till death, " bearing his last body."

Now no pious Sakyan professed himself capable of stating what was the nature of the End of the Way. He had, it is once and well said, no words in which to speak of, he might have added, conceive it.[4] But negatively it was the extinction of everything physical, mental, moral which belonged to imperfection: Nibbāna, the going out as of a flame. Logically therefore no man could fitly be defined as having Nibbāna while in the body. There was on the one hand bodily suffering to which the saintly, from the Bhagavā downwards, were liable: a state by no means to be called perfect. There was the fact of the embodied state itself, which could not but detract from perfection, were it never so healthy, were it never so supernormal in a few individuals. There was the fact that the saint had still to think with the mind that could not conceive, to utter with language that could not utter concerning things as yet inconceivable, ineffable. And in the Anthologies, as I have elsewhere said, the saint is never found thinking and speaking of any bliss save that

The strife is o'er, the battle won,

and the warrior safe. He is feeling assured and he is

[1] E.g. i, 232; ii, 5; iv, 399, etc.
[2] *Kathāvatthu*, i, 2.
[3] Text, p. 266; Dil. 63.
[4] *Sutta-Nipāta*, ver. 1076.

retrospective.[1] He is nothing more. He is, as he says, awaiting his wages[2]; his not yet the word:

"home art gone and ta'en thy wages."[3]

And so far as the "home" meant anything, we feel in the presence of houses swept and garnished, rather than in that of any abodes of positive treasure of superthought, superwill.

Here then is the discrepancy I speak of: on the one hand the Way, or coming-to-be, a process implying the "yet-to-be-done" till the ineffable, the inconceivable is reached; on the other, the Way ended and fruition touched under conditions incompatible therewith.

Is this to call the Sakyan arahan theory illogical? I am as loth to use that word as I was eighteen years ago. Illogical thinkers quarrel with their own premisses. But the *premisses* of Sakyan, or Buddhist monks were not just those I believe to have been premisses in their Founder's message. Monasticism first altered emphases; and to do this is virtually to change those factors in the argument which really determine the conclusion.

For example, Gotama's professed aim, in uttering his message, was to show man as so wayfaring along the whole (not a part) of life as to be advancing towards "the end of ill", that is, becoming utterly well. The Way symbolizes the "becoming" better and better. Here lay *his* emphasis.

Monasticism saw the whole of life, here or hereafter, as ill, and the wise remedy to be a "cutting out" from the way of it, the short-cut of an artificial life the sooner to touch the End. Thus "becoming"

[1] Cf. *Pss. of the Sisters*, xxxi.
[2] *Pss. of the Brethren*, 606, 654, 1003.
[3] *Cymbeline*.

became a sinister word, and the pregnant force of the Way was weakened. It was resolved (*a*) into an emphasis on qualities, (*b*) into a fourfold emphasis on saying farewell to earth, i.e. retrospective emphasis, even as the new emphasis on ill had meant saying farewell to the world as quite past praying for.

And again, for Gotama, emphasis lay, I seem to see, on the very central fact of the " man ", who was on no account to be confused with his body or his mind. It was not primarily the bettering of *these instruments* in the Way of becoming that he taught; it was that new word to India: the *becoming-process in the man*. The man, as fundamentally divine in nature, was, in India, conceived as Being (*sat*), for whom there was no question of Becoming. There was here no atheistic antagonism to the best in brahman teaching; there was a building on it, an infusion of deeper truth; there was the one and only reconciling of the two positions: man's will to his weal (*attha*), and man's hope of ultimately attaining it. In other words, *because man's nature and the Highest were one*, (*a*) man willed the better, and (*b*) it was in him to become the Best, the Highest.

The monastic teaching, in its protest against the current brahman teaching, worsened this conception of the very man or " self "; was in consequence unable to see survival of death as that of a persisting, if growing " man ", and concentrated emphasis on making this little stage of the World-way the arena for life's culmination. Hence the arahan-theory of man's perfectibility here below.

Had the reality of the " man " been retained, the theory might have been held, as it was in both India

and in Platonic thought. The man might have been conceived as perfectible, and only handicapped in having here to express himself by limited, imperfect means, as in a prison, namely, by an earthly mind and body. Just as the greatest genius could not fitly express his genius with poor instruments, musical or other. But without that reality, or with that reality as only found in, and therefore intimately associated with, mind, perfectibility here is at least hard to vindicate. It is for apologists of Hīnayāna Buddhism to do that. It may well be, as I said those 18 years ago, quoting R. L. Stevenson, that we are "thinking of something else", when we are puzzled, or would word an apologia.[1] Not for nothing are, or should we be heirs of the ages. Our idea of man's perfection is still ineffable, inconceivable. But we may be so far advanced about it, that to what extent we can say more, conceive more about it, we rule out some things that in the past were permitted in that concept, and insist on some things that were, in the past, not in it. In a word, we have in mind our ideal, and our premisses, not the old-world Sakyan ideal and its premisses. Well for us if we are no longer content with these as sufficient for the best we have become to-day. Well for us if we realize this.

C. An Indian Utopia

I have now to make out how far Māṇava's writings show the arahan as not past becoming. And I find his contribution to this in his most original effort :— the Dhamma-nagara, or City of Right.

[1] *Buddhism* (Home University Library), p. 109.

The City of Right

The Dhamma-nagara is the real theme of the section wrongly appended, in the texts used by Trenckner in his edition of our book, to the Meṇḍaka-pañha, or Dilemmas. It is entitled Anumāna-pañha, or Questions on Inference. And what with the king, in it, being figured as reopening the same doubt he puts forward in the genuine conversations :—Did you ever see the Buddha ? . . . and the fact that the Dilemmas peter out into questions and answers, there is some excuse for careless, or ignorant scribes to have lumped this section together with the Dilemma section. But it is really a separate essay, with a fresh start. And in style it may be said to be in Māṇava's middle style, namely between the less literary, more interrupted and colloquial manner of the Dilemmas, and the smoother more literary, often very eloquent style of the following section on Dhutangas or extra practices. In the latter Māṇava is expatiating on the beauty of holiness in the individual saint. In the City he tries (with indifferent success) to show him in a different light.

On the titular subject of inference, where the question is: What should be sufficient evidence to establish what is now termed the historicity of anyone of long ago, famous for this or that, I have already said a little. In the matter of evidence it is interesting to note Māṇava's advance as compared with Nāgasena's. Neither, I repeat, had such a word as " evidence ". The translator's rendering is here free. The dummy-king's rejoinder is, in Pali, "Verily here is no Buddha manifest." A term for " evidence " may be in old Indian jurisprudence—I know not—but it would scarcely occur to any of the three to use it in this connection.

The problem of historical evidence had not yet arisen in culture. It is an outcome of centuries of written narrative. Today the narrator is exercizing the will to write down, not what is impressive, interesting, edifying, patriotic, but what is true. That Milinda in his day, and subsequently Māṇava should have raised the question is, I am inclined to believe, the breathing of a new spirit then in its infancy in India.

The translator suggests, that we have here a "parody" of the question in the Tevijja Suttanta: "Is there a single three-Veda brahman who has seen Brahmā face to face?"[1] I think we neither have anything of the nature of a parody, nor is the question of historicity, I should say rather of real existence, raised in the Suttanta. The argument is a powerful illustration of what the Founder meant by life as a Way leading to the Highest.

You brahmans, he was saying, believe in a moral, a holy divinity. You seek ways to union with Him. How shall you get to the End of that way, if you are not shaping your lives so as also to become moral, to become holy as He is holy to make yourselves fit to join Him? To have queried the existence of Deity was unthinkable.

Nāgasena, in this other matter, fell back on what is remote in space, yet commonly believed to be true. That the Buddha had lived was remote in time, yet so believed in. The identical argument would to-day be given by the great majority in both East and West. Māṇava's reply is a distinct advance. We may reword it thus:—X lived, because ascribed to him is a new and better teaching, namely, the teaching we have called

[1] Trans., i, p. 109, n.; Dīgha Nikāya, i, No. xiii.

ABC. . . . This teaching did not spring up without a teacher. If he was not X, it is for you to prove he was YZ. . . . We see the man no more, but we see his work, and by it we judge what manner of man he was, however he was called.

It is not likely that Māṇava would have approved of the last clause. But *we* should contend, that his argument goes no further than to shift the burden of proof on to the man who might say :—Yes, the teaching is there, but how are we to be sure it was the work of him you call the Buddha ? For instance, was it the teaching of one man only ?

We might go farther and say : Are you sure that those teachings were really his, *unchanged as he taught them ?* Māṇava did not go so far, and even we of to-day do not see as we should, that the very heads of doctrine he named :—the 37 Bodhipakkhiya dhammas (things belonging to enlightenment)—suggest powerfully that his teaching has *not* remained unchanged.

We have but to look at their contents and history. They are said, in the book of the Founder's decease, to have been the last and the one code he committed to his disciples.[1] Worthily therefore are they given this place of honour. But when we consider them in detail, we note that the famous Four Truths, long held as a central tenet, and often referred to by both Nāgasena and Māṇava, are absent ! Only the fourth, the Way, is included, and that, the real centre, is placed at the end, when it should have stood first. And more have we not yet noticed :—the fact that the " fourth truth ", the Way, is entered as not one item,

[1] *Dīgha-Nikāya*, ii, 120.

but as eight, brings up the list to the quite inauspicious number of 37, instead of the more auspicious one of 30. And " luck " of this sort was a potent thing both in Sakya and in India generally. It is noteworthy here too, that the *number being* 37 is nowhere formulated in the Piṭakas, and even in our book is not yet so formmulated, frequently though it is so stated in later literature.

That Māṇava should have illustrated his intelligent reply by the " insignia " (literally, " enjoyment-commodities ") is not very commendable. He of all people knew how often these tokens of kshatriyaship had been, and were being used, in his India of the toppling dynasties, by pretenders and usurpers. But his next simile is better, and once used, it led him on to expatiate on what was either a happy inspiration of the moment, or else a more latent idea he had brooded over. This was—and it is as suitable for his day as the other was not—that an ideally fine city, well planned from the first and long famous as delectable and attractive, was a just source whereby men might infer both the historicity and excellence of the original architect. If we are right, his own city Sāgala had arisen as the new Euthydemeia, as a phoenix from the older Sāgala, destroyed by Alexander's armies, some two centuries before Milinda's date.

From this parable-city Māṇava goes on, in a strain of eloquent writing finer than he had yet put forth, to depict a Dhamma-city, a city of the Right, a peerless city, a Nirvana-city, built through the teaching of the Buddha and solely inhabited by men who had in their long " upward way " qualified for, or who

were advanced in qualifying for Parinirvana. We are not, I take it, to see in the city that Parinirvana as entered upon; this were too unorthodox for a writer who, whatever his own convictions, must have been aware he was writing mainly for a prevalent Sakya culture in his readers and their listeners. Moreover the "citizens" are, as he goes on, often referred to as "bhikkhus", a state implying earthly limitations. It will be to men in that Nibbana of the house swept and purged of all evil, to which Nāgasena had alluded, and where arahans passed their remaining days of waiting for the coming of the mysterious and final "going out" into. He is thus not hampered by the barriers of the ineffable and inconceivable. He has moreover become a fluent writer, whatever the tool he wielded. The pace of lofty and eloquent rapture he set, from the time he invited himself to give a parable, is well maintained, and having already, as it were impatiently, broken out into a few lines of verse on the great Architect, he finally resumes the metrical style for his peroration.

I am frankly disposed to wonder why this, I believe, unique, and I am certain, earliest attempt at Utopia-portrayal in India has been so little admired either by Buddhists or by historians. As to the latter, I would not go so far as to see in the whole book "a model of Indian prose". The very absence of what would constitute a "model" in literary excellence for a written debate, or even catechism is for me a strong argument both for the conversations being genuine "records", and also for the editor of them having been both mandated not to go beyond his materials, and also it may be in being himself a tyro at the work of

compiling a lañchaka. But how it can be claimed, as it has been claimed, that only these conversations can lay claim to being a work of art, and the privately composed portions of the work rated as artistically inferior, I cannot see, nor do I agree.

I am not saying that, as a Utopia essay, the Dhamma-nagara comes out on top when compared with the better known essays of Plato, Cicero, Augustine and later efforts. I am coming to such defects as I see in it. But as a literary composition we may look in vain in anything in Pali books earlier or later to compare with either it, or the following section on, not the saintly sodality, but the saint. I can remember how the original translator was moved by them in 1894. We have in them surely just what we look for in a " work of art " :—the definite subject to be ideally presented, that is, with certain features so brought out " ideally ", rather than as in actual happening, as to combine to produce an aesthetic effect. There is practically nothing of this in that human document, the conversations.

The chief feature thus " ideally " put forward by Māṇava in the City is the saint conceived as living " ideally ", not as a recluse, but in a sodality of saints. We of the West, fortunately never over-weighted with the tradition, that the best life is only to be realized in seclusion from our fellowmen, cannot easily picture what a bold new word it was for Māṇava to give his world. Not easy is it to estimate what that recluse tradition has cost India and the countries where Hīnayāna spread. It has meant, that a large proportion of the best manhood has for centuries been withdrawn from promoting the welfare of the

land, and has served that mainly in the negative way, by not being drawn into movements where their gifts might have been misused to stir up strife. By the best manhood I mean not necessarily those who excelled physically and mentally. I mean those who cared for the things that really in the long run matter most :—the things that belong to the growth of the very man ; the things that make for life considered in its entirety and not in a stage of it ; in a word for religion. In the late war the best men *of this kind* may have, will have been but a small proportion in the manhood wasted, a glorious minority among those lost, but their loss to their countries and to the world was a very dreadful thing. Yet that other loss in Asia, not during a very few years but during centuries, is even more appalling. It is only shirking the truth to speak of the quiet, necessary to concentrated work of thought, of meditation prayerful or less wise, of creative effort. There was no intention in the mind of most Indian or Buddhist recluses of using seclusion as a means the better to serve mankind during or after retreat. There was first and chiefly the recluse's personal maturing for ultimate salvation as the motive ; there was also, but only as a corollary, the merit accruing to others by maintaining him as, industrially considered, a parasite, and by such overflow of merit as might radiate from his nearness.

Now Nāgasena had the word " recluse " (*samaṇa*, *yogâvacara*), let alone " monk " ever to the front. So had Māṇava.[1] But it was always in connection with the man's personal life and nature. There was

[1] He adds, in his latest writing, the word *yogī*. Neither this nor the second term occur in the Piṭakas. (I think the P. Dict. reference to Kathāvatthu, 220, is a mistake.)

no serious discussion of the saint as a man seeking salvation among and along with his fellowmen. As a result the whole field of what is now called ethical problems does not come to the front at all. This is the more worth noticing, in that the tendency in writers on Buddhism to-day is to call it, not a religion or a philosophy, but a system of ethics. These writers perhaps mistake that training of the man in virtue and holiness for himself alone as the training of him in his relations with, and his influence on his fellows. In this the old teaching of Buddhism is largely negative; I mean, it is largely what a man should not do. And there is reason in this, when the most saintly man is pictured as one avoiding the company of his fellows, even of his fellow-worldforsakers. The chief concern became for such, that in no way should his life be damaging to other men, at least at such times as of necessity brought him up against them for maintenance of bodily life,—a contact which for him as a non-producer, was bound to happen. He was to be, as almsman, like the bee, sucking honey and taking pollen " without injuring the flower ". (That as bee his taking would redound to the benefiting the flower " in kind " was not, in the verse I quote, taken into account.[1])

I think I am not wrong in calling this by no means a constant feature in the ideal of saintship held by the dead world of the past in Europe, but more of a constant feature in both the past and the present world in Central Asia (including the South). It will not perhaps be hard to find exceptions, and exceptions test the rule, test it as not true in every case. But as

[1] *Dhammapada*, ver. 49.

exceptions they do show that the rule is true for the great majority of cases. The more exceptional, the more novel is it to find Māṇava boldly producing his city of happy saints dwelling in full and active and busy sodality, with no thought of their fellows' company detracting a whit from the aims of the holy life. I repeat, the newness of his picture seems to have escaped the notice of writers, the possibility too of Māṇava's Utopia as a result of acquaintance with Utopias already written in the West—with Plato's of some two centuries and more in priority, or with Cicero's recently published effort. Māṇava's is in every way, save in the one salient feature " Utopian ", very different from these, infected as it is with the salient defect in a culture which had been, and for yet a while was, in the control of monks. Thus we search in vain in his city for one-half of his fellowmen : women. Nay, for four-fifths, since the child too is absent. Yet both woman-saint and child-saint were features in his lañchakas, and in commentarial teaching. No reader of the Suttas can ignore the former; and it was the children sought after and warded, *in the latter only*, that showed me the Founder as if saying:—"Suffer me to come unto the little children."[1] We can perhaps overlook the mention of the woman-saint, since as saint she was held to be not *vir* but *homo* ; she lost sex and was just man. Yet that does not excuse him from not missing, in India of all countries ! the mother-note, as a right and essential characteristic of his worthy citizens in their mutual warding and fostering of each other. He did see it, but later and then only for a moment, equating the mother with

[1] *Pss. of the Brethren*, xxxi.

father and with friend, when he was describing holy practices.[1]

Then again, his city is too largely one of shops and shopping to rank high in ideal pictures of its kind. It may be said in defence, that he is depicting his city mainly as a visitor would see it. He does take account of more than bazaars and street-farers; are there not the warders (i.e. police) of the city, the "chaplains", they, that is, who with knowledge of the unseen, speak of life in the larger sense, the judges, the lamp-lighters, much like the chaplains, the warders of Right, i.e. teachers of moral law, the recluses—since retreat is to some extent wise for all? These would not, for the visitor, be so evident in their business as the shoppers and purveyors.

This is very true. And it is not the evident bustle of these which in itself is a defect, any more than the mention of the others, worthily done as it is, leaves no deficiency. Deficiency is there, and the Utopia you or I would draw, would not show it, for we do not belong to Māṇava's world or day. The consumer is prominent; so is the distributor, or purveyor; so are the engineers of the smooth working of the civic machinery, so are the watchers on the towers. But the producer is absent! The wares sold are all, is it too irreverent to say so? canned goods. I mean that the goods are in every case ideas which, as material, as "Stoff", as ways of advance, are in many cases for all time and every place, but in these bazaars, these ideas, are on sale as having "materialized", that is, been shaped and worded in a certain way for a certain set of conditions. This corresponds fitly enough for a

[1] Text, p. 354.

readymade culture shaped by and in a certain tradition. We do not look for more from the bazaar simile. But there is no account of men engaged upon the New, whether it is the New in the True, in the Good, or in the Beautiful.

Here is what is to me the second main defect in the picture. And it is only what we should expect from the son of a culture which had not broken out in wording either will, or, as to myself I call it, " more-will." The joyous Dhamma-nagara, even in its truncated state of one-sex-ness, leaves us with the impression of, in the main, abundant and active will, even though Māṇava had not the fit word. But it seems largely the will of the squirrel in a cage—a fixed tether, a round of life rather than a healthy nucleus of workers in more-will, evolving the new, the fresh, the " up-to-date ", to be, when ready, *substituted* for the goods in stock at the bazaars. How poor are we not ourselves in wording this, the very essence of what we call higher in our nature! More-will finds vent in what we now call creative effort, new syntheses, genius—well, it is good we have some words anyway, and not none, as was Māṇava's case.

And yet, Māṇava comes near now and then to more-will in his saints; and it is just herein that, in his hands, the arahan becomes the " More-man ", and not the man only who " has lived, has done what was to be done, has no more to do ". Where and how do I find this?

Speaking of his treatment generally, it is in the way he depicts the arahan as different from the way in the Piṭakas. We see this mainly in what he omits concerning them; we also see it here and there in what

he says about them. Readers conversant with the Piṭakas will notice, that we do not find Māṇava making any use of those frequent Piṭaka-refrains announcing in fixing formulas the winning of the arahan fruit or status. There are three of these, (just as there is but one for the winning the status of the so-called First Path :—" Perished is purgatory! etc."[1]—), but none for the winning the status of the so-called Second and Third Paths, the status of arahantship being the " Fourth Path ". The three formulas I numbered A, B, and C, in the Index-volume to the Saṃyutta-Nikāya (Introd.), and they have been so entered in the Pali Dictionary (Rhys Davids and Stede, art : Arahan). They resemble diplomas for successful examinees, and in my opinion do not hail from the true early Sakya of the Founder. These Four Paths are not his Magga or Way, save only in this, that they take account, not of this earth only, but also of the worlds as belonging to the man's life, and they have the idea of progress in view far better than that other *edited* version the " Eightfold " (or again, the Tenfold) " Path ". But by the compilers of the Sutta-Piṭaka they and the formulas were taken very literally, making the Suttas amount now and then to a sort of Community-Log, with entries of the addition of So-and-so to the rank of arahan.[2] The earliest application of this diplomaship that can be called (remotely) historical is the account of Ānanda's " passing his examination " only on the very eve of the First Council, in which a place had been reserved for him—an episode which is dramatically worked up in the Commentaries in a way that is virtually humorous—and perhaps not unintentionally so.

[1] *Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, ii, p. 71, etc. [2] E.g. ibid. i, 140, 161 f.

In the Piṭakas then a monk was either arahan with a definite status, or he was not. Either he was the finished in becoming, the done with growing, the static man, the all-but-a-Tathâgata, or he was not. In Māṇava's hands the fixed barriers have become blurred; the diplomas are gone. This holds in both his chapter on the City and also in that on the holy living, which follows. In the City Māṇava gives us an inclusive list of the worthy inhabitants, to wit, those who are (learned in) Suttas, Vinaya and Abhidhamma; they who repeat, or recite (*bhāṇakā*) each of the Five Nikāyas, and they who teach Dhamma; the virtuous, the concentrated, the wise, those who love developing the " wisdom-factors ", men of psychic insight, recluses, men whose life shows forth the Way, men in any one of the " Four Paths ", or ensuing " Fruits ", musers (in Jhāna) and so forth. The City is therefore not exclusively for those who are distinguished as having graduated in arahantship. Nevertheless it is not, I say here again, hard to see that it was arahans whom Māṇava had in mind as the bulk at least of his citizens. For it is at the end of this miscellaneous list that he goes on to say: " like a wood of bamboo, a wood of timber the City of the Right was crowded and frequented and thronged by these arahans."

I think that, in this and other passages, he shows, that for him the clear-cut distinction in the authorized claim to be " arahan " had faded out, and that, for him, all good men showing not only will, but " more-will " in the Way of coming-to-be were truly Worthy (" arahan ").

If I judge him truly, then is the arahan, as so

implicitly defined by him, no longer the finished man. It is true that he has not specialized—as we say—in production, or producers, in his City. But it may well be, that for him the fact, that he had no fixed idea of any of his citizens as finished and perfected, amounted to this: that his "consumers" (and of course all the middlemen were of necessity consumers also) were by the fact of their "godly living" producers, and as such were producing *in their own growth*, by bringing about in each man a "more" which was, for him, the very New.

This was no growth, in the first place, in body or in mind. It was that growth in the very man, self, soul, spirit for which even we have hardly fit words, but which some among us would call growth in holiness, spiritual growth, and which some would call growth of character. I find neither direct enough; I call it "growth of the man", "becoming in the man". For holiness is but attribute; character is but man's self-expression, is but a term for different forms of more-will. "Will" is the very "man"-in-action. And it is mainly will in which the best of us can make progress here below, when we have distinguished the man from body and mind. In other worlds, greater light of knowledge will be added with yet greater will-power, of which knowledge is but an aspect.

Māṇava makes play, as in his day he was bound to do, with appreciation of knowledge in text and repeating among qualified citizens. Yet throughout the City-parable there is an undercurrent of vivid, earnest will-to-weal among the inmates, more suggestive of men who are intent on becoming, than of men who have become. His saints, nay, even his Buddhas! have not

abandoned what we may call dynamic kinetic states. We shall see this better presently. We note it, in the City, in the bold metaphor of calling those who much desired and enjoyed the taste and draughts of Dhamma and the teaching of it " topers and tipplers in the Bhagavā's Dhamma-city ".[1]

Now I do not think there is much that may be called aesthetic enjoyment in Māṇava's conception of his city's delights. The various wares, ambrosia and the rest, are valued on the one hand by what has gone to procure them, and on the other for what they will enable the buyer to produce in himself, in his own further growth. And here I may say, in passing, that the translator has seemed to be needlessly perplexed, in a long footnote,[2] over the question as to " karma as the price ". We can first dismiss the question as to the little verse, and its successors being scriptural. They are but Māṇava's feelings beginning in ripples to take metric form, before he breaks out in poetic rhapsody in his peroration. We can next discount the Western tendency, which, as I have said years ago,[3] in retaining the use of the alien word karma, especially as here with a capital K, has tended to see the meaning in a glamour, and to attach to it a mystic import which it would not convey to Jain or Buddhist. Karma has even been made (and this very translation will have helped to cover an identical permanent somewhat, used to do duty for the " soul ") as that which transmigrates from one life to another. . . . Great verily is the myth of the Word ! Karma (Pali, *kamma*), with the corresponding verb, is the useful

[1] Text, p. 345.
[2] Trans. ii, p. 213, n. 3.
[3] *Buddhism*, p. 71.

hack, which in India has had to do service for work, doing, making, action, deed, business—for one and all of these. And Māṇava is describing the ordinary process of exchanging, through the medium of "price" (*mūla*), work done for goods purchased. It is obvious that effective work would alone count in the transaction, and not ineffective work, damage, breakages. These would reduce the available assets of the man who came with the price in his hand. Only "good karma", not bad, would be represented in his pouch.

Now if we will forget for a moment the Karma with capital K, we shall have these happy citizens, who have been very busy over the good work (*kamma*) of growing and helping each other to grow, whether in study or as teaching or as adjudicating or as warding in general, coming with their, shall we say, State-paid wage into the acquisition of new "credit" of this or that kind. This credit is worded by "object" (*ārammaṇa*), a word meaning, in its first intention, something acquired, or to be acquired (*rabh*, *rambh*), but usually referring to some mental asset. And this we may either, following Māṇava literally, take as acquisition of some worded way or state in holiness, or as the entering upon some finer stage of the man's becoming, worded in the goods described, but in his case, he being an individual, i.e. not quite like anyone else, a new becoming or "werden" peculiar to himself.

If I then do justice to Māṇava, in reserving the term karma here to mean "work done by the citizen in the city for himself and the city", we can on the one hand slough off the nightmare of a bogy of past deeds done in past days, past years, past lives, before the

man attained to citizenship, but on the other we must accept the idea of the saintly man, arahan, or nearly so, as that of one who still works, who still has work to do, who has not finished, whose full harvest is yet to come.

When we turn to the consideration of the saint, not in a sodality but as an individual, we again find Māṇava's treatment one that tends to obliterate formulated barriers. In orthodox Theravāda the main social cleavage was between laity and monk; among the latter there were the cenobites dwelling in monastic sodality, at first either on tour or in little cells (*vihāras*), then to a large extent stationary in larger vihāras, or monasteries, and there were the true recluses, dwelling away from the village borders, in uncleared, usually woodland haunts, either in leaf huts or in the open. These but not necessarily these exclusively, would be observing some or all of certain more or less austerer practices which had gradually emerged in the Sangha from early days, and had been developed from indefiniteness in name and number to thirteen distinct restrictions covered by technical names. From the passing references in the Vinaya to a *dhuta-vāda* (school or theory of scrupulosity) we see, in the Suttas five ways of stricter living, ascribed to and repudiated by the Founder[1]; we see in the Anthology of the monks a chant about thirteen more clearly defined stricter practices[2]; finally in the Visuddhi-magga the thirteen, now called as they are in the Milinda book, but are not in the Anthology, *dhut'angāni*, are formally catalogued and described.

[1] *Majjhima-Nikāya*, Sutta 73.
[2] *Theragāthā*, Bhaddiya, Kāḷigodha.

The word means "factors in that which is shaken (off)" and the accepted religious import of the metaphor appears early in the Anthology :—

> (The saintly man) doth shake off (*dhunāti*) naughty things
> As they were forest-leaves by wind-god blown (ver. 2).

The factors were technically termed (1) the practice of the refuse-ragman, (2) of the threefold gear, (3) of the almsman, (4) of the house-to-house goer, (5) of the one-seater, (6) of the bowl-fooder, (7) of the after-meal-refuser, (8) of the forester, (9) of the tree-root-man, (10) of the open air man, (11) of the charnel-fielder, (12) of the any-lodging-er, (13) of the sitter (who never lies down). It will be seen that, with perhaps the exception of the last, the practices stop short of a fakir's self-torture, as readers may see in the text of Visuddhi-Magga's (or its translations)[1] exposition. To this extent they are less excruciatingly foolish, though childish enough for all that, childish not because strictness about the "simple life" was never advisable for some at some times or in some places, but because they are so commended in both our book and by Buddhaghosa as a sort of super-instrument for the developing all that is best in the observer. Māṇava indeed describes them as "longed for and prayed for (*patthita*) by all Buddhas", a remark for which the Piṭakas give him no support. "It is not for such practices as these, Udāyin, that men commend me and learn of me."[2] Māṇava however finds, that no man can attain saintship in this life without the dhutanga practices.

And yet how very little does each of these rather sordid prescriptions count in his very eloquent eulogy of the saint's life! The emphasis is all on the latter,

[1] *The Path of Purity*, ch. ii, by P. Maung Tin. [2] *Majjhima*, loc. cit.

and not a little in its ethical features, with which the dhutangas have hardly anything to do. So much is this the case, and so late in the chapter does he bring out a list of the thirteen—Buddhaghosa *starts* with this—that I am tempted to believe the list is an insertion of Ceylon editing. I go further. I cannot see Māṇava's hand in this dragging in the allusions to the dhutangas at all. He has obviously grown much in literary skill. He has not only acquired a power, unprecedented in any other Pali literature we know, of literary style, he has also the well defined literary object in this section of expressing his conception of the saint's saintly life as applying equally to laymen and monk. Thus the " king " is made to ask whether it is possible for laymen to develop " Nirvana ", or the consummated life, while on earth as laymen? On hearing that it is, he then repeats the question he had put to Ayupāla, before meeting Nāgasena : " Why then be a monk ? " (It is only in a very suggested way that the inquiry is made to Nāgasena.) And the dummy-Nāgasena would be expected to reply in terms not of a certain phase in monkish practice, but in those of monk-life in general versus the lay-life. Instead, he is made to exalt that phase only over against the lay-life. How he could have made the general and more obvious contrast had already been given in the Kathāvatthu (Book iv, 1), a work with which he does not appear to have been acquainted—as would certainly have been the case had he been monk.

That as layman, he does not in his own words and values contrast the two ways of life, but only the one way with the stricter side of the other way leaves two conclusions open to us. The one is that I am wrong :

that Māṇava estimated the monk-life as the dhutanga life, at least when worthily carried out, and that the text is as he wrote it. The other conclusion is, that when this portion of his work (the latest MS. of it) reached the Ceylon Vihāras, and shared the editorial fate of the previous portions, the doctrine of the Thirteen Dhutangas had become all the vogue, such as we see it was when Buddhaghosa came later to write in Ceylon his Visuddhi-magga. And the editors judged that it would lend weight and point to Māṇava's description of the saintly life for layman *or* monk, to have it presented as essentially based on the Thirteen, and not as it is more generally worded in the Kathāvatthu.

If I am right, and we read Māṇava's chapter, with all references to the Dhutangas eliminated, we then have left us a quite valuable contribution to old world notions of human worth, in many respects lovely for all time, and applicable to layman and recluse. Had our book been a few centuries earlier, the writer, where we now read Dhutangas and what is involved in, or guaranteed by them, we should have read *brahmachariya*, or divine life, and the practiser as *brahmachārin*. But the beautiful words had suffered depreciation, and, under monasticism, had come to stand for celibacy. The first just lingers in the old sense in the Conversations, where Nāgasena speaks of care for the body only for the better fostering of " the divine life ". And the other term also lingers, misunderstood by the king (Text. p. 75).

Even without the venerable words, the Co-Founders of Sakya would have highly valued Māṇava's ideal life. " Dhutanga," he writes, using the word in this

general way in the singular, " has pure livelihood, happy results, is blameless, works no ill to others, is fearless (or safe), does not molest, is absolutely a growing-thing, not a decaying thing, is candid, is giver of warding that is prayed for . . . long suffering, past valuing, infinite . . ." and more on this wise. Māṇava would write better than that now, in a world over which there passed long ago that breath of a greater ethic, a greater weal, which bade men not halt at the blameless, the harmless, the warding prayed for ; that word of the New Will which, for the negative virtues, inspired the positive welldoing, which sent the warding Samaritan to the man unable to pray for help. It was coming, that Brahma-breathing, it was not very far off, and Māṇava might well have wept with Asita, that it was to be after his time. No blame is his ; he wrote the worthiest word of his day ; blame is theirs alone who will not see, that not one but more New Words have come since that day when he so wrote. Praise rather is due to him that his was the courage and wisdom to see in the Arahan, not the finished statue, not the run-down machine, nor yet the emotionless Stoic, but the man ever bent on the " absolutely growing-thing ", the man who was, as Gotama had desired of them who would reach the Highest, " wanting to learn " : *sikkhākāma*, who is strong in enterprise, who abides in amity, who with all Buddhas longs and prays for the holy living.

D. Similes and the Saint

Time again has past and Māṇava has now, a grey haired man, become a famous writer. This meant in

his case, famous in the monastic world near and far, famous now as not only the Conversations-editor, but as the compiler of much more. And since his MSS. evidently were without colophons testifying to himself as author, it is very possible, that his remoter readers, notably in Ceylon, were coming to think that he was editor only of his own compositions—an error he was asking for, as we say, when he annexed king and thera as dummies in his own discourses. It was but natural, that he should compose yet again; it was natural, that he should fall back on a less ambitious scheme of contents; it was natural, that with a vogue and influence predominantly among monks, his chief patrons, he should lose sight of his wider range of saintly laymen, and confine himself to religieux alone. "How many features (*angāni*) must a monk have to realize saintship?"

Very consistently does he, shall we say, maunder on in the field already of old so rich in Sakyan literature, of the simile or metaphor, concluding his life's work on earth just as Nāgasena had for him begun it. At times he is in light vein, and would have us smile. It is clearly a meant absurdity when he makes the squirrel thud the ground (with his tail to bring about an impressive inflation). At times he is in loftier vein and, in the now narrowed scope, not without his earlier eloquence. But, as we should expect, such a vein is slight. The monkey, a good-for-nothing in Sutta figures, is promoted as wise and discreet, and the ill-boding crow fairly shines. But then it is a *vayāsa* that is so called, not a *kāka*. It is of interest to find a group of no fewer than six similes of things marine, hinting at a voyage somewhen in his life:

ship, anchor, mast, pilot, sailor and sea. Māṇava makes no reference, in his sea-group of similes, five in number, to the better known eight of Vinaya, Anguttara and Udāna; nevertheless he uses their features in his five, omitting the saltness, the shelving depths and the shore-limits. I wonder too whether, in a metaphor he uses no less than three times—the seeing spiritual liberty as flowers—he knew that it was a figure of the Anthology (ver. 100)? I wonder too that, in his hilltop similes fit to stir a response in many to-day, he makes no reference to the eloquent verses on highland charms ascribed, in that collection, to Mahā-Kassapa, instead of quoting a verse with no such reference? And was he ware, I wonder, as he wrote it, of the echo of the very Sakya gospel in his words on food (*bhojana*):—that the true monk was he who was as a handle to the gate of the Way to all men, and was himself ever growing in the good? The latter clause is defective, and needs a cause for his own growth corresponding to food in bodily growth. Wayfaring in the Way would have supplied it.

But to leave these details which have little historic significance, there are two features in this collection which are as faint shades thrown on the blank screen of the Buddhist history of this period. The one is the writer's frequent citation of verses ascribed to notable disciples of early Sakya, which are not included in the Pali Canon. There is an Appendix on these and other citations in my Theragātha translation, and to what is there said the last sixteen years have brought nothing of a definite nature to add. I wrote:—They are all quoted by the author as bearing precisely as much or as little

authority as those other verses which he quotes on the five remaining occasions, from the Canon. I would now only add this :—the fairly obvious inference is, that there will have come to be collected possibly after, possibly by agencies unconsulted by Piṭaka editors, another, shall we call it Apocryphal Anthology, which was repeated by certain *bhāṇakas* at Nālandā, etc., or had been written down, and from which Māṇava quoted. The names of the putative versifiers are so eminent, that no Piṭaka editors would have eliminated them in making the Theragāthā Anthology, or any other. The verses, as collected, or separately, will have come to hand from outlying vihāras, not from those of Sāvatthī, Rājagaha, Benares, Patna, Sāketa, Kapilavatthu, vihāras which all contributed, I believe, to the great revision work undertaken in Asoka's day at Patna.[1] And if they did *not* find the door of the Canon open to them when, as I hold, the last two books of Abhidhamma *did*, here is a point to test the truth of that alleged late inclusion withal (p. 114). Let only critics bear in mind, that the real vogue of that early scholastic, post-Patna period was Abhidhamma, rather than Sutta gāthās. I cannot see Māṇava composing verses, and then fathering them on such saints as Sāriputta, or pretending to cite them as theirs, along and level with canonical verses. He was too serious for that, too mindful also of his monk readers. The specimens he cites are worthy to have been included in the (very varying) poetic and religous level of the Anthology. If I here also refer specially to two—by Sāriputta and Subhūti respectively—it is that in the former saint's gracious humility,

[1] The prominence of multiples of 6 in the account is interesting.

as willing to learn even from a child, we have now confirming evidence in at least one Commentary,[1] in the latter we have a rehabilitation of the word *vana* = wood. Exegetical comments on the word as suggestive of jungly obstructions like worldly temptations, coupled with the prefix *nir*, in the word *nirvāṇa*, gives the wood a sinister implication, in spite of the much avowed loyalty to forest life. But Subhūti rectifies this with the very word :—

> Infected as thou art by lust,
> By illwill and illusion's taint,
> Come thou away and leave the wood !
> This is the home of souls made pure.
> Of stainless anchorites austere.
> Defile not thou the purified !
> Come thou away and leave the wood !

The other feature is the suggestion of Mahāyānist emphasis, occurring once, namely in the sixtieth Simile, that of the woodcraftsman. His care in selecting hard wood, and rejecting soft wood is likened to the diligent monk's care in rejecting certain views, not so much through greater absorption in practical holiness as through his preference for another view, judged as better. The translator has already drawn attention to this in a very weighty footnote, hence there is less need for me to dwell on the matter. But the translation of the terse technical phrases is very free in places, and has probably been suggested by the Sinhalese Commentary, which for me offers untrustworthy guidance.

The "view" judged better is of the metaphysical theory termed *Suññatā*, in Sanskrit *Shūnya*, in Japanese, *Ku*. I have rendered it literally, without

[1] *Saratthappakāsinī*, i, 123 ; *Kindred Sayings*, i, 88 *n*. (*l* "in this").

the commentarial gloss, as " should lay hold of the very-nature (*sabhāva*) of things-as-composite (*sankhārā*), the highest emptiness, without motion, without living principle, the infinite, emptiness". "Empty" is already a significant word here and there in the Piṭakas, significant, it is true, usually in the Sakyan way, that is, religiously and morally rather than metaphysically; but also here and there metaphysically, as in the probably later accretions to the Majjhima Nikāya, among which is the Mahā-Suññata-Sutta. The new significance, in our book, is the selection of the theory so named, and so magnified, as being set over all other theories as the wise monk's choice. There is nothing in the context to show any awareness in the writer of divergence from, or of building up over older revered teachings. This was to come later, when Mahāyāna came to " feel " itself. Māṇava was being drawn too much by a vogue to recognize it as vogue.

On the translation of the views " to be forsaken ", commentarially elucidated, I would say, that the irrational rendering " what is not done is of no avail ", literally " the not-done the not fit to do ", is very possibly a technical term (of the day) for the attack on the Arahan theory; an assertion that the done (*kataṃ*) had not been done, the perfectly fit was not fit. And further, that the phrase " men's actions are of no importance " (*apurisa-kāraṃ*) was more correctly a reference to the Sānkhyan view, that the *puriṣa*, the self, soul, or very man, as distinct from mind as well as body, was inactive, not a doer, entirely detached, passive.

E. Nirvana

The contribution made by the Milindapañha to the words on Nirvana is perhaps the portion for which it best deserves to be still read and remembered. This is because the earlier words on the subject left so much to be desired. We do not know, I have said, when the word was taken over by the Sakya. That movement had, I think, two chief words for the goal and consummation of man's life :—the end of ill (*dukkhass' anta*) and the good or the quest (*attha paramattha*). It found in its world and its day the word *svarga*, Pali *sagga*, a popular concept like our " heaven ". The deeper Indian teaching of life as in many worlds stripped such a word of finality or perfection. Those ideas were driven out of space inwards, their growth in worth depending thenceforth on the growth in man's conception of highest worth. The end of ills on the one hand, the attainment of the sought-after on the other are the negative and positive aspects of the Highest and Ultimate in life. And it is regrettable, if characteristic of Indian monasticism, that the negative aspect should have been the one to be reinforced by the negative word Nirvana :— going-out, extinction. It was not realized, that with so much emphasis laid on the extinguishing of the undesirable and the obstructing, the weight attaching to the real thing, the end of the Way, and the emergence of the idea " Utterly Well " would of necessity become weakened, starved. It was not realized, that with so much told of what was not to be done, man might come to wonder, what was left, what it was all for, and to cry, in the words put into the fictitious

Milinda's mouth, " Do not show me this question by covering it up ! show it as open, as manifest. With desire, with force shed here all that you have learnt ; this people is herein bewildered, in doubt, plunged in hesitation ! "

Māṇava's answers as to how he conceives the nature of life's supreme mystery are a very notable effort, for any writer in any literature, to express the ineffable, to conceive the inconceivable. Nothing of the kind had been before attempted. He echoes, it is true, terms here and there used in the Piṭakas, but as if unawares. It is possible, that the anguish in the tone of the question may have been suggested by a similar feeling breathing in the appeals of the Parāyana :—

For those oppressed by old age and by death,
Tell thou me of an island in the flood . . .
What leaving is't that they Nirvana call ?

Is he gone out as flame wind-blown ?
Or doth he not exist ? Or is
He henceforth and for ever " well " ?
(*Sutta-Nipāta*, 1092, 1075)

But there is nothing to show he had the little poems in mind, nor the warning in them :—

Nowhere is measure for one gone to oblivion,
That whereby we speak of him, for him that is not.
Wholly cut off all ways-whereby-we-think, (*dhammā*)
Cut off are also channels of our speech. (Ibid. 1076.)

We can give Māṇava full credit then for his courageous and delicate exordiums. He shows a vision singularly free from what would be called now anthropomorphic illusions. In other words he does his utmost to suggest the *man as supremely well.* Not in body, whereof there is no need where space is not—as he says : " there is no place where Nirvana is situate "—nor yet as a congeries of *dhammās* :—

qualities or states, amounting to what might be called mind—but the very man, the man not got at perhaps when we analyze body or mind, the man who is not the analyzed, the rated, the worthed, but the man who is analyzer, rater, valuer, worther. This is his man consummated, man not conceived as a negation, but man expanded infinitely as the indefinitely More valuing the indefinitely Many.

How then does Māṇava value or worth this consummation of the man? This should first be noted :—he mixes up, in valuing, the preliminary Nirvana in the saint's career in this life with the infinite Parinirvana. Thus while he denies that Nirvana is in space, just as Nāgasena denied that it was in time, he "sees" it as the "abode" (*āvāsa*) of saintly individuals. Again, it is true that he called it repeatedly the "not-going-on" (*apavatta*) loosely translated as "not becoming", yet he sees it as a nourishing process in will-power, or "more-will" (*iddhibala-vaḍḍhanaṃ*), perhaps a bigger truer word than he dreamt he was uttering. One thing is clear, and I have said it already:—he may mix his Nirvanas, but he has, as Nirvana, not this life only in mind, any more than had Nāgasena. When men are conceived as very much alive, yet no more in time or space, we have something very much More than just earthbound conditions.

The word he might have used to distinguish between preliminary and Pariṇirvana was as we saw ready to hand:—*diṭṭhadhamme nibbānaṃ* : *Nirvana* (with the seen quality), and it is possible, it was too linked with a traditional heresy for him to use it.[1] He has the term "preliminary stage" (*pubbabhāgo*), but he reserves this for man's *efforts* to seek and reach Nirvana here.

[1] *Dīgha-Nikāya*, i, 36.

It is perhaps regrettable he was not more lucid, nevertheless he represents in his very vagueness an Indian, a Buddhist mentality of the past which is interesting in its " otherness "—its *paratta*, as he himself would say—of meaning. For him the man as arahan was from that moment not the now and the then, but the Now, not the here and elsewhere, but the Here. And once we can get rid of our notions of the " man " as just body and mind, once we can realize, as India has ever realized, that to say " we are man " is to say " we are we " (just using a body and mind), and that as we, we are THAT, even one in nature with the Highest, we can then value the " man " quâ man as not necessarily in either time or space. But the changed attitude of vision is first necessary. In Bunyan's simile, we must raise our eyes from the muck-rake; we must see who holds what above us.

To return, Māṇava values Nirvana, i.e. holds it is to be seen (*daṭṭhabbam*) or " considered " (translated as " realized ") in ten modes: as without distress, or trouble, or peril (=fear), as safe, peaceful, happy, pleasant, excellent, pure, cool. Most of these, as we might expect, are negative notions. They express escape from the undesirable, safety, and peace,—it is curious he does not include release, or emancipation—all these are but negations of disturbing, perilous, hampering conditions. The other modes are just positive ways of wellbeing in the most general terms. His own more significant term I mentioned above: " well " (*arogo*), is not here, where it should have been. For that matter we ourselves do not see how much more worthy a word it is than " happy " to express man's consummation, or how significant

herein is its close relation to " will ". In the words of a Jātaka verse, Māṇava might have said :—

Now am I, look you ! (well) e'en as I willed to be !

For what is the true value in those negative terms if it is not to express freedom from all that stops us, not to cease becoming, but to become, not to will no more, but to be radiant will unchecked, not to end action but to work divinely. And all this we can only conceivably become and will and do if we remain " we ", not necessarily body and mind, but " we " the valuers, the worthers, we the willers, we the doers.

We may believe Māṇava would say so now. He rated Nirvana as a " not going on " yet he called it " absolute happiness ", surely a very mighty going on. He valued it in terms of not this and that, for he was Indian, and he wrote for a Buddhist public. But he was more than Buddhist, for his Nirvana was something to be seen to be realized, and to see to realize, there had to be seer, realizer, there had to be man. He felt this, and for him it was man first and man last, even in the very highest worth, even in the highest, even as the Highest.

PART III

SUMMARY OF THE NEW IDEAS

NO falser word could be said about Buddhism than that it has no history.[1] For that matter this is to contradict its own belief in the transience, the onward faring, *of all things*. *A fortiori* is it untrue to say, that practically no history, i.e changing ideas, can be elicited from the Canon of the Piṭakas. Much has happened, and again has not happened, to obscure the course of that history from our eyes. We who would follow it have to travel, not as on land with a series, a *santati*, of traces to be unearthed if we dig, but as by water, meeting only now and then some upstanding rocks which have not been submerged. Such a rock is the book of the Milinda-Questions. And whether I have, or have not succeeded in convincing her or him who reads, that in it we may see the rock-strata, in process of fresh transformation, as compared with much in earlier rock-strata seen on our voyage, I here sum up what, as it seems to me, we may find.

In that the period of the Questions and their sequels coincides with the ending of Greek rule and with the beginning of writing books in India, I have tried to show an unnoticed influence implanted by the former (p. 21), and the too little noticed effects on religious mentality of the latter (p. 21 f.).

I have called attention to the grown prominence of the Anatta doctrine, and why this had taken place (p. 28 f.).

[1] It has been so said, and not once only.

I have shown the significance in the otherwise inexplicable position assigned to the word *paññā* (wisdom or understanding), and to the word *sati* (*smṛti*: mindfulness and memorized tradition) in Sakyan thought (pp. 47–52 and 57–63).

I have shown a new feature and development in Sakyan psychology, to wit, (*a*) analysis pursued beyond mind-experience on occasion of sense, (*b*) a grasping after the idea of process, procedure, in it, and (*c*) a recognition of the distinction between the conscious and the subconscious. And the question has been raised of some bifurcating growth in North Indian, as compared with Sinhalese Buddhist development in "Abhidhamma" (pp. 52–6 and 65).

I have shown Buddhist logic in the book as midway between that of the Piṭakas and that of the Commentaries, at least in the matter of definition (p. 64). Further, there has been noted the Sakyan fondness for analogy, with an appreciation of it on the one hand, as opening up a manifold, a plurality, where there had seemed to be uniqueness, and a deprecation of its taking the rank of reasoning assigned it in Sakyan and Buddhist thought (pp. 33–5, etc.). Again, there has been noted two early steps taken in the beginnings of the appreciation of "historical evidence" (p. 95).

We saw that the old cardinal tenet of *viriya* was worsening, that of *faith* developing (p. 65 f.).

We noted a new and interesting association of *duration* with *becoming*, and, in this connection, life infused into the lumber-room of the *sankhārā* category (p. 80), but no reference to the term *vāsana* (with its hint at what we call "heredity") till the latter and later portion of the book (p. 83). In this connection we

also marked how, in spite of the doctrine of "the man-as-not-real" of *anatta*, the real man as *doer* was not evaded, as was the real man as *experiencer* (p. 74).

We noticed (p. 97), as not met with before, save once in Abhidhamma the notion of other worlds being considered as "above" the earth, and not, as in the Suttas, a being rather otherwise, than otherwhere.

We noticed also, that the word *yogâvacara*, not occurring, I believe, in the Pitakas,[1] had come to stay, and was at the end reinforced by the word *yogī*.

I come to such emergency of new ideas, or at least of new wordings of them as are to be associated with Māṇava's own contributions. I have found these mainly in connection with the three concepts:—Buddha, Arahan, Nirvana. I will try to put each succinctly. And when I say "new ideas", I am not perhaps using the word "new" in every case in the worthiest way. When we use it, we may mean what is an advance in the better; we may equally mean an advance in deterioration. It just means "not met with before". The words "progress", "advance", "development", "evolution" are all equally ambiguous. And again, that which in "the new" is to some the better, is to others "the worse". Herein we stumble upon poverty in the language we are using. When our way of thought on man and life was largely in static conceptions, we did not think of kinetic terms as expressing the norm, the rule, in both man and life. Could we, in English, just prefix our kinetic terms with the little Pali syllables *su-* (well, or good) and *du-* (ill or de-),

[1] The reference in the Rh.D. and St. Pali Dictionary I cannot trace. I think there has been a confusion with the Commentary where the word does occur.

I should not have needed to halt here. I will try to make this good by using " new " only for such words or ideas as seem to me " *su-* ", in that they evince fresh constructive effort in the particular world referred to, in man and life, as being " more ", and more manifold, than had till then been conceived. Other wordings and ideas, where I do not find this, I will call not " new ", but " first occurring ", or equivalents.

With regard to the Buddha-concept, we find in Māṇava's treatment both what is new, and also what was evidently a trend gaining force. We, who read our Piṭakas, know how severely devitalized, as man, they tend to make Gotama the Man. We see him with rare exceptions being stripped of all positive qualities that will have gone to make him the richly, diversely gifted human " son-of-man " that he must have been. It is no wonder he came to be portrayed usually as the immobile eternal sitter. Now in many of the Dilemmas the puzzle concerning the Founder is to find the very human man beneath the denaturalized super-man. So far, Māṇava's work is " new ", for he is seeking the man, and not the deva, not the little earth-god. And that man had been so lost sight of, that it was " new " work to reconstruct him for a later world. When, in the later Māṇava, we see the author swept along by the prevailing trend, calling the man *devâtideva*, and placing him above all comparison, Māṇava has nothing " new " to give us. He helps to bring in a term hardly met with before, but he is no more showing us the More in the man ; he is only doing what is old business in man's history :—seeing a personal god where had been a man. To such an " advance " I would place the prefix " *du-* ".

With respect to the Sakyan theory of the Arahan, Māṇava's " new " contribution was on the lines of the foregoing. I have shown him as uninterested in the man-worsening doctrine of *anatta*, as seeing, in the man a user of body and of mind, often worried by the one, but tamer, valuer, of the other. I have shown him as giving us, in the arahan, a man, not a complex of *dhammas*; as breaking down those barriers of " diploma-graduation " which run through the Piṭakas; and as opening up a suggestion of vitalized arahans, lay or monk, with the recluse as only a " side-line ", dwelling together in a model city. This was of the "new". This was to show, in his religious aristocracy, a very much More, and more manifold, than any Robinson Crusoe ideal of the saint could display. And I believe, that it may have been amid some loosening of rigid caste-in-saintship, that the broader finer ideal of Bodhisattvaship in Mahāyāna found birth. The probable fact that the Commentarial tradition was already written down in Sinhalese, when the Māṇava books reached the island, was probably the reason why Buddhaghosa, in dealing with the Commentaries in Ceylon, retarded such a breaking down of barriers about arahantship in Hīnayāna. As not a Buddhist, Māṇava was not similarly handicapped.

Lastly, with regard to Nirvana, it is once more the " new ", that Māṇava instilled into that severely negative concept. He sought, with an eloquence new in Indian literature, to justify the one positive ascription permitted, of *sukha*: happiness, in respect to Nirvana. He even lets drop, in passing, the yet worthier ascription of " being WELL " as what it meant.

He has, it is true, no idea of its being the crown of the Way in the Founder's message, yet for him too it is the reward and culmination of long, long effort, to be gained, not by the expiring reach of the exhausted, etiolated individual, entering upon " Emptiness ", but by the splendid stride of the Man entering into his divine heritage of realization as not only More but Most, as not only Many but All.

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